Weapons of mass destruction: The North Korean threat

Korean Journal of Defense Analysis

Volumn 16, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 79-108

  Bennett, Bruce ^a,b  

^a RAND's Intl Secty Def Plcy Ctr

^b CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 6344278119     PISSN: 10163271     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10163270409464066     Document Type: Review

References (70)

1. See http://www.whitehouse.go/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html.
2. See Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, January 2001, pp. 9-11, 34-42.
3. Of particular concern are China and Russia, each of which have made large investments in WMD. Ibid., pp. 13-17, 53-57. But the Defense Department has also been concerned about India, Pakistan, Syria, Libya, the Sudan, and transnational threats. Ibid., pp. 21-30, 42-50, 61-66. 4 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, especially Section V. Soon thereafter, the United States also published: The White House, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 2002.
4. Of particular concern are China and Russia, each of which have made large investments in WMD. Ibid., pp. 13-17, 53-57. But the Defense Department has also been concerned about India, Pakistan, Syria, Libya, the Sudan, and transnational threats. Ibid., pp. 21-30, 42-50, 61-66. 4 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, especially Section V. Soon thereafter, the United States also published: The White House, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 2002.
5. Of particular concern are China and Russia, each of which have made large investments in WMD. Ibid., pp. 13-17, 53-57. But the Defense Department has also been concerned about India, Pakistan, Syria, Libya, the Sudan, and transnational threats. Ibid., pp. 21-30, 42-50, 61-66. 4 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, especially Section V. Soon thereafter, the United States also published: The White House, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 2002.
6. Of particular concern are China and Russia, each of which have made large investments in WMD. Ibid., pp. 13-17, 53-57. But the Defense Department has also been concerned about India, Pakistan, Syria, Libya, the Sudan, and transnational threats. Ibid., pp. 21-30, 42-50, 61-66. 4 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, especially Section V. Soon thereafter, the United States also published: The White House, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 2002.
7. The 2000 Defense White Paper defined the first ROK defense objective as: "First, 'defending the nation from external military threats and invasion' means protecting it from any possible external military threat as well as those immediate threats from North Korea, which as the nation's main enemy could endanger our survival." The Ministry of National Defense, The Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper, 2000, p. 68. There was subsequently no White Paper in 2001 or 2002, in part because of contention on this issue. See Ryu Jin, "Conservatives Stick to NK as Main Enemy," Korea Times, July 15, 2004. The 2003 White Paper no longer refers to North Korea as the main enemy, nor does it speak of North Korea as posing an invasion threat. Rather, it speaks of North Korean threats as: ". . . our military will establish a firm defense posture against North Korea's infiltration, limited provocation, terrorist and non-military activities. . . ," The Ministry of National Defense, The Republic of Korea, Participatory Government Defense Policy, 2003, p. 37. Both White Papers are available at http://www.mnd.go.kr (in English, too).
8. The 2000 Defense White Paper defined the first ROK defense objective as: "First, 'defending the nation from external military threats and invasion' means protecting it from any possible external military threat as well as those immediate threats from North Korea, which as the nation's main enemy could endanger our survival." The Ministry of National Defense, The Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper, 2000, p. 68. There was subsequently no White Paper in 2001 or 2002, in part because of contention on this issue. See Ryu Jin, "Conservatives Stick to NK as Main Enemy," Korea Times, July 15, 2004. The 2003 White Paper no longer refers to North Korea as the main enemy, nor does it speak of North Korea as posing an invasion threat. Rather, it speaks of North Korean threats as: ". . . our military will establish a firm defense posture against North Korea's infiltration, limited provocation, terrorist and non-military activities. . . ," The Ministry of National Defense, The Republic of Korea, Participatory Government Defense Policy, 2003, p. 37. Both White Papers are available at http://www.mnd.go.kr (in English, too).
9. The 2000 Defense White Paper defined the first ROK defense objective as: "First, 'defending the nation from external military threats and invasion' means protecting it from any possible external military threat as well as those immediate threats from North Korea, which as the nation's main enemy could endanger our survival." The Ministry of National Defense, The Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper, 2000, p. 68. There was subsequently no White Paper in 2001 or 2002, in part because of contention on this issue. See Ryu Jin, "Conservatives Stick to NK as Main Enemy," Korea Times, July 15, 2004. The 2003 White Paper no longer refers to North Korea as the main enemy, nor does it speak of North Korea as posing an invasion threat. Rather, it speaks of North Korean threats as: ". . . our military will establish a firm defense posture against North Korea's infiltration, limited provocation, terrorist and non-military activities. . . ," The Ministry of National Defense, The Republic of Korea, Participatory Government Defense Policy, 2003, p. 37. Both White Papers are available at http://www.mnd.go.kr (in English, too).
10. Defense White Paper, 2000, p. 58. "In May 1996 ROK Foreign Minister Yu Chong-ha reported to the National Assembly that it was estimated that North Korea possessed approximately 5,000 ton of biological and chemical weapons. Given the extensive production facilities, this later estimate may constitute the low end of the actual stockpile." Federation of American Scientists web site, available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/cw/index.html.
11. Defense White Paper, 2000, p. 58. "In May 1996 ROK Foreign Minister Yu Chong-ha reported to the National Assembly that it was estimated that North Korea possessed approximately 5,000 ton of biological and chemical weapons. Given the extensive production facilities, this later estimate may constitute the low end of the actual stockpile." Federation of American Scientists web site, available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/cw/index.html.
12. Korea Research Institute for Strategy (KRIS), The Strategic Balance in Northeast Asia, 2003 (Seoul: Dongjin Publishing Co., December 2003), p. 363.
13. Defense Intelligence Agency, North Korea Handbook, PC-2600-6421-94, 1994, pp. 3-15 to 3-16.
14. Defense Intelligence Agency, North Korea: The Foundations for Military Strength-Update 1995, PC-1510-101-96, 1996, p. 12.
15. I b i d.
16. Defense White Paper, 2000, p. 86.
17. "Nuclear Nightmare - Understanding North Korea," Discovery Channel, Aug. 6, 2003.
18. Defense White Paper, 2000, p. 58.
19. I b i d.
20. Frederick R. Sidell, et. al., Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, 1997, pp. 461-62, available at http://www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/Home- Page/WhatsNew/MedAspects/Ch-21electrv699.pdf. This document cited the original source as: J. Fialka "CIA says North Korea appears active in biological, nuclear arms," Wall Street Journal, Feb. 25, 1993, p. A-10.
21. Frederick R. Sidell, et. al., Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, 1997, pp. 461-62, available at http://www.nbc-med.org/SiteContent/Home- Page/WhatsNew/MedAspects/Ch-21electrv699.pdf. This document cited the original source as: J. Fialka "CIA says North Korea appears active in biological, nuclear arms," Wall Street Journal, Feb. 25, 1993, p. A-10.
22. See the final paragraph of http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/44_ 1113.html.
23. Larry A. Niksch, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program, Congressional Research Service, IB91141, updated Aug. 27, 2003, p. 6, available at http://fpc. state.gov/documents/organization/24045.pdf.
24. "However, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency reportedly estimated in late 1993 that North Korea extracted enough fuel rods for about 12 kgs of plutonium - sufficient for one to two atomic bombs. . . . South Korean and Japanese intelligence estimates reportedly are higher: 16-24 kilograms (Japan) and 7-22 kilograms (South Korea). . . . Russian Defense Ministry analyses of late 1993 reportedly came to a similar estimate of about 20 kilograms of plutonium. . . ." Niksch, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program, p. 8.
25. "North Korean has one or possibly two weapons using plutonium it produced prior to 1992." CIA unclassified paper on North Korea dated Nov. 19, 2002, available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/cia111902.html. "Until January 1994, the Department of Energy (DOE) estimated that 8 kilograms would be needed to make a small nuclear weapon. . . . In January 1994, however, DOE reduced the estimate of the amount of plutonium needed to 4 kilograms . . ." "North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program," updated April 24, 2003, available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/index.html.
26. Sharon A. Squassoni, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: How Soon an Arsenal? Congressional Research Service, updated July 29, 2003, p. 5, available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/24042.pdf.
27. Glenn Kessler, "N. Korea Nuclear Estimate To Rise: U.S. Report to Say Country Has At Least 8 Bombs," Washington Post, April 28, 2004, p. 1.
28. Niksch, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program, p. 9.
29. Lee Wa Rang, "Why So Much Fuss Over North Korea's High Explosive Tests," available at http://www.kimsoft.com/1997/leew991.htm.
30. "Since 1997, the CIA said, Pakistan had been sharing sophisticated technology, warhead-design information, and weapons-testing data with the Pyongyang regime." Seymour M. Hersh, "The Cold Test: What the Administration Knew About Pakistan and the North Korean Nuclear Program," The New Yorker, Jan. 27, 3003. "A new classified intelligence report presented to the White House last week detailed for the first time the extent to which Pakistan's Khan Research Laboratories provided North Korea with all the equipment and technology it needed to produce uranium-based nuclear weapons. . . ," David E. Sanger, "U.S. Widens View of Pakistan Link to Korean Arms," New York Times, March 14, 2004.
31. "Since 1997, the CIA said, Pakistan had been sharing sophisticated technology, warhead-design information, and weapons-testing data with the Pyongyang regime." Seymour M. Hersh, "The Cold Test: What the Administration Knew About Pakistan and the North Korean Nuclear Program," The New Yorker, Jan. 27, 3003. "A new classified intelligence report presented to the White House last week detailed for the first time the extent to which Pakistan's Khan Research Laboratories provided North Korea with all the equipment and technology it needed to produce uranium-based nuclear weapons. . . ," David E. Sanger, "U.S. Widens View of Pakistan Link to Korean Arms," New York Times, March 14, 2004.
32. "The 25-kiloton design was the one used in China's fourth nuclear test, which was an atmospheric test using a ballistic missile launch. This configuration is said to be a fairly sophisticated design, with each warhead weighing considerably less than the unwieldy, first-generation U.S. and Soviet weapons which weighed several thousand kilograms." See "Pakistan Nuclear Weapons," available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/ index.html.
33. "Pakistan's Nuclear Forces, 2001," NRDC Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, available at http://www.thebulletin.org/ issues/nukenotes/ jf02nukenote.htm.
34. Note the use of the term device, as opposed to warhead. This first generation weapon was likely very large, like early U.S. atomic weapons - much too large for a missile warhead.
35. The 1990 KGB report that North Korea already had a nuclear device was dated Feb. 22, 1990. See Margaret Shapiro, "1990 KGB Document Concluded North Korea Had 'Nuclear Device'," Washington Post, June 25, 1994, p. 17. The 1989 removal of rods from the Yongbyon reactor is not associated with any date in the sources this author has seen, but is said to have lasted 70 days. See Niksch, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program, p. 8. Thereafter, the extracted fuel would have needed to cool for perhaps 5 months or so. Squassoni, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons, p. 2. Thereafter, at least a month would have been required to reprocess the plutonium, and 1 to 2 months to convert the material into metal and shape a weapon. Ibid., p. 5. These dates would likely have been extended for the first major reprocessing of plutonium at Yongbyon and the first assembly of a nuclear weapon, making completion before February 1990 unlikely even if the reactor shutdown occurred early in 1989.
36. The 1990 KGB report that North Korea already had a nuclear device was dated Feb. 22, 1990. See Margaret Shapiro, "1990 KGB Document Concluded North Korea Had 'Nuclear Device'," Washington Post, June 25, 1994, p. 17. The 1989 removal of rods from the Yongbyon reactor is not associated with any date in the sources this author has seen, but is said to have lasted 70 days. See Niksch, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program, p. 8. Thereafter, the extracted fuel would have needed to cool for perhaps 5 months or so. Squassoni, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons, p. 2. Thereafter, at least a month would have been required to reprocess the plutonium, and 1 to 2 months to convert the material into metal and shape a weapon. Ibid., p. 5. These dates would likely have been extended for the first major reprocessing of plutonium at Yongbyon and the first assembly of a nuclear weapon, making completion before February 1990 unlikely even if the reactor shutdown occurred early in 1989.
37. The 1990 KGB report that North Korea already had a nuclear device was dated Feb. 22, 1990. See Margaret Shapiro, "1990 KGB Document Concluded North Korea Had 'Nuclear Device'," Washington Post, June 25, 1994, p. 17. The 1989 removal of rods from the Yongbyon reactor is not associated with any date in the sources this author has seen, but is said to have lasted 70 days. See Niksch, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program, p. 8. Thereafter, the extracted fuel would have needed to cool for perhaps 5 months or so. Squassoni, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons, p. 2. Thereafter, at least a month would have been required to reprocess the plutonium, and 1 to 2 months to convert the material into metal and shape a weapon. Ibid., p. 5. These dates would likely have been extended for the first major reprocessing of plutonium at Yongbyon and the first assembly of a nuclear weapon, making completion before February 1990 unlikely even if the reactor shutdown occurred early in 1989.
38. The 1990 KGB report that North Korea already had a nuclear device was dated Feb. 22, 1990. See Margaret Shapiro, "1990 KGB Document Concluded North Korea Had 'Nuclear Device'," Washington Post, June 25, 1994, p. 17. The 1989 removal of rods from the Yongbyon reactor is not associated with any date in the sources this author has seen, but is said to have lasted 70 days. See Niksch, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program, p. 8. Thereafter, the extracted fuel would have needed to cool for perhaps 5 months or so. Squassoni, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons, p. 2. Thereafter, at least a month would have been required to reprocess the plutonium, and 1 to 2 months to convert the material into metal and shape a weapon. Ibid., p. 5. These dates would likely have been extended for the first major reprocessing of plutonium at Yongbyon and the first assembly of a nuclear weapon, making completion before February 1990 unlikely even if the reactor shutdown occurred early in 1989.
39. Hosuk Han, "The US-DPRK Relations at the Close of the 20th Century and the Prospect for United Korea at the Dawn of the 21st Century," available at http://www.kimsoft.com/2000/hanho.htm.
40. While many sources argue that HEU must be enriched to over 90% to become a weapon, at least two reports say that the U.S. atomic weapon dropped on Hiroshima consisted of 64 kgs of 80% enriched HEU. See "Nuclear Weapon Design," available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/design.htm/; Lee Wha Rang, "Does North Korea Have H-Bombs?" Oct. 25, 2002, available at http://www.kimsoft.com/2002/nk-nuke6.htm. Note that this amount of HEU would be sufficient for 3 or 4 weapons of the Chinese design cited above, potentially allowing North Korea to expand the numbers of any first generation HEU-based weapons it had by using the Chinese design.
41. While many sources argue that HEU must be enriched to over 90% to become a weapon, at least two reports say that the U.S. atomic weapon dropped on Hiroshima consisted of 64 kgs of 80% enriched HEU. See "Nuclear Weapon Design," available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/design.htm/; Lee Wha Rang, "Does North Korea Have H-Bombs?" Oct. 25, 2002, available at http://www.kimsoft.com/2002/nk-nuke6.htm. Note that this amount of HEU would be sufficient for 3 or 4 weapons of the Chinese design cited above, potentially allowing North Korea to expand the numbers of any first generation HEU-based weapons it had by using the Chinese design.
42. "Yongbyon High-Explosive Test Site," available at http://www.nti.org/db/ profiles/dprk/nuc/fac/weapon/NK_N_ybhets_GO.html. A North Korean sympathizer says that these tests began in 1980. See Ran, "The US-DPRK Relations."
43. "Yongbyon High-Explosive Test Site," "According to other reports in late 2002, the tests are said to be conducted deep inside two mine shafts to elude detection by satellites. . . . South Korean newspapers have reported that in late 1997, a North Korean soldier provided samples of topsoil from the area to a South Korean intelligence agent. The soil samples reportedly contained radioactive particles typical of residue from a full-scale high-explosive test using fissile material." "Kusong," available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/ world/dprk/kusong.htm.
44. There are several seismic estimates of the yield of the first Pakistani tests, which Pakistan claimed was 30 to 40 kilotons for just the largest of five warheads detonated simultaneously. The estimates range from 7-8 kilotons in "Pakistan Nuclear Weapons," available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/ guide/pakistan/ nuke/index.html, to estimates of 5-20 kilotons from different sources as discussed in "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program - 1998: The Year of Testing," available at http://nuketesting.enviroweb.org/hew/ Pakistan/PakTests.html. In the second test, the announced 12-18 kilotons appeared in the seismic data to be more likely 1-3 kilotons, see "Pakistan Nuclear Weapons," available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/ index.html. Other estimates of the second test were 2-11 kilotons from different sources as discussed in "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program-1998."
45. There are several seismic estimates of the yield of the first Pakistani tests, which Pakistan claimed was 30 to 40 kilotons for just the largest of five warheads detonated simultaneously. The estimates range from 7-8 kilotons in "Pakistan Nuclear Weapons," available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/ guide/pakistan/ nuke/index.html, to estimates of 5-20 kilotons from different sources as discussed in "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program - 1998: The Year of Testing," available at http://nuketesting.enviroweb.org/hew/ Pakistan/PakTests.html. In the second test, the announced 12-18 kilotons appeared in the seismic data to be more likely 1-3 kilotons, see "Pakistan Nuclear Weapons," available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/ index.html. Other estimates of the second test were 2-11 kilotons from different sources as discussed in "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program-1998."
46. There are several seismic estimates of the yield of the first Pakistani tests, which Pakistan claimed was 30 to 40 kilotons for just the largest of five warheads detonated simultaneously. The estimates range from 7-8 kilotons in "Pakistan Nuclear Weapons," available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/ guide/pakistan/ nuke/index.html, to estimates of 5-20 kilotons from different sources as discussed in "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program - 1998: The Year of Testing," available at http://nuketesting.enviroweb.org/hew/ Pakistan/PakTests.html. In the second test, the announced 12-18 kilotons appeared in the seismic data to be more likely 1-3 kilotons, see "Pakistan Nuclear Weapons," available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/ index.html. Other estimates of the second test were 2-11 kilotons from different sources as discussed in "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program-1998."
47. USA in Review, "1999 Report Predicted North Korean Crisis," available at http://www.usainreview.com/1_14_Korean_Report(2).htm.
48. Federation of American Scientists web site, available at http://www.fas.org/ nuke/guide/dprk/cw/index.html.
49. Statement of Admiral Thomas B. Fargo on the "U.S. Pacific Command Posture" before The House International Relations Committee Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, June 26, 2003.
50. Some in the ROK argue that North Korea would only use its nuclear weapons against Japan. But North Korean nuclear weapon use against Japan would almost certainly lead to a Japanese declaration of war supported by the United States, counter to the North Korean goal of getting the United States to disengage. North Korean nuclear threats and/or attacks against ROK targets could have operational utility supporting the invasion, cause more pressure directly on the United States to disengage from the ROK, avoid undesired horizontal escalation, and potentially support an escalation control concept.
51. "When negotiators were hammering out the 1994 accord. . . , Pyongyang also warned that it would turn the South Korean capital of Seoul into a 'sea of fire.'" See "North Korea Warns of 'Sea of Fire' as U.S. Envoy Arrives," Sydney Morning Herald, Jan. 13, 2003, available at http://www.smh.com.au/articles/ 2003/01/13/1041990188030.htm?oneclick=true.
52. It has recently been claimed that North Korea provided uranium prepared for enrichment to Libya; it may also have provided WMD or expertise to other countries or groups. See, for example, Stephen Fidler, "North Korea 'Closer Than Suspected to Nuclear Arms,'" London Financial Times, May 26, 2004.
53. Ken Alibek, Prepared Testimony Before the House Armed Services Committee Oversight Panel on Terrorism, May 23, 2000.
54. Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg, and William Broad, Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), pp. 18-25.
55. Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg, Plague Wars: A True Story of Biological Warfare (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), pp. 24-25.
56. See Jonathan B. Tucker and Raymond A Zilinskas, The 1971 Smallpox Epidemic in Aralsk, Kazakhstan, and the Soviet Biological Warfare Program, Center for Non-proliferation Studies, Occasional Paper No. 9, July 2002, pp. 3-11. Aircraft used for crop dusting and trucks supporting fumigation both can create a large-scale aerosol cloud and doing so relatively covertly.
57. LD50 "indicates the quantity of material that, if administered to a population of subjects, will cause 50% of the subjects to perish." See http://chemlabs.uoregon. edu/Safety/toxicity.html.
58. About 130,000 tons of CW was used in World War I by all sides. Between 1915 and 1917, the UK had 20,000 CW casualties. After mustard was introduced (with its higher toxicity), the UK suffered a further 160,000 CW casualties. See Victor A. Utgoff, The Challenge of Chemical Weapons: An American Perspective (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 6.
59. Ibid., p. 7.
60. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment, August 1993, pp. 53-54. Seoul would likely see higher casualties because of its higher population density, though building heights may mitigate chemical effects to some extent.
61. Mangold and Goldberg, Plague Wars, p. 33.
62. See also Edward J. Lord, "Exercises Involving an Act of Biological or Chemical Terrorism: What Are the Psychological Consequences?" Military Medicine, Vol. 166, Supplement 2, December 2001, pp. 34-35.
63. V. Ramalingaswami, "Psychosocial Effects of the 1994 Plague Outbreak in Surat, India," Military Medicine, Vol. 166, Supplement 2, December 2001, pp. 29-30.
64. Wendy Orent, "In War on Pathogens, Our Defenses Are Down," Los Angeles Times, May 23,2004, p. M3.
65. The North Korean Nodong would have a warhead with a lethal radius of about 1.5 kilometers but arrive within 2 kilometers of the target only about half of the time. "Nodong 1/2," Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, June 15, 2004.
66. Mangold and Goldberg, Plague Wars, pp. 341-348.
67. A guide to individual protection is: Lynn E. Davis, et. al., Individual Preparedness and Response to Chemical, Radiological, Nuclear, and Biological Terrorist Attacks (Santa Monica: RAND, MR-1731-SF, 2003), available at http://www.rand.org/ publications/MR/MR1731.
68. However the United States responds to North Korean WMD use will set a precedent for other countries who might be interested in using WMD; the United States could be forced to take drastic action against North Korea to strengthen international deterrence.
69. North Korea's media has claimed that, "The United States' stockpiling of biological and chemical weapons at U.S. Army bases in South Korea is a challenge. . . , Pyongyang KCNA, "'Verification' of USFK Bases 'Precondition' to 'Nuclear-Free' Korea," FBIS translation, June 17, 2004.
70. Donald Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Department of Defense, Sept. 30, 2001, p. vi.