Designing input prices to motivate process innovation

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 27, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 390-402

  Chen, Yongmin ^a   Sappington, David E M ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA   (United States)

Author keywords

Innovation; Input prices; Regulation; Vertical integration

Indexed keywords

COSTS; OPTIMIZATION;

BERTRAND COMPETITIONS; COURNOT COMPETITIONS; DOWNSTREAM COMPETITIONS; INDUSTRY STRUCTURES; INPUT PRICES; OPTIMAL DESIGNS; PRICING RULES; PROCESS INNOVATIONS; REGULATION; VERTICAL INTEGRATION; VERTICAL SEPARATIONS;

COMPETITION;

EID: 63449134125     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2008.10.008     Document Type: Article

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