Fixing the blame: Organizational culture and the Quebec bridge collapse

Technology and Culture

Volumn 45, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 487-518

  Kranakis, Eda ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 6344240536     PISSN: 0040165X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/tech.2004.0137     Document Type: Review

References (175)

1. "The Greatest Engineering Disaster," Engineering News 58 (5 September 1907): 256.
2. The most important recent retellings include John Tarkov, "A Disaster in the Making," American Heritage of Invention and Technology 1 (spring 1986): 10-17; Wilfred G. Lockett, "The Lesson of the Quebec Bridge," Scientia Canadensis 11 (1987): 63-89; Eugene Ferguson, Engineering and the Mind's Eye (Cambridge, Mass., 1992), 174-77; Henry Petroski, Engineers of Dreams: Great Bridge Builders and the Spanning of America (Cambridge, Mass., 1994), 66-121; Thomas R. Winpenny, Without Fitting, Filing, or Chipping: An Illustrated History of the Phoenix Bridge Company (Easton, Pa., 1996), 75-85; William D. Middleton, The Bridge at Québec (Bloomington, Ind., 2001); and Michel L'Hébreux, Le pont du Québec (Sillery, Québec, 2001). See also Carleton University's web-page on the disaster, http://www.civeng.carleton.ca/Exhibits/Quebec_Bridge/intro.html.
3. The most important recent retellings include John Tarkov, "A Disaster in the Making," American Heritage of Invention and Technology 1 (spring 1986): 10-17; Wilfred G. Lockett, "The Lesson of the Quebec Bridge," Scientia Canadensis 11 (1987): 63-89; Eugene Ferguson, Engineering and the Mind's Eye (Cambridge, Mass., 1992), 174-77; Henry Petroski, Engineers of Dreams: Great Bridge Builders and the Spanning of America (Cambridge, Mass., 1994), 66-121; Thomas R. Winpenny, Without Fitting, Filing, or Chipping: An Illustrated History of the Phoenix Bridge Company (Easton, Pa., 1996), 75-85; William D. Middleton, The Bridge at Québec (Bloomington, Ind., 2001); and Michel L'Hébreux, Le pont du Québec (Sillery, Québec, 2001). See also Carleton University's web-page on the disaster, http://www.civeng.carleton.ca/Exhibits/Quebec_Bridge/intro.html.
4. The most important recent retellings include John Tarkov, "A Disaster in the Making," American Heritage of Invention and Technology 1 (spring 1986): 10-17; Wilfred G. Lockett, "The Lesson of the Quebec Bridge," Scientia Canadensis 11 (1987): 63-89; Eugene Ferguson, Engineering and the Mind's Eye (Cambridge, Mass., 1992), 174-77; Henry Petroski, Engineers of Dreams: Great Bridge Builders and the Spanning of America (Cambridge, Mass., 1994), 66-121; Thomas R. Winpenny, Without Fitting, Filing, or Chipping: An Illustrated History of the Phoenix Bridge Company (Easton, Pa., 1996), 75-85; William D. Middleton, The Bridge at Québec (Bloomington, Ind., 2001); and Michel L'Hébreux, Le pont du Québec (Sillery, Québec, 2001). See also Carleton University's web-page on the disaster, http://www.civeng.carleton.ca/Exhibits/Quebec_Bridge/intro.html.
5. The most important recent retellings include John Tarkov, "A Disaster in the Making," American Heritage of Invention and Technology 1 (spring 1986): 10-17; Wilfred G. Lockett, "The Lesson of the Quebec Bridge," Scientia Canadensis 11 (1987): 63-89; Eugene Ferguson, Engineering and the Mind's Eye (Cambridge, Mass., 1992), 174-77; Henry Petroski, Engineers of Dreams: Great Bridge Builders and the Spanning of America (Cambridge, Mass., 1994), 66-121; Thomas R. Winpenny, Without Fitting, Filing, or Chipping: An Illustrated History of the Phoenix Bridge Company (Easton, Pa., 1996), 75-85; William D. Middleton, The Bridge at Québec (Bloomington, Ind., 2001); and Michel L'Hébreux, Le pont du Québec (Sillery, Québec, 2001). See also Carleton University's web-page on the disaster, http://www.civeng.carleton.ca/Exhibits/Quebec_Bridge/intro.html.
6. The most important recent retellings include John Tarkov, "A Disaster in the Making," American Heritage of Invention and Technology 1 (spring 1986): 10-17; Wilfred G. Lockett, "The Lesson of the Quebec Bridge," Scientia Canadensis 11 (1987): 63-89; Eugene Ferguson, Engineering and the Mind's Eye (Cambridge, Mass., 1992), 174-77; Henry Petroski, Engineers of Dreams: Great Bridge Builders and the Spanning of America (Cambridge, Mass., 1994), 66-121; Thomas R. Winpenny, Without Fitting, Filing, or Chipping: An Illustrated History of the Phoenix Bridge Company (Easton, Pa., 1996), 75-85; William D. Middleton, The Bridge at Québec (Bloomington, Ind., 2001); and Michel L'Hébreux, Le pont du Québec (Sillery, Québec, 2001). See also Carleton University's web-page on the disaster, http://www.civeng.carleton.ca/Exhibits/Quebec_Bridge/intro.html.
7. The most important recent retellings include John Tarkov, "A Disaster in the Making," American Heritage of Invention and Technology 1 (spring 1986): 10-17; Wilfred G. Lockett, "The Lesson of the Quebec Bridge," Scientia Canadensis 11 (1987): 63-89; Eugene Ferguson, Engineering and the Mind's Eye (Cambridge, Mass., 1992), 174-77; Henry Petroski, Engineers of Dreams: Great Bridge Builders and the Spanning of America (Cambridge, Mass., 1994), 66-121; Thomas R. Winpenny, Without Fitting, Filing, or Chipping: An Illustrated History of the Phoenix Bridge Company (Easton, Pa., 1996), 75-85; William D. Middleton, The Bridge at Québec (Bloomington, Ind., 2001); and Michel L'Hébreux, Le pont du Québec (Sillery, Québec, 2001). See also Carleton University's web-page on the disaster, http://www.civeng.carleton.ca/Exhibits/Quebec_Bridge/intro.html.
8. The most important recent retellings include John Tarkov, "A Disaster in the Making," American Heritage of Invention and Technology 1 (spring 1986): 10-17; Wilfred G. Lockett, "The Lesson of the Quebec Bridge," Scientia Canadensis 11 (1987): 63-89; Eugene Ferguson, Engineering and the Mind's Eye (Cambridge, Mass., 1992), 174-77; Henry Petroski, Engineers of Dreams: Great Bridge Builders and the Spanning of America (Cambridge, Mass., 1994), 66-121; Thomas R. Winpenny, Without Fitting, Filing, or Chipping: An Illustrated History of the Phoenix Bridge Company (Easton, Pa., 1996), 75-85; William D. Middleton, The Bridge at Québec (Bloomington, Ind., 2001); and Michel L'Hébreux, Le pont du Québec (Sillery, Québec, 2001). See also Carleton University's web-page on the disaster, http://www.civeng.carleton.ca/Exhibits/Quebec_Bridge/intro.html.
9. The most important recent retellings include John Tarkov, "A Disaster in the Making," American Heritage of Invention and Technology 1 (spring 1986): 10-17; Wilfred G. Lockett, "The Lesson of the Quebec Bridge," Scientia Canadensis 11 (1987): 63-89; Eugene Ferguson, Engineering and the Mind's Eye (Cambridge, Mass., 1992), 174-77; Henry Petroski, Engineers of Dreams: Great Bridge Builders and the Spanning of America (Cambridge, Mass., 1994), 66-121; Thomas R. Winpenny, Without Fitting, Filing, or Chipping: An Illustrated History of the Phoenix Bridge Company (Easton, Pa., 1996), 75-85; William D. Middleton, The Bridge at Québec (Bloomington, Ind., 2001); and Michel L'Hébreux, Le pont du Québec (Sillery, Québec, 2001). See also Carleton University's web-page on the disaster, http://www.civeng.carleton.ca/Exhibits/Quebec_Bridge/intro.html.
10. "Report on the Quebec Bridge Inquiry," 3 vols., Sessional Papers, 1908, No. 154 (hereafter cited as Quebec Bridge Inquiry), 1:9.
11. Appointed within forty-eight hours of the collapse, the Royal Commission was composed of three prominent Canadian engineers: Chairman Henry Holgate, partner in a Montreal consulting engineering firm; John Galbraith, dean of the Faculty of Applied Science and Engineering at the University of Toronto; and John G. Kerry, a civil engineer of wide practice who also taught at McGill University in Montreal. Galbraith's papers are preserved at the University of Toronto Archives, but do not add significantly to our understanding of the Quebec Bridge disaster beyond what is available in the Royal Commission's published report.
12. The organizational dimensions of the Quebec Bridge project have not been adequately analyzed, although some threads of the story have been explored. Petroski, 112-18, examines the problematic terms of Theodore Cooper's appointment as consulting engineer. Lockett, Tarkov, and Winpenny all cast doubt on the Royal Commission's finding that the disaster could not "be attributed ... to a desire to economize," although without fully explaining how economic issues affected technical and organizational decisions. Sarah Pfatteicher has analyzed the collapse in relation to engineers' concerns with licensing and codes of ethics; "Death by Design: Ethics, Responsibility, and Failure in the American Civil Engineering Community, 1852-1986" (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1996), 141-85. The two most recent accounts, by Middleton and L'Hébreux, add to our understanding of the general history of the project, the rebuilding of a new bridge, and the disaster's impact on the victims' families and communities, but neither analyzes its organizational culture or the role of organizational factors in the exercise of engineering judgment.
13. The immediate cause of the bridge's collapse was defective design of the built-up compression chords. The chords could not achieve their intended strength because the latticing was too weak and the allowed rivet stress for chords and latticing was too high. The incorrect weight estimate, a further deficiency, was deemed by the Royal Commission to have been an error "of sufficient magnitude to have required the condemnation of the bridge, even if the details of the lower chords had been of sufficient strength." The unit stress limits, "higher than any established by past practice," were a contributing factor that interacted with the other two factors. Thus, the weight underestimate together with the high unit stresses permitted would have doomed the bridge even if the chords had not been defective. Quebec Bridge Inquiry, 1:9.
14. The literature on engineering disasters is large and growing. Among the sources I found useful are Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies, 2nd ed. (Princeton, N.J., 1999); Henry Petroski, To Engineer Is Human: The Role of Failure in Successful Design (New York, 1992); Diane Vaughan, The "Challenger" Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture and Deviance at NASA (Chicago, 1996), and "The Dark Side of Organizations: Mistake, Misconduct, and Disaster," Annual Review of Sociology 25 (1999): 271-305; Malcolm McConnell, "Challenger": A Major Malfunction (Garden City, N.Y., 1987); Richard S. Lewis, "Challenger" : The Final Voyage (New York, 1988); Joseph J. Trento, Prescription for Disaster (New York, 1987); William H. Starbuck and Frances J. Milliken, "Challenger: Fine-Tuning the Odds until Something Breaks," Journal of Management Studies 25 (1988): 319-40; Russell P. Boisjoly, Ellen Foster Curtis, and Eugene Mellican, "Roger Boisjoly and the Challenger Disaster: The Ethical Dimensions," Journal of Business Ethics 8 (1989): 217-30; Lee Clarke and James E Short Jr., "Social Organization and Risk: Some Current Controversies," Annual Review of Sociology 19 (1993): 375-99; Barry A. Turner, "The Organizational and Interorganizational Development of Disasters," Administrative Science Quarterly 21 (1976): 378-97; Elizabeth A. Banset and Gerald M. Parsons, "Communications Failure in the Hyatt-Regency Disaster," Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering 115 (1989): 273-88; Charles H. Thornton, Robert A. Rubin, and Lisa A. Banick, "The Hyatt Decision-Two Opinions: The Attorney/Engineers Speak," Civil Engineering/ASCE 56 (1986): 69-72; Gregory P. Luth, "Chronology and Context of the Hyatt Regency Collapse," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 14 (2000): 51-66; David J. Hatem, "Impact of Professional Practice Standards on Liability of Engineers," Journal of Management in Engineering 5 (July 1989): 249-56; Deborah G. Johnson, Ethical Issues in Engineering (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1991); Robert A. Rubin, "The Hyatt Regency Decision: One View," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 1 (1987): 161-67; W. M. Kim Roddis, "Structural Failures and Engineering Ethics," Journal of Structural Engineering 119 (1993): 1539-55; D. A. Gasparini, "Collapse of the Ashtabula Bridge on December 29, 1876," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 7 (1993): 109-25.
15. The literature on engineering disasters is large and growing. Among the sources I found useful are Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies, 2nd ed. (Princeton, N.J., 1999); Henry Petroski, To Engineer Is Human: The Role of Failure in Successful Design (New York, 1992); Diane Vaughan, The "Challenger" Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture and Deviance at NASA (Chicago, 1996), and "The Dark Side of Organizations: Mistake, Misconduct, and Disaster," Annual Review of Sociology 25 (1999): 271-305; Malcolm McConnell, "Challenger": A Major Malfunction (Garden City, N.Y., 1987); Richard S. Lewis, "Challenger" : The Final Voyage (New York, 1988); Joseph J. Trento, Prescription for Disaster (New York, 1987); William H. Starbuck and Frances J. Milliken, "Challenger: Fine-Tuning the Odds until Something Breaks," Journal of Management Studies 25 (1988): 319-40; Russell P. Boisjoly, Ellen Foster Curtis, and Eugene Mellican, "Roger Boisjoly and the Challenger Disaster: The Ethical Dimensions," Journal of Business Ethics 8 (1989): 217-30; Lee Clarke and James E Short Jr., "Social Organization and Risk: Some Current Controversies," Annual Review of Sociology 19 (1993): 375-99; Barry A. Turner, "The Organizational and Interorganizational Development of Disasters," Administrative Science Quarterly 21 (1976): 378-97; Elizabeth A. Banset and Gerald M. Parsons, "Communications Failure in the Hyatt-Regency Disaster," Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering 115 (1989): 273-88; Charles H. Thornton, Robert A. Rubin, and Lisa A. Banick, "The Hyatt Decision-Two Opinions: The Attorney/Engineers Speak," Civil Engineering/ASCE 56 (1986): 69-72; Gregory P. Luth, "Chronology and Context of the Hyatt Regency Collapse," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 14 (2000): 51-66; David J. Hatem, "Impact of Professional Practice Standards on Liability of Engineers," Journal of Management in Engineering 5 (July 1989): 249-56; Deborah G. Johnson, Ethical Issues in Engineering (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1991); Robert A. Rubin, "The Hyatt Regency Decision: One View," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 1 (1987): 161-67; W. M. Kim Roddis, "Structural Failures and Engineering Ethics," Journal of Structural Engineering 119 (1993): 1539-55; D. A. Gasparini, "Collapse of the Ashtabula Bridge on December 29, 1876," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 7 (1993): 109-25.
16. The literature on engineering disasters is large and growing. Among the sources I found useful are Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies, 2nd ed. (Princeton, N.J., 1999); Henry Petroski, To Engineer Is Human: The Role of Failure in Successful Design (New York, 1992); Diane Vaughan, The "Challenger" Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture and Deviance at NASA (Chicago, 1996), and "The Dark Side of Organizations: Mistake, Misconduct, and Disaster," Annual Review of Sociology 25 (1999): 271-305; Malcolm McConnell, "Challenger": A Major Malfunction (Garden City, N.Y., 1987); Richard S. Lewis, "Challenger" : The Final Voyage (New York, 1988); Joseph J. Trento, Prescription for Disaster (New York, 1987); William H. Starbuck and Frances J. Milliken, "Challenger: Fine-Tuning the Odds until Something Breaks," Journal of Management Studies 25 (1988): 319-40; Russell P. Boisjoly, Ellen Foster Curtis, and Eugene Mellican, "Roger Boisjoly and the Challenger Disaster: The Ethical Dimensions," Journal of Business Ethics 8 (1989): 217-30; Lee Clarke and James E Short Jr., "Social Organization and Risk: Some Current Controversies," Annual Review of Sociology 19 (1993): 375-99; Barry A. Turner, "The Organizational and Interorganizational Development of Disasters," Administrative Science Quarterly 21 (1976): 378-97; Elizabeth A. Banset and Gerald M. Parsons, "Communications Failure in the Hyatt-Regency Disaster," Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering 115 (1989): 273-88; Charles H. Thornton, Robert A. Rubin, and Lisa A. Banick, "The Hyatt Decision-Two Opinions: The Attorney/Engineers Speak," Civil Engineering/ASCE 56 (1986): 69-72; Gregory P. Luth, "Chronology and Context of the Hyatt Regency Collapse," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 14 (2000): 51-66; David J. Hatem, "Impact of Professional Practice Standards on Liability of Engineers," Journal of Management in Engineering 5 (July 1989): 249-56; Deborah G. Johnson, Ethical Issues in Engineering (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1991); Robert A. Rubin, "The Hyatt Regency Decision: One View," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 1 (1987): 161-67; W. M. Kim Roddis, "Structural Failures and Engineering Ethics," Journal of Structural Engineering 119 (1993): 1539-55; D. A. Gasparini, "Collapse of the Ashtabula Bridge on December 29, 1876," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 7 (1993): 109-25.
17. The literature on engineering disasters is large and growing. Among the sources I found useful are Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies, 2nd ed. (Princeton, N.J., 1999); Henry Petroski, To Engineer Is Human: The Role of Failure in Successful Design (New York, 1992); Diane Vaughan, The "Challenger" Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture and Deviance at NASA (Chicago, 1996), and "The Dark Side of Organizations: Mistake, Misconduct, and Disaster," Annual Review of Sociology 25 (1999): 271-305; Malcolm McConnell, "Challenger": A Major Malfunction (Garden City, N.Y., 1987); Richard S. Lewis, "Challenger" : The Final Voyage (New York, 1988); Joseph J. Trento, Prescription for Disaster (New York, 1987); William H. Starbuck and Frances J. Milliken, "Challenger: Fine-Tuning the Odds until Something Breaks," Journal of Management Studies 25 (1988): 319-40; Russell P. Boisjoly, Ellen Foster Curtis, and Eugene Mellican, "Roger Boisjoly and the Challenger Disaster: The Ethical Dimensions," Journal of Business Ethics 8 (1989): 217-30; Lee Clarke and James E Short Jr., "Social Organization and Risk: Some Current Controversies," Annual Review of Sociology 19 (1993): 375-99; Barry A. Turner, "The Organizational and Interorganizational Development of Disasters," Administrative Science Quarterly 21 (1976): 378-97; Elizabeth A. Banset and Gerald M. Parsons, "Communications Failure in the Hyatt-Regency Disaster," Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering 115 (1989): 273-88; Charles H. Thornton, Robert A. Rubin, and Lisa A. Banick, "The Hyatt Decision-Two Opinions: The Attorney/Engineers Speak," Civil Engineering/ASCE 56 (1986): 69-72; Gregory P. Luth, "Chronology and Context of the Hyatt Regency Collapse," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 14 (2000): 51-66; David J. Hatem, "Impact of Professional Practice Standards on Liability of Engineers," Journal of Management in Engineering 5 (July 1989): 249-56; Deborah G. Johnson, Ethical Issues in Engineering (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1991); Robert A. Rubin, "The Hyatt Regency Decision: One View," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 1 (1987): 161-67; W. M. Kim Roddis, "Structural Failures and Engineering Ethics," Journal of Structural Engineering 119 (1993): 1539-55; D. A. Gasparini, "Collapse of the Ashtabula Bridge on December 29, 1876," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 7 (1993): 109-25.
18. The literature on engineering disasters is large and growing. Among the sources I found useful are Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies, 2nd ed. (Princeton, N.J., 1999); Henry Petroski, To Engineer Is Human: The Role of Failure in Successful Design (New York, 1992); Diane Vaughan, The "Challenger" Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture and Deviance at NASA (Chicago, 1996), and "The Dark Side of Organizations: Mistake, Misconduct, and Disaster," Annual Review of Sociology 25 (1999): 271-305; Malcolm McConnell, "Challenger": A Major Malfunction (Garden City, N.Y., 1987); Richard S. Lewis, "Challenger" : The Final Voyage (New York, 1988); Joseph J. Trento, Prescription for Disaster (New York, 1987); William H. Starbuck and Frances J. Milliken, "Challenger: Fine-Tuning the Odds until Something Breaks," Journal of Management Studies 25 (1988): 319-40; Russell P. Boisjoly, Ellen Foster Curtis, and Eugene Mellican, "Roger Boisjoly and the Challenger Disaster: The Ethical Dimensions," Journal of Business Ethics 8 (1989): 217-30; Lee Clarke and James E Short Jr., "Social Organization and Risk: Some Current Controversies," Annual Review of Sociology 19 (1993): 375-99; Barry A. Turner, "The Organizational and Interorganizational Development of Disasters," Administrative Science Quarterly 21 (1976): 378-97; Elizabeth A. Banset and Gerald M. Parsons, "Communications Failure in the Hyatt-Regency Disaster," Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering 115 (1989): 273-88; Charles H. Thornton, Robert A. Rubin, and Lisa A. Banick, "The Hyatt Decision-Two Opinions: The Attorney/Engineers Speak," Civil Engineering/ASCE 56 (1986): 69-72; Gregory P. Luth, "Chronology and Context of the Hyatt Regency Collapse," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 14 (2000): 51-66; David J. Hatem, "Impact of Professional Practice Standards on Liability of Engineers," Journal of Management in Engineering 5 (July 1989): 249-56; Deborah G. Johnson, Ethical Issues in Engineering (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1991); Robert A. Rubin, "The Hyatt Regency Decision: One View," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 1 (1987): 161-67; W. M. Kim Roddis, "Structural Failures and Engineering Ethics," Journal of Structural Engineering 119 (1993): 1539-55; D. A. Gasparini, "Collapse of the Ashtabula Bridge on December 29, 1876," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 7 (1993): 109-25.
19. The literature on engineering disasters is large and growing. Among the sources I found useful are Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies, 2nd ed. (Princeton, N.J., 1999); Henry Petroski, To Engineer Is Human: The Role of Failure in Successful Design (New York, 1992); Diane Vaughan, The "Challenger" Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture and Deviance at NASA (Chicago, 1996), and "The Dark Side of Organizations: Mistake, Misconduct, and Disaster," Annual Review of Sociology 25 (1999): 271-305; Malcolm McConnell, "Challenger": A Major Malfunction (Garden City, N.Y., 1987); Richard S. Lewis, "Challenger" : The Final Voyage (New York, 1988); Joseph J. Trento, Prescription for Disaster (New York, 1987); William H. Starbuck and Frances J. Milliken, "Challenger: Fine-Tuning the Odds until Something Breaks," Journal of Management Studies 25 (1988): 319-40; Russell P. Boisjoly, Ellen Foster Curtis, and Eugene Mellican, "Roger Boisjoly and the Challenger Disaster: The Ethical Dimensions," Journal of Business Ethics 8 (1989): 217-30; Lee Clarke and James E Short Jr., "Social Organization and Risk: Some Current Controversies," Annual Review of Sociology 19 (1993): 375-99; Barry A. Turner, "The Organizational and Interorganizational Development of Disasters," Administrative Science Quarterly 21 (1976): 378-97; Elizabeth A. Banset and Gerald M. Parsons, "Communications Failure in the Hyatt-Regency Disaster," Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering 115 (1989): 273-88; Charles H. Thornton, Robert A. Rubin, and Lisa A. Banick, "The Hyatt Decision-Two Opinions: The Attorney/Engineers Speak," Civil Engineering/ASCE 56 (1986): 69-72; Gregory P. Luth, "Chronology and Context of the Hyatt Regency Collapse," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 14 (2000): 51-66; David J. Hatem, "Impact of Professional Practice Standards on Liability of Engineers," Journal of Management in Engineering 5 (July 1989): 249-56; Deborah G. Johnson, Ethical Issues in Engineering (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1991); Robert A. Rubin, "The Hyatt Regency Decision: One View," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 1 (1987): 161-67; W. M. Kim Roddis, "Structural Failures and Engineering Ethics," Journal of Structural Engineering 119 (1993): 1539-55; D. A. Gasparini, "Collapse of the Ashtabula Bridge on December 29, 1876," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 7 (1993): 109-25.
20. The literature on engineering disasters is large and growing. Among the sources I found useful are Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies, 2nd ed. (Princeton, N.J., 1999); Henry Petroski, To Engineer Is Human: The Role of Failure in Successful Design (New York, 1992); Diane Vaughan, The "Challenger" Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture and Deviance at NASA (Chicago, 1996), and "The Dark Side of Organizations: Mistake, Misconduct, and Disaster," Annual Review of Sociology 25 (1999): 271-305; Malcolm McConnell, "Challenger": A Major Malfunction (Garden City, N.Y., 1987); Richard S. Lewis, "Challenger" : The Final Voyage (New York, 1988); Joseph J. Trento, Prescription for Disaster (New York, 1987); William H. Starbuck and Frances J. Milliken, "Challenger: Fine-Tuning the Odds until Something Breaks," Journal of Management Studies 25 (1988): 319-40; Russell P. Boisjoly, Ellen Foster Curtis, and Eugene Mellican, "Roger Boisjoly and the Challenger Disaster: The Ethical Dimensions," Journal of Business Ethics 8 (1989): 217-30; Lee Clarke and James E Short Jr., "Social Organization and Risk: Some Current Controversies," Annual Review of Sociology 19 (1993): 375-99; Barry A. Turner, "The Organizational and Interorganizational Development of Disasters," Administrative Science Quarterly 21 (1976): 378-97; Elizabeth A. Banset and Gerald M. Parsons, "Communications Failure in the Hyatt-Regency Disaster," Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering 115 (1989): 273-88; Charles H. Thornton, Robert A. Rubin, and Lisa A. Banick, "The Hyatt Decision-Two Opinions: The Attorney/Engineers Speak," Civil Engineering/ASCE 56 (1986): 69-72; Gregory P. Luth, "Chronology and Context of the Hyatt Regency Collapse," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 14 (2000): 51-66; David J. Hatem, "Impact of Professional Practice Standards on Liability of Engineers," Journal of Management in Engineering 5 (July 1989): 249-56; Deborah G. Johnson, Ethical Issues in Engineering (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1991); Robert A. Rubin, "The Hyatt Regency Decision: One View," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 1 (1987): 161-67; W. M. Kim Roddis, "Structural Failures and Engineering Ethics," Journal of Structural Engineering 119 (1993): 1539-55; D. A. Gasparini, "Collapse of the Ashtabula Bridge on December 29, 1876," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 7 (1993): 109-25.
21. The literature on engineering disasters is large and growing. Among the sources I found useful are Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies, 2nd ed. (Princeton, N.J., 1999); Henry Petroski, To Engineer Is Human: The Role of Failure in Successful Design (New York, 1992); Diane Vaughan, The "Challenger" Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture and Deviance at NASA (Chicago, 1996), and "The Dark Side of Organizations: Mistake, Misconduct, and Disaster," Annual Review of Sociology 25 (1999): 271-305; Malcolm McConnell, "Challenger": A Major Malfunction (Garden City, N.Y., 1987); Richard S. Lewis, "Challenger" : The Final Voyage (New York, 1988); Joseph J. Trento, Prescription for Disaster (New York, 1987); William H. Starbuck and Frances J. Milliken, "Challenger: Fine-Tuning the Odds until Something Breaks," Journal of Management Studies 25 (1988): 319-40; Russell P. Boisjoly, Ellen Foster Curtis, and Eugene Mellican, "Roger Boisjoly and the Challenger Disaster: The Ethical Dimensions," Journal of Business Ethics 8 (1989): 217-30; Lee Clarke and James E Short Jr., "Social Organization and Risk: Some Current Controversies," Annual Review of Sociology 19 (1993): 375-99; Barry A. Turner, "The Organizational and Interorganizational Development of Disasters," Administrative Science Quarterly 21 (1976): 378-97; Elizabeth A. Banset and Gerald M. Parsons, "Communications Failure in the Hyatt-Regency Disaster," Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering 115 (1989): 273-88; Charles H. Thornton, Robert A. Rubin, and Lisa A. Banick, "The Hyatt Decision-Two Opinions: The Attorney/Engineers Speak," Civil Engineering/ASCE 56 (1986): 69-72; Gregory P. Luth, "Chronology and Context of the Hyatt Regency Collapse," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 14 (2000): 51-66; David J. Hatem, "Impact of Professional Practice Standards on Liability of Engineers," Journal of Management in Engineering 5 (July 1989): 249-56; Deborah G. Johnson, Ethical Issues in Engineering (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1991); Robert A. Rubin, "The Hyatt Regency Decision: One View," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 1 (1987): 161-67; W. M. Kim Roddis, "Structural Failures and Engineering Ethics," Journal of Structural Engineering 119 (1993): 1539-55; D. A. Gasparini, "Collapse of the Ashtabula Bridge on December 29, 1876," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 7 (1993): 109-25.
22. The literature on engineering disasters is large and growing. Among the sources I found useful are Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies, 2nd ed. (Princeton, N.J., 1999); Henry Petroski, To Engineer Is Human: The Role of Failure in Successful Design (New York, 1992); Diane Vaughan, The "Challenger" Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture and Deviance at NASA (Chicago, 1996), and "The Dark Side of Organizations: Mistake, Misconduct, and Disaster," Annual Review of Sociology 25 (1999): 271-305; Malcolm McConnell, "Challenger": A Major Malfunction (Garden City, N.Y., 1987); Richard S. Lewis, "Challenger" : The Final Voyage (New York, 1988); Joseph J. Trento, Prescription for Disaster (New York, 1987); William H. Starbuck and Frances J. Milliken, "Challenger: Fine-Tuning the Odds until Something Breaks," Journal of Management Studies 25 (1988): 319-40; Russell P. Boisjoly, Ellen Foster Curtis, and Eugene Mellican, "Roger Boisjoly and the Challenger Disaster: The Ethical Dimensions," Journal of Business Ethics 8 (1989): 217-30; Lee Clarke and James E Short Jr., "Social Organization and Risk: Some Current Controversies," Annual Review of Sociology 19 (1993): 375-99; Barry A. Turner, "The Organizational and Interorganizational Development of Disasters," Administrative Science Quarterly 21 (1976): 378-97; Elizabeth A. Banset and Gerald M. Parsons, "Communications Failure in the Hyatt-Regency Disaster," Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering 115 (1989): 273-88; Charles H. Thornton, Robert A. Rubin, and Lisa A. Banick, "The Hyatt Decision-Two Opinions: The Attorney/Engineers Speak," Civil Engineering/ASCE 56 (1986): 69-72; Gregory P. Luth, "Chronology and Context of the Hyatt Regency Collapse," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 14 (2000): 51-66; David J. Hatem, "Impact of Professional Practice Standards on Liability of Engineers," Journal of Management in Engineering 5 (July 1989): 249-56; Deborah G. Johnson, Ethical Issues in Engineering (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1991); Robert A. Rubin, "The Hyatt Regency Decision: One View," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 1 (1987): 161-67; W. M. Kim Roddis, "Structural Failures and Engineering Ethics," Journal of Structural Engineering 119 (1993): 1539-55; D. A. Gasparini, "Collapse of the Ashtabula Bridge on December 29, 1876," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 7 (1993): 109-25.
23. The literature on engineering disasters is large and growing. Among the sources I found useful are Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies, 2nd ed. (Princeton, N.J., 1999); Henry Petroski, To Engineer Is Human: The Role of Failure in Successful Design (New York, 1992); Diane Vaughan, The "Challenger" Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture and Deviance at NASA (Chicago, 1996), and "The Dark Side of Organizations: Mistake, Misconduct, and Disaster," Annual Review of Sociology 25 (1999): 271-305; Malcolm McConnell, "Challenger": A Major Malfunction (Garden City, N.Y., 1987); Richard S. Lewis, "Challenger" : The Final Voyage (New York, 1988); Joseph J. Trento, Prescription for Disaster (New York, 1987); William H. Starbuck and Frances J. Milliken, "Challenger: Fine-Tuning the Odds until Something Breaks," Journal of Management Studies 25 (1988): 319-40; Russell P. Boisjoly, Ellen Foster Curtis, and Eugene Mellican, "Roger Boisjoly and the Challenger Disaster: The Ethical Dimensions," Journal of Business Ethics 8 (1989): 217-30; Lee Clarke and James E Short Jr., "Social Organization and Risk: Some Current Controversies," Annual Review of Sociology 19 (1993): 375-99; Barry A. Turner, "The Organizational and Interorganizational Development of Disasters," Administrative Science Quarterly 21 (1976): 378-97; Elizabeth A. Banset and Gerald M. Parsons, "Communications Failure in the Hyatt-Regency Disaster," Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering 115 (1989): 273-88; Charles H. Thornton, Robert A. Rubin, and Lisa A. Banick, "The Hyatt Decision-Two Opinions: The Attorney/Engineers Speak," Civil Engineering/ASCE 56 (1986): 69-72; Gregory P. Luth, "Chronology and Context of the Hyatt Regency Collapse," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 14 (2000): 51-66; David J. Hatem, "Impact of Professional Practice Standards on Liability of Engineers," Journal of Management in Engineering 5 (July 1989): 249-56; Deborah G. Johnson, Ethical Issues in Engineering (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1991); Robert A. Rubin, "The Hyatt Regency Decision: One View," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 1 (1987): 161-67; W. M. Kim Roddis, "Structural Failures and Engineering Ethics," Journal of Structural Engineering 119 (1993): 1539-55; D. A. Gasparini, "Collapse of the Ashtabula Bridge on December 29, 1876," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 7 (1993): 109-25.
24. The literature on engineering disasters is large and growing. Among the sources I found useful are Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies, 2nd ed. (Princeton, N.J., 1999); Henry Petroski, To Engineer Is Human: The Role of Failure in Successful Design (New York, 1992); Diane Vaughan, The "Challenger" Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture and Deviance at NASA (Chicago, 1996), and "The Dark Side of Organizations: Mistake, Misconduct, and Disaster," Annual Review of Sociology 25 (1999): 271-305; Malcolm McConnell, "Challenger": A Major Malfunction (Garden City, N.Y., 1987); Richard S. Lewis, "Challenger" : The Final Voyage (New York, 1988); Joseph J. Trento, Prescription for Disaster (New York, 1987); William H. Starbuck and Frances J. Milliken, "Challenger: Fine-Tuning the Odds until Something Breaks," Journal of Management Studies 25 (1988): 319-40; Russell P. Boisjoly, Ellen Foster Curtis, and Eugene Mellican, "Roger Boisjoly and the Challenger Disaster: The Ethical Dimensions," Journal of Business Ethics 8 (1989): 217-30; Lee Clarke and James E Short Jr., "Social Organization and Risk: Some Current Controversies," Annual Review of Sociology 19 (1993): 375-99; Barry A. Turner, "The Organizational and Interorganizational Development of Disasters," Administrative Science Quarterly 21 (1976): 378-97; Elizabeth A. Banset and Gerald M. Parsons, "Communications Failure in the Hyatt-Regency Disaster," Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering 115 (1989): 273-88; Charles H. Thornton, Robert A. Rubin, and Lisa A. Banick, "The Hyatt Decision-Two Opinions: The Attorney/Engineers Speak," Civil Engineering/ASCE 56 (1986): 69-72; Gregory P. Luth, "Chronology and Context of the Hyatt Regency Collapse," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 14 (2000): 51-66; David J. Hatem, "Impact of Professional Practice Standards on Liability of Engineers," Journal of Management in Engineering 5 (July 1989): 249-56; Deborah G. Johnson, Ethical Issues in Engineering (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1991); Robert A. Rubin, "The Hyatt Regency Decision: One View," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 1 (1987): 161-67; W. M. Kim Roddis, "Structural Failures and Engineering Ethics," Journal of Structural Engineering 119 (1993): 1539-55; D. A. Gasparini, "Collapse of the Ashtabula Bridge on December 29, 1876," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 7 (1993): 109-25.
25. The literature on engineering disasters is large and growing. Among the sources I found useful are Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies, 2nd ed. (Princeton, N.J., 1999); Henry Petroski, To Engineer Is Human: The Role of Failure in Successful Design (New York, 1992); Diane Vaughan, The "Challenger" Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture and Deviance at NASA (Chicago, 1996), and "The Dark Side of Organizations: Mistake, Misconduct, and Disaster," Annual Review of Sociology 25 (1999): 271-305; Malcolm McConnell, "Challenger": A Major Malfunction (Garden City, N.Y., 1987); Richard S. Lewis, "Challenger" : The Final Voyage (New York, 1988); Joseph J. Trento, Prescription for Disaster (New York, 1987); William H. Starbuck and Frances J. Milliken, "Challenger: Fine-Tuning the Odds until Something Breaks," Journal of Management Studies 25 (1988): 319-40; Russell P. Boisjoly, Ellen Foster Curtis, and Eugene Mellican, "Roger Boisjoly and the Challenger Disaster: The Ethical Dimensions," Journal of Business Ethics 8 (1989): 217-30; Lee Clarke and James E Short Jr., "Social Organization and Risk: Some Current Controversies," Annual Review of Sociology 19 (1993): 375-99; Barry A. Turner, "The Organizational and Interorganizational Development of Disasters," Administrative Science Quarterly 21 (1976): 378-97; Elizabeth A. Banset and Gerald M. Parsons, "Communications Failure in the Hyatt-Regency Disaster," Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering 115 (1989): 273-88; Charles H. Thornton, Robert A. Rubin, and Lisa A. Banick, "The Hyatt Decision-Two Opinions: The Attorney/Engineers Speak," Civil Engineering/ASCE 56 (1986): 69-72; Gregory P. Luth, "Chronology and Context of the Hyatt Regency Collapse," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 14 (2000): 51-66; David J. Hatem, "Impact of Professional Practice Standards on Liability of Engineers," Journal of Management in Engineering 5 (July 1989): 249-56; Deborah G. Johnson, Ethical Issues in Engineering (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1991); Robert A. Rubin, "The Hyatt Regency Decision: One View," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 1 (1987): 161-67; W. M. Kim Roddis, "Structural Failures and Engineering Ethics," Journal of Structural Engineering 119 (1993): 1539-55; D. A. Gasparini, "Collapse of the Ashtabula Bridge on December 29, 1876," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 7 (1993): 109-25.
26. The literature on engineering disasters is large and growing. Among the sources I found useful are Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies, 2nd ed. (Princeton, N.J., 1999); Henry Petroski, To Engineer Is Human: The Role of Failure in Successful Design (New York, 1992); Diane Vaughan, The "Challenger" Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture and Deviance at NASA (Chicago, 1996), and "The Dark Side of Organizations: Mistake, Misconduct, and Disaster," Annual Review of Sociology 25 (1999): 271-305; Malcolm McConnell, "Challenger": A Major Malfunction (Garden City, N.Y., 1987); Richard S. Lewis, "Challenger" : The Final Voyage (New York, 1988); Joseph J. Trento, Prescription for Disaster (New York, 1987); William H. Starbuck and Frances J. Milliken, "Challenger: Fine-Tuning the Odds until Something Breaks," Journal of Management Studies 25 (1988): 319-40; Russell P. Boisjoly, Ellen Foster Curtis, and Eugene Mellican, "Roger Boisjoly and the Challenger Disaster: The Ethical Dimensions," Journal of Business Ethics 8 (1989): 217-30; Lee Clarke and James E Short Jr., "Social Organization and Risk: Some Current Controversies," Annual Review of Sociology 19 (1993): 375-99; Barry A. Turner, "The Organizational and Interorganizational Development of Disasters," Administrative Science Quarterly 21 (1976): 378-97; Elizabeth A. Banset and Gerald M. Parsons, "Communications Failure in the Hyatt-Regency Disaster," Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering 115 (1989): 273-88; Charles H. Thornton, Robert A. Rubin, and Lisa A. Banick, "The Hyatt Decision-Two Opinions: The Attorney/Engineers Speak," Civil Engineering/ASCE 56 (1986): 69-72; Gregory P. Luth, "Chronology and Context of the Hyatt Regency Collapse," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 14 (2000): 51-66; David J. Hatem, "Impact of Professional Practice Standards on Liability of Engineers," Journal of Management in Engineering 5 (July 1989): 249-56; Deborah G. Johnson, Ethical Issues in Engineering (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1991); Robert A. Rubin, "The Hyatt Regency Decision: One View," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 1 (1987): 161-67; W. M. Kim Roddis, "Structural Failures and Engineering Ethics," Journal of Structural Engineering 119 (1993): 1539-55; D. A. Gasparini, "Collapse of the Ashtabula Bridge on December 29, 1876," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 7 (1993): 109-25.
27. The literature on engineering disasters is large and growing. Among the sources I found useful are Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies, 2nd ed. (Princeton, N.J., 1999); Henry Petroski, To Engineer Is Human: The Role of Failure in Successful Design (New York, 1992); Diane Vaughan, The "Challenger" Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture and Deviance at NASA (Chicago, 1996), and "The Dark Side of Organizations: Mistake, Misconduct, and Disaster," Annual Review of Sociology 25 (1999): 271-305; Malcolm McConnell, "Challenger": A Major Malfunction (Garden City, N.Y., 1987); Richard S. Lewis, "Challenger" : The Final Voyage (New York, 1988); Joseph J. Trento, Prescription for Disaster (New York, 1987); William H. Starbuck and Frances J. Milliken, "Challenger: Fine-Tuning the Odds until Something Breaks," Journal of Management Studies 25 (1988): 319-40; Russell P. Boisjoly, Ellen Foster Curtis, and Eugene Mellican, "Roger Boisjoly and the Challenger Disaster: The Ethical Dimensions," Journal of Business Ethics 8 (1989): 217-30; Lee Clarke and James E Short Jr., "Social Organization and Risk: Some Current Controversies," Annual Review of Sociology 19 (1993): 375-99; Barry A. Turner, "The Organizational and Interorganizational Development of Disasters," Administrative Science Quarterly 21 (1976): 378-97; Elizabeth A. Banset and Gerald M. Parsons, "Communications Failure in the Hyatt-Regency Disaster," Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering 115 (1989): 273-88; Charles H. Thornton, Robert A. Rubin, and Lisa A. Banick, "The Hyatt Decision-Two Opinions: The Attorney/Engineers Speak," Civil Engineering/ASCE 56 (1986): 69-72; Gregory P. Luth, "Chronology and Context of the Hyatt Regency Collapse," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 14 (2000): 51-66; David J. Hatem, "Impact of Professional Practice Standards on Liability of Engineers," Journal of Management in Engineering 5 (July 1989): 249-56; Deborah G. Johnson, Ethical Issues in Engineering (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1991); Robert A. Rubin, "The Hyatt Regency Decision: One View," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 1 (1987): 161-67; W. M. Kim Roddis, "Structural Failures and Engineering Ethics," Journal of Structural Engineering 119 (1993): 1539-55; D. A. Gasparini, "Collapse of the Ashtabula Bridge on December 29, 1876," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 7 (1993): 109-25.
28. The literature on engineering disasters is large and growing. Among the sources I found useful are Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies, 2nd ed. (Princeton, N.J., 1999); Henry Petroski, To Engineer Is Human: The Role of Failure in Successful Design (New York, 1992); Diane Vaughan, The "Challenger" Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture and Deviance at NASA (Chicago, 1996), and "The Dark Side of Organizations: Mistake, Misconduct, and Disaster," Annual Review of Sociology 25 (1999): 271-305; Malcolm McConnell, "Challenger": A Major Malfunction (Garden City, N.Y., 1987); Richard S. Lewis, "Challenger" : The Final Voyage (New York, 1988); Joseph J. Trento, Prescription for Disaster (New York, 1987); William H. Starbuck and Frances J. Milliken, "Challenger: Fine-Tuning the Odds until Something Breaks," Journal of Management Studies 25 (1988): 319-40; Russell P. Boisjoly, Ellen Foster Curtis, and Eugene Mellican, "Roger Boisjoly and the Challenger Disaster: The Ethical Dimensions," Journal of Business Ethics 8 (1989): 217-30; Lee Clarke and James E Short Jr., "Social Organization and Risk: Some Current Controversies," Annual Review of Sociology 19 (1993): 375-99; Barry A. Turner, "The Organizational and Interorganizational Development of Disasters," Administrative Science Quarterly 21 (1976): 378-97; Elizabeth A. Banset and Gerald M. Parsons, "Communications Failure in the Hyatt-Regency Disaster," Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering 115 (1989): 273-88; Charles H. Thornton, Robert A. Rubin, and Lisa A. Banick, "The Hyatt Decision-Two Opinions: The Attorney/Engineers Speak," Civil Engineering/ASCE 56 (1986): 69-72; Gregory P. Luth, "Chronology and Context of the Hyatt Regency Collapse," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 14 (2000): 51-66; David J. Hatem, "Impact of Professional Practice Standards on Liability of Engineers," Journal of Management in Engineering 5 (July 1989): 249-56; Deborah G. Johnson, Ethical Issues in Engineering (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1991); Robert A. Rubin, "The Hyatt Regency Decision: One View," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 1 (1987): 161-67; W. M. Kim Roddis, "Structural Failures and Engineering Ethics," Journal of Structural Engineering 119 (1993): 1539-55; D. A. Gasparini, "Collapse of the Ashtabula Bridge on December 29, 1876," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 7 (1993): 109-25.
29. The literature on engineering disasters is large and growing. Among the sources I found useful are Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies, 2nd ed. (Princeton, N.J., 1999); Henry Petroski, To Engineer Is Human: The Role of Failure in Successful Design (New York, 1992); Diane Vaughan, The "Challenger" Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture and Deviance at NASA (Chicago, 1996), and "The Dark Side of Organizations: Mistake, Misconduct, and Disaster," Annual Review of Sociology 25 (1999): 271-305; Malcolm McConnell, "Challenger": A Major Malfunction (Garden City, N.Y., 1987); Richard S. Lewis, "Challenger" : The Final Voyage (New York, 1988); Joseph J. Trento, Prescription for Disaster (New York, 1987); William H. Starbuck and Frances J. Milliken, "Challenger: Fine-Tuning the Odds until Something Breaks," Journal of Management Studies 25 (1988): 319-40; Russell P. Boisjoly, Ellen Foster Curtis, and Eugene Mellican, "Roger Boisjoly and the Challenger Disaster: The Ethical Dimensions," Journal of Business Ethics 8 (1989): 217-30; Lee Clarke and James E Short Jr., "Social Organization and Risk: Some Current Controversies," Annual Review of Sociology 19 (1993): 375-99; Barry A. Turner, "The Organizational and Interorganizational Development of Disasters," Administrative Science Quarterly 21 (1976): 378-97; Elizabeth A. Banset and Gerald M. Parsons, "Communications Failure in the Hyatt-Regency Disaster," Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering 115 (1989): 273-88; Charles H. Thornton, Robert A. Rubin, and Lisa A. Banick, "The Hyatt Decision-Two Opinions: The Attorney/Engineers Speak," Civil Engineering/ASCE 56 (1986): 69-72; Gregory P. Luth, "Chronology and Context of the Hyatt Regency Collapse," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 14 (2000): 51-66; David J. Hatem, "Impact of Professional Practice Standards on Liability of Engineers," Journal of Management in Engineering 5 (July 1989): 249-56; Deborah G. Johnson, Ethical Issues in Engineering (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1991); Robert A. Rubin, "The Hyatt Regency Decision: One View," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 1 (1987): 161-67; W. M. Kim Roddis, "Structural Failures and Engineering Ethics," Journal of Structural Engineering 119 (1993): 1539-55; D. A. Gasparini, "Collapse of the Ashtabula Bridge on December 29, 1876," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 7 (1993): 109-25.
30. The literature on engineering disasters is large and growing. Among the sources I found useful are Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies, 2nd ed. (Princeton, N.J., 1999); Henry Petroski, To Engineer Is Human: The Role of Failure in Successful Design (New York, 1992); Diane Vaughan, The "Challenger" Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture and Deviance at NASA (Chicago, 1996), and "The Dark Side of Organizations: Mistake, Misconduct, and Disaster," Annual Review of Sociology 25 (1999): 271-305; Malcolm McConnell, "Challenger": A Major Malfunction (Garden City, N.Y., 1987); Richard S. Lewis, "Challenger" : The Final Voyage (New York, 1988); Joseph J. Trento, Prescription for Disaster (New York, 1987); William H. Starbuck and Frances J. Milliken, "Challenger: Fine-Tuning the Odds until Something Breaks," Journal of Management Studies 25 (1988): 319-40; Russell P. Boisjoly, Ellen Foster Curtis, and Eugene Mellican, "Roger Boisjoly and the Challenger Disaster: The Ethical Dimensions," Journal of Business Ethics 8 (1989): 217-30; Lee Clarke and James E Short Jr., "Social Organization and Risk: Some Current Controversies," Annual Review of Sociology 19 (1993): 375-99; Barry A. Turner, "The Organizational and Interorganizational Development of Disasters," Administrative Science Quarterly 21 (1976): 378-97; Elizabeth A. Banset and Gerald M. Parsons, "Communications Failure in the Hyatt-Regency Disaster," Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering 115 (1989): 273-88; Charles H. Thornton, Robert A. Rubin, and Lisa A. Banick, "The Hyatt Decision-Two Opinions: The Attorney/Engineers Speak," Civil Engineering/ASCE 56 (1986): 69-72; Gregory P. Luth, "Chronology and Context of the Hyatt Regency Collapse," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 14 (2000): 51-66; David J. Hatem, "Impact of Professional Practice Standards on Liability of Engineers," Journal of Management in Engineering 5 (July 1989): 249-56; Deborah G. Johnson, Ethical Issues in Engineering (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1991); Robert A. Rubin, "The Hyatt Regency Decision: One View," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 1 (1987): 161-67; W. M. Kim Roddis, "Structural Failures and Engineering Ethics," Journal of Structural Engineering 119 (1993): 1539-55; D. A. Gasparini, "Collapse of the Ashtabula Bridge on December 29, 1876," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 7 (1993): 109-25.
31. The literature on engineering disasters is large and growing. Among the sources I found useful are Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies, 2nd ed. (Princeton, N.J., 1999); Henry Petroski, To Engineer Is Human: The Role of Failure in Successful Design (New York, 1992); Diane Vaughan, The "Challenger" Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture and Deviance at NASA (Chicago, 1996), and "The Dark Side of Organizations: Mistake, Misconduct, and Disaster," Annual Review of Sociology 25 (1999): 271-305; Malcolm McConnell, "Challenger": A Major Malfunction (Garden City, N.Y., 1987); Richard S. Lewis, "Challenger" : The Final Voyage (New York, 1988); Joseph J. Trento, Prescription for Disaster (New York, 1987); William H. Starbuck and Frances J. Milliken, "Challenger: Fine-Tuning the Odds until Something Breaks," Journal of Management Studies 25 (1988): 319-40; Russell P. Boisjoly, Ellen Foster Curtis, and Eugene Mellican, "Roger Boisjoly and the Challenger Disaster: The Ethical Dimensions," Journal of Business Ethics 8 (1989): 217-30; Lee Clarke and James E Short Jr., "Social Organization and Risk: Some Current Controversies," Annual Review of Sociology 19 (1993): 375-99; Barry A. Turner, "The Organizational and Interorganizational Development of Disasters," Administrative Science Quarterly 21 (1976): 378-97; Elizabeth A. Banset and Gerald M. Parsons, "Communications Failure in the Hyatt-Regency Disaster," Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering 115 (1989): 273-88; Charles H. Thornton, Robert A. Rubin, and Lisa A. Banick, "The Hyatt Decision-Two Opinions: The Attorney/Engineers Speak," Civil Engineering/ASCE 56 (1986): 69-72; Gregory P. Luth, "Chronology and Context of the Hyatt Regency Collapse," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 14 (2000): 51-66; David J. Hatem, "Impact of Professional Practice Standards on Liability of Engineers," Journal of Management in Engineering 5 (July 1989): 249-56; Deborah G. Johnson, Ethical Issues in Engineering (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1991); Robert A. Rubin, "The Hyatt Regency Decision: One View," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 1 (1987): 161-67; W. M. Kim Roddis, "Structural Failures and Engineering Ethics," Journal of Structural Engineering 119 (1993): 1539-55; D. A. Gasparini, "Collapse of the Ashtabula Bridge on December 29, 1876," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 7 (1993): 109-25.
32. The literature on engineering disasters is large and growing. Among the sources I found useful are Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies, 2nd ed. (Princeton, N.J., 1999); Henry Petroski, To Engineer Is Human: The Role of Failure in Successful Design (New York, 1992); Diane Vaughan, The "Challenger" Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture and Deviance at NASA (Chicago, 1996), and "The Dark Side of Organizations: Mistake, Misconduct, and Disaster," Annual Review of Sociology 25 (1999): 271-305; Malcolm McConnell, "Challenger": A Major Malfunction (Garden City, N.Y., 1987); Richard S. Lewis, "Challenger" : The Final Voyage (New York, 1988); Joseph J. Trento, Prescription for Disaster (New York, 1987); William H. Starbuck and Frances J. Milliken, "Challenger: Fine-Tuning the Odds until Something Breaks," Journal of Management Studies 25 (1988): 319-40; Russell P. Boisjoly, Ellen Foster Curtis, and Eugene Mellican, "Roger Boisjoly and the Challenger Disaster: The Ethical Dimensions," Journal of Business Ethics 8 (1989): 217-30; Lee Clarke and James E Short Jr., "Social Organization and Risk: Some Current Controversies," Annual Review of Sociology 19 (1993): 375-99; Barry A. Turner, "The Organizational and Interorganizational Development of Disasters," Administrative Science Quarterly 21 (1976): 378-97; Elizabeth A. Banset and Gerald M. Parsons, "Communications Failure in the Hyatt-Regency Disaster," Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering 115 (1989): 273-88; Charles H. Thornton, Robert A. Rubin, and Lisa A. Banick, "The Hyatt Decision-Two Opinions: The Attorney/Engineers Speak," Civil Engineering/ASCE 56 (1986): 69-72; Gregory P. Luth, "Chronology and Context of the Hyatt Regency Collapse," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 14 (2000): 51-66; David J. Hatem, "Impact of Professional Practice Standards on Liability of Engineers," Journal of Management in Engineering 5 (July 1989): 249-56; Deborah G. Johnson, Ethical Issues in Engineering (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1991); Robert A. Rubin, "The Hyatt Regency Decision: One View," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 1 (1987): 161-67; W. M. Kim Roddis, "Structural Failures and Engineering Ethics," Journal of Structural Engineering 119 (1993): 1539-55; D. A. Gasparini, "Collapse of the Ashtabula Bridge on December 29, 1876," Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities 7 (1993): 109-25.
33. Donald Wilson, "Social Mechanisms for Controlling Engineers' Performance," in Ethical Issues in Engineering, ed. Deborah G. Johnson (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1991), 359. In another contribution to the same volume, Richard T. De George writes that "the ethical responsibilities of the engineer in a large organization have as much to do with the organization as with the engineer"; "Ethical Responsibilities of Engineers in Large Organizations," 185.
34. Donald Wilson, "Social Mechanisms for Controlling Engineers' Performance," in Ethical Issues in Engineering, ed. Deborah G. Johnson (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1991), 359. In another contribution to the same volume, Richard T. De George writes that "the ethical responsibilities of the engineer in a large organization have as much to do with the organization as with the engineer"; "Ethical Responsibilities of Engineers in Large Organizations," 185.
35. Holgate testified to a Canadian parliamentary committee that the Quebec Bridge was too complex to be fully understood by any single individual. He therefore advocated the establishment of a board of engineers to oversee the bridge's redesign and reconstruction. See House of Commons, Select Committee Appointed to Investigate the Conditions and Guarantees Under Which the Dominion Government Paid Moneys to the Quebec Bridge Company, Report ... with Minutes of Proceedings (Ottawa, 1908) (hereafter cited as Select Committee Report), 137-49.
36. Royal Commission members disagreed about how wide to cast their net of inquiry into the causes of the bridge's collapse and about subsequent presentation of evidence. Chairman Holgate wrote to the deputy minister of Canada's Department of Railways and Canals, R. J. Butler, that his findings were "not completely in accord with those of [his] colleagues." Holgate wanted to present not merely "an analytical description of why the bridge fell, but what might be called a semi-technical and semi-business description of the whole of the occurrence." His two colleagues wanted rather to focus on "purely technical matters." They were not eager to investigate how the technical failure was linked to its organizational context. The conflict
37. See Vaughan, "Challenger" Launch Decision, and Perrow's critique of Vaughan's approach in Normal Accidents, 379-80. On the ambiguities and challenges of analyzing technological failure, see also Graeme Gooday, "Rewriting the 'Book of Blots': Critical Reflections on Histories of Technological 'Failure,'" History and Technology 14 (1998): 265-92. Gooday's analysis is more focused on marginalized innovations than engineering catastrophes, but many of the ideas he presents have relevance for analysis of the latter. See also Hans-Joachim Braun's introduction to the special issue of Social Studies of Science on failed innovations, Social Studies of Science 22 (1992): 213-30.
38. See Vaughan, "Challenger" Launch Decision, and Perrow's critique of Vaughan's approach in Normal Accidents, 379-80. On the ambiguities and challenges of analyzing technological failure, see also Graeme Gooday, "Rewriting the 'Book of Blots': Critical Reflections on Histories of Technological 'Failure,'" History and Technology 14 (1998): 265-92. Gooday's analysis is more focused on marginalized innovations than engineering catastrophes, but many of the ideas he presents have relevance for analysis of the latter. See also Hans-Joachim Braun's introduction to the special issue of Social Studies of Science on failed innovations, Social Studies of Science 22 (1992): 213-30.
39. See Vaughan, "Challenger" Launch Decision, and Perrow's critique of Vaughan's approach in Normal Accidents, 379-80. On the ambiguities and challenges of analyzing technological failure, see also Graeme Gooday, "Rewriting the 'Book of Blots': Critical Reflections on Histories of Technological 'Failure,'" History and Technology 14 (1998): 265-92. Gooday's analysis is more focused on marginalized innovations than engineering catastrophes, but many of the ideas he presents have relevance for analysis of the latter. See also Hans-Joachim Braun's introduction to the special issue of Social Studies of Science on failed innovations, Social Studies of Science 22 (1992): 213-30.
40. Quoted from http://www.civeng.carleton.ca/ECL/reports/ECL270/Judgement. html; and http://www.civeng.carleton.ca/ECL/reports/ECL270/Human-Failures.html.
41. On organizational culture, see Vaughan, "Challenger" Launch Decision and "Dark Side of Organizations" (both n. 7 above); Stewart Ranson, Bob Hinings, and Royston Greenwood, "The Structuring of Organizational Structures," Administrative Science Quarterly 25 (1980): 1-17; W. Richard Scott, "The Adolescence of Institutional Theory," Administrative Science Quarterly 32 (1987): 493-511; Charles Perrow, Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay, 3rd ed. (New York, 1986), and Normal Accidents (n. 7 above); Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago, 1991); Paul DiMaggio, "Culture and Cognition," Annual Review of Sociology 23 (1997): 263-87; David Mechanic, "Sources of Power of Lower Participants in Complex Organizations," Administrative Science Quarterly 7 (1962-1963): 349-64; Stephen R. Barley, "Semiotics and the Study of Occupational and Organizational Cultures," Administrative Science Quarterly 28 (1983): 393-413; Linda Smircich, "Concepts of Culture and Organizational Analysis," Administrative Science Quarterly 28 (1983): 339-58.
42. On organizational culture, see Vaughan, "Challenger" Launch Decision and "Dark Side of Organizations" (both n. 7 above); Stewart Ranson, Bob Hinings, and Royston Greenwood, "The Structuring of Organizational Structures," Administrative Science Quarterly 25 (1980): 1-17; W. Richard Scott, "The Adolescence of Institutional Theory," Administrative Science Quarterly 32 (1987): 493-511; Charles Perrow, Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay, 3rd ed. (New York, 1986), and Normal Accidents (n. 7 above); Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago, 1991); Paul DiMaggio, "Culture and Cognition," Annual Review of Sociology 23 (1997): 263-87; David Mechanic, "Sources of Power of Lower Participants in Complex Organizations," Administrative Science Quarterly 7 (1962-1963): 349-64; Stephen R. Barley, "Semiotics and the Study of Occupational and Organizational Cultures," Administrative Science Quarterly 28 (1983): 393-413; Linda Smircich, "Concepts of Culture and Organizational Analysis," Administrative Science Quarterly 28 (1983): 339-58.
43. On organizational culture, see Vaughan, "Challenger" Launch Decision and "Dark Side of Organizations" (both n. 7 above); Stewart Ranson, Bob Hinings, and Royston Greenwood, "The Structuring of Organizational Structures," Administrative Science Quarterly 25 (1980): 1-17; W. Richard Scott, "The Adolescence of Institutional Theory," Administrative Science Quarterly 32 (1987): 493-511; Charles Perrow, Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay, 3rd ed. (New York, 1986), and Normal Accidents (n. 7 above); Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago, 1991); Paul DiMaggio, "Culture and Cognition," Annual Review of Sociology 23 (1997): 263-87; David Mechanic, "Sources of Power of Lower Participants in Complex Organizations," Administrative Science Quarterly 7 (1962-1963): 349-64; Stephen R. Barley, "Semiotics and the Study of Occupational and Organizational Cultures," Administrative Science Quarterly 28 (1983): 393-413; Linda Smircich, "Concepts of Culture and Organizational Analysis," Administrative Science Quarterly 28 (1983): 339-58.
44. On organizational culture, see Vaughan, "Challenger" Launch Decision and "Dark Side of Organizations" (both n. 7 above); Stewart Ranson, Bob Hinings, and Royston Greenwood, "The Structuring of Organizational Structures," Administrative Science Quarterly 25 (1980): 1-17; W. Richard Scott, "The Adolescence of Institutional Theory," Administrative Science Quarterly 32 (1987): 493-511; Charles Perrow, Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay, 3rd ed. (New York, 1986), and Normal Accidents (n. 7 above); Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago, 1991); Paul DiMaggio, "Culture and Cognition," Annual Review of Sociology 23 (1997): 263-87; David Mechanic, "Sources of Power of Lower Participants in Complex Organizations," Administrative Science Quarterly 7 (1962-1963): 349-64; Stephen R. Barley, "Semiotics and the Study of Occupational and Organizational Cultures," Administrative Science Quarterly 28 (1983): 393-413; Linda Smircich, "Concepts of Culture and Organizational Analysis," Administrative Science Quarterly 28 (1983): 339-58.
45. On organizational culture, see Vaughan, "Challenger" Launch Decision and "Dark Side of Organizations" (both n. 7 above); Stewart Ranson, Bob Hinings, and Royston Greenwood, "The Structuring of Organizational Structures," Administrative Science Quarterly 25 (1980): 1-17; W. Richard Scott, "The Adolescence of Institutional Theory," Administrative Science Quarterly 32 (1987): 493-511; Charles Perrow, Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay, 3rd ed. (New York, 1986), and Normal Accidents (n. 7 above); Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago, 1991); Paul DiMaggio, "Culture and Cognition," Annual Review of Sociology 23 (1997): 263-87; David Mechanic, "Sources of Power of Lower Participants in Complex Organizations," Administrative Science Quarterly 7 (1962-1963): 349-64; Stephen R. Barley, "Semiotics and the Study of Occupational and Organizational Cultures," Administrative Science Quarterly 28 (1983): 393-413; Linda Smircich, "Concepts of Culture and Organizational Analysis," Administrative Science Quarterly 28 (1983): 339-58.
46. On organizational culture, see Vaughan, "Challenger" Launch Decision and "Dark Side of Organizations" (both n. 7 above); Stewart Ranson, Bob Hinings, and Royston Greenwood, "The Structuring of Organizational Structures," Administrative Science Quarterly 25 (1980): 1-17; W. Richard Scott, "The Adolescence of Institutional Theory," Administrative Science Quarterly 32 (1987): 493-511; Charles Perrow, Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay, 3rd ed. (New York, 1986), and Normal Accidents (n. 7 above); Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago, 1991); Paul DiMaggio, "Culture and Cognition," Annual Review of Sociology 23 (1997): 263-87; David Mechanic, "Sources of Power of Lower Participants in Complex Organizations," Administrative Science Quarterly 7 (1962-1963): 349-64; Stephen R. Barley, "Semiotics and the Study of Occupational and Organizational Cultures," Administrative Science Quarterly 28 (1983): 393-413; Linda Smircich, "Concepts of Culture and Organizational Analysis," Administrative Science Quarterly 28 (1983): 339-58.
47. On organizational culture, see Vaughan, "Challenger" Launch Decision and "Dark Side of Organizations" (both n. 7 above); Stewart Ranson, Bob Hinings, and Royston Greenwood, "The Structuring of Organizational Structures," Administrative Science Quarterly 25 (1980): 1-17; W. Richard Scott, "The Adolescence of Institutional Theory," Administrative Science Quarterly 32 (1987): 493-511; Charles Perrow, Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay, 3rd ed. (New York, 1986), and Normal Accidents (n. 7 above); Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago, 1991); Paul DiMaggio, "Culture and Cognition," Annual Review of Sociology 23 (1997): 263-87; David Mechanic, "Sources of Power of Lower Participants in Complex Organizations," Administrative Science Quarterly 7 (1962-1963): 349-64; Stephen R. Barley, "Semiotics and the Study of Occupational and Organizational Cultures," Administrative Science Quarterly 28 (1983): 393-413; Linda Smircich, "Concepts of Culture and Organizational Analysis," Administrative Science Quarterly 28 (1983): 339-58.
48. On organizational culture, see Vaughan, "Challenger" Launch Decision and "Dark Side of Organizations" (both n. 7 above); Stewart Ranson, Bob Hinings, and Royston Greenwood, "The Structuring of Organizational Structures," Administrative Science Quarterly 25 (1980): 1-17; W. Richard Scott, "The Adolescence of Institutional Theory," Administrative Science Quarterly 32 (1987): 493-511; Charles Perrow, Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay, 3rd ed. (New York, 1986), and Normal Accidents (n. 7 above); Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago, 1991); Paul DiMaggio, "Culture and Cognition," Annual Review of Sociology 23 (1997): 263-87; David Mechanic, "Sources of Power of Lower Participants in Complex Organizations," Administrative Science Quarterly 7 (1962-1963): 349-64; Stephen R. Barley, "Semiotics and the Study of Occupational and Organizational Cultures," Administrative Science Quarterly 28 (1983): 393-413; Linda Smircich, "Concepts of Culture and Organizational Analysis," Administrative Science Quarterly 28 (1983): 339-58.
49. On organizational culture, see Vaughan, "Challenger" Launch Decision and "Dark Side of Organizations" (both n. 7 above); Stewart Ranson, Bob Hinings, and Royston Greenwood, "The Structuring of Organizational Structures," Administrative Science Quarterly 25 (1980): 1-17; W. Richard Scott, "The Adolescence of Institutional Theory," Administrative Science Quarterly 32 (1987): 493-511; Charles Perrow, Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay, 3rd ed. (New York, 1986), and Normal Accidents (n. 7 above); Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago, 1991); Paul DiMaggio, "Culture and Cognition," Annual Review of Sociology 23 (1997): 263-87; David Mechanic, "Sources of Power of Lower Participants in Complex Organizations," Administrative Science Quarterly 7 (1962-1963): 349-64; Stephen R. Barley, "Semiotics and the Study of Occupational and Organizational Cultures," Administrative Science Quarterly 28 (1983): 393-413; Linda Smircich, "Concepts of Culture and Organizational Analysis," Administrative Science Quarterly 28 (1983): 339-58.
50. On organizational culture, see Vaughan, "Challenger" Launch Decision and "Dark Side of Organizations" (both n. 7 above); Stewart Ranson, Bob Hinings, and Royston Greenwood, "The Structuring of Organizational Structures," Administrative Science Quarterly 25 (1980): 1-17; W. Richard Scott, "The Adolescence of Institutional Theory," Administrative Science Quarterly 32 (1987): 493-511; Charles Perrow, Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay, 3rd ed. (New York, 1986), and Normal Accidents (n. 7 above); Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago, 1991); Paul DiMaggio, "Culture and Cognition," Annual Review of Sociology 23 (1997): 263-87; David Mechanic, "Sources of Power of Lower Participants in Complex Organizations," Administrative Science Quarterly 7 (1962-1963): 349-64; Stephen R. Barley, "Semiotics and the Study of Occupational and Organizational Cultures," Administrative Science Quarterly 28 (1983): 393-413; Linda Smircich, "Concepts of Culture and Organizational Analysis," Administrative Science Quarterly 28 (1983): 339-58.
51. See, for example, Vaughan, "Challenger" Launch Decision; Perrow, Normal Accidents; Paul DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields," American Sociological Review 48 (1983): 147-60; Turner (n. 7 above).
52. See, for example, Vaughan, "Challenger" Launch Decision; Perrow, Normal Accidents; Paul DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields," American Sociological Review 48 (1983): 147-60; Turner (n. 7 above).
53. See, for example, Vaughan, "Challenger" Launch Decision; Perrow, Normal Accidents; Paul DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields," American Sociological Review 48 (1983): 147-60; Turner (n. 7 above).
54. See, for example, Vaughan, "Challenger" Launch Decision; Perrow, Normal Accidents; Paul DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields," American Sociological Review 48 (1983): 147-60; Turner (n. 7 above).
55. Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organizations, 3rd ed. (New York, 1976); James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York, 1958); J. G. March, ed. Decisions and Organizations (London, 1988); Scott Sagan, Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons; Martha S. Feldman, Order without Design: Information Production and Policy Making (Stanford, Calif., 1989); Martha S. Feldman and James G. March, "Information in Organizations as Sign and Symbol," Administrative Science Quarterly 26 (1981): 171-84; David A. Bella, "Organizations and Systematic Distortion of Information," Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering 113 (1987): 360-70; Paul R. Schulman, "The 'Logic' of Organizational Irrationality," Administration and Society 31 (1989): 31-53; Vaughan, "Challenger" Launch Decision; Diane Vaughan, "The Role of Organizations in the Production of Techno-Scientific Knowledge," Social Studies of Science 29 (1999): 913-43; Lee Clarke, Acceptable Risk? Making Decisions in a Toxic Environment (Berkeley, Calif., 1989), and Mission Improbable: Using Fantasy Documents to Tame Disaster (Chicago, 1999); Irving L. Janis, Groupthink (Boston, 1982).
56. Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organizations, 3rd ed. (New York, 1976); James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York, 1958); J. G. March, ed. Decisions and Organizations (London, 1988); Scott Sagan, Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons; Martha S. Feldman, Order without Design: Information Production and Policy Making (Stanford, Calif., 1989); Martha S. Feldman and James G. March, "Information in Organizations as Sign and Symbol," Administrative Science Quarterly 26 (1981): 171-84; David A. Bella, "Organizations and Systematic Distortion of Information," Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering 113 (1987): 360-70; Paul R. Schulman, "The 'Logic' of Organizational Irrationality," Administration and Society 31 (1989): 31-53; Vaughan, "Challenger" Launch Decision; Diane Vaughan, "The Role of Organizations in the Production of Techno-Scientific Knowledge," Social Studies of Science 29 (1999): 913-43; Lee Clarke, Acceptable Risk? Making Decisions in a Toxic Environment (Berkeley, Calif., 1989), and Mission Improbable: Using Fantasy Documents to Tame Disaster (Chicago, 1999); Irving L. Janis, Groupthink (Boston, 1982).
57. Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organizations, 3rd ed. (New York, 1976); James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York, 1958); J. G. March, ed. Decisions and Organizations (London, 1988); Scott Sagan, Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons; Martha S. Feldman, Order without Design: Information Production and Policy Making (Stanford, Calif., 1989); Martha S. Feldman and James G. March, "Information in Organizations as Sign and Symbol," Administrative Science Quarterly 26 (1981): 171-84; David A. Bella, "Organizations and Systematic Distortion of Information," Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering 113 (1987): 360-70; Paul R. Schulman, "The 'Logic' of Organizational Irrationality," Administration and Society 31 (1989): 31-53; Vaughan, "Challenger" Launch Decision; Diane Vaughan, "The Role of Organizations in the Production of Techno-Scientific Knowledge," Social Studies of Science 29 (1999): 913-43; Lee Clarke, Acceptable Risk? Making Decisions in a Toxic Environment (Berkeley, Calif., 1989), and Mission Improbable: Using Fantasy Documents to Tame Disaster (Chicago, 1999); Irving L. Janis, Groupthink (Boston, 1982).
58. Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organizations, 3rd ed. (New York, 1976); James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York, 1958); J. G. March, ed. Decisions and Organizations (London, 1988); Scott Sagan, Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons; Martha S. Feldman, Order without Design: Information Production and Policy Making (Stanford, Calif., 1989); Martha S. Feldman and James G. March, "Information in Organizations as Sign and Symbol," Administrative Science Quarterly 26 (1981): 171-84; David A. Bella, "Organizations and Systematic Distortion of Information," Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering 113 (1987): 360-70; Paul R. Schulman, "The 'Logic' of Organizational Irrationality," Administration and Society 31 (1989): 31-53; Vaughan, "Challenger" Launch Decision; Diane Vaughan, "The Role of Organizations in the Production of Techno-Scientific Knowledge," Social Studies of Science 29 (1999): 913-43; Lee Clarke, Acceptable Risk? Making Decisions in a Toxic Environment (Berkeley, Calif., 1989), and Mission Improbable: Using Fantasy Documents to Tame Disaster (Chicago, 1999); Irving L. Janis, Groupthink (Boston, 1982).
59. Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organizations, 3rd ed. (New York, 1976); James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York, 1958); J. G. March, ed. Decisions and Organizations (London, 1988); Scott Sagan, Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons; Martha S. Feldman, Order without Design: Information Production and Policy Making (Stanford, Calif., 1989); Martha S. Feldman and James G. March, "Information in Organizations as Sign and Symbol," Administrative Science Quarterly 26 (1981): 171-84; David A. Bella, "Organizations and Systematic Distortion of Information," Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering 113 (1987): 360-70; Paul R. Schulman, "The 'Logic' of Organizational Irrationality," Administration and Society 31 (1989): 31-53; Vaughan, "Challenger" Launch Decision; Diane Vaughan, "The Role of Organizations in the Production of Techno-Scientific Knowledge," Social Studies of Science 29 (1999): 913-43; Lee Clarke, Acceptable Risk? Making Decisions in a Toxic Environment (Berkeley, Calif., 1989), and Mission Improbable: Using Fantasy Documents to Tame Disaster (Chicago, 1999); Irving L. Janis, Groupthink (Boston, 1982).
60. Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organizations, 3rd ed. (New York, 1976); James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York, 1958); J. G. March, ed. Decisions and Organizations (London, 1988); Scott Sagan, Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons; Martha S. Feldman, Order without Design: Information Production and Policy Making (Stanford, Calif., 1989); Martha S. Feldman and James G. March, "Information in Organizations as Sign and Symbol," Administrative Science Quarterly 26 (1981): 171-84; David A. Bella, "Organizations and Systematic Distortion of Information," Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering 113 (1987): 360-70; Paul R. Schulman, "The 'Logic' of Organizational Irrationality," Administration and Society 31 (1989): 31-53; Vaughan, "Challenger" Launch Decision; Diane Vaughan, "The Role of Organizations in the Production of Techno-Scientific Knowledge," Social Studies of Science 29 (1999): 913-43; Lee Clarke, Acceptable Risk? Making Decisions in a Toxic Environment (Berkeley, Calif., 1989), and Mission Improbable: Using Fantasy Documents to Tame Disaster (Chicago, 1999); Irving L. Janis, Groupthink (Boston, 1982).
61. Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organizations, 3rd ed. (New York, 1976); James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York, 1958); J. G. March, ed. Decisions and Organizations (London, 1988); Scott Sagan, Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons; Martha S. Feldman, Order without Design: Information Production and Policy Making (Stanford, Calif., 1989); Martha S. Feldman and James G. March, "Information in Organizations as Sign and Symbol," Administrative Science Quarterly 26 (1981): 171-84; David A. Bella, "Organizations and Systematic Distortion of Information," Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering 113 (1987): 360-70; Paul R. Schulman, "The 'Logic' of Organizational Irrationality," Administration and Society 31 (1989): 31-53; Vaughan, "Challenger" Launch Decision; Diane Vaughan, "The Role of Organizations in the Production of Techno-Scientific Knowledge," Social Studies of Science 29 (1999): 913-43; Lee Clarke, Acceptable Risk? Making Decisions in a Toxic Environment (Berkeley, Calif., 1989), and Mission Improbable: Using Fantasy Documents to Tame Disaster (Chicago, 1999); Irving L. Janis, Groupthink (Boston, 1982).
62. Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organizations, 3rd ed. (New York, 1976); James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York, 1958); J. G. March, ed. Decisions and Organizations (London, 1988); Scott Sagan, Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons; Martha S. Feldman, Order without Design: Information Production and Policy Making (Stanford, Calif., 1989); Martha S. Feldman and James G. March, "Information in Organizations as Sign and Symbol," Administrative Science Quarterly 26 (1981): 171-84; David A. Bella, "Organizations and Systematic Distortion of Information," Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering 113 (1987): 360-70; Paul R. Schulman, "The 'Logic' of Organizational Irrationality," Administration and Society 31 (1989): 31-53; Vaughan, "Challenger" Launch Decision; Diane Vaughan, "The Role of Organizations in the Production of Techno-Scientific Knowledge," Social Studies of Science 29 (1999): 913-43; Lee Clarke, Acceptable Risk? Making Decisions in a Toxic Environment (Berkeley, Calif., 1989), and Mission Improbable: Using Fantasy Documents to Tame Disaster (Chicago, 1999); Irving L. Janis, Groupthink (Boston, 1982).
63. Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organizations, 3rd ed. (New York, 1976); James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York, 1958); J. G. March, ed. Decisions and Organizations (London, 1988); Scott Sagan, Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons; Martha S. Feldman, Order without Design: Information Production and Policy Making (Stanford, Calif., 1989); Martha S. Feldman and James G. March, "Information in Organizations as Sign and Symbol," Administrative Science Quarterly 26 (1981): 171-84; David A. Bella, "Organizations and Systematic Distortion of Information," Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering 113 (1987): 360-70; Paul R. Schulman, "The 'Logic' of Organizational Irrationality," Administration and Society 31 (1989): 31-53; Vaughan, "Challenger" Launch Decision; Diane Vaughan, "The Role of Organizations in the Production of Techno-Scientific Knowledge," Social Studies of Science 29 (1999): 913-43; Lee Clarke, Acceptable Risk? Making Decisions in a Toxic Environment (Berkeley, Calif., 1989), and Mission Improbable: Using Fantasy Documents to Tame Disaster (Chicago, 1999); Irving L. Janis, Groupthink (Boston, 1982).
64. Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organizations, 3rd ed. (New York, 1976); James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York, 1958); J. G. March, ed. Decisions and Organizations (London, 1988); Scott Sagan, Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons; Martha S. Feldman, Order without Design: Information Production and Policy Making (Stanford, Calif., 1989); Martha S. Feldman and James G. March, "Information in Organizations as Sign and Symbol," Administrative Science Quarterly 26 (1981): 171-84; David A. Bella, "Organizations and Systematic Distortion of Information," Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering 113 (1987): 360-70; Paul R. Schulman, "The 'Logic' of Organizational Irrationality," Administration and Society 31 (1989): 31-53; Vaughan, "Challenger" Launch Decision; Diane Vaughan, "The Role of Organizations in the Production of Techno-Scientific Knowledge," Social Studies of Science 29 (1999): 913-43; Lee Clarke, Acceptable Risk? Making Decisions in a Toxic Environment (Berkeley, Calif., 1989), and Mission Improbable: Using Fantasy Documents to Tame Disaster (Chicago, 1999); Irving L. Janis, Groupthink (Boston, 1982).
65. Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organizations, 3rd ed. (New York, 1976); James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York, 1958); J. G. March, ed. Decisions and Organizations (London, 1988); Scott Sagan, Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons; Martha S. Feldman, Order without Design: Information Production and Policy Making (Stanford, Calif., 1989); Martha S. Feldman and James G. March, "Information in Organizations as Sign and Symbol," Administrative Science Quarterly 26 (1981): 171-84; David A. Bella, "Organizations and Systematic Distortion of Information," Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering 113 (1987): 360-70; Paul R. Schulman, "The 'Logic' of Organizational Irrationality," Administration and Society 31 (1989): 31-53; Vaughan, "Challenger" Launch Decision; Diane Vaughan, "The Role of Organizations in the Production of Techno-Scientific Knowledge," Social Studies of Science 29 (1999): 913-43; Lee Clarke, Acceptable Risk? Making Decisions in a Toxic Environment (Berkeley, Calif., 1989), and Mission Improbable: Using Fantasy Documents to Tame Disaster (Chicago, 1999); Irving L. Janis, Groupthink (Boston, 1982).
66. Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organizations, 3rd ed. (New York, 1976); James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York, 1958); J. G. March, ed. Decisions and Organizations (London, 1988); Scott Sagan, Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons; Martha S. Feldman, Order without Design: Information Production and Policy Making (Stanford, Calif., 1989); Martha S. Feldman and James G. March, "Information in Organizations as Sign and Symbol," Administrative Science Quarterly 26 (1981): 171-84; David A. Bella, "Organizations and Systematic Distortion of Information," Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering 113 (1987): 360-70; Paul R. Schulman, "The 'Logic' of Organizational Irrationality," Administration and Society 31 (1989): 31-53; Vaughan, "Challenger" Launch Decision; Diane Vaughan, "The Role of Organizations in the Production of Techno-Scientific Knowledge," Social Studies of Science 29 (1999): 913-43; Lee Clarke, Acceptable Risk? Making Decisions in a Toxic Environment (Berkeley, Calif., 1989), and Mission Improbable: Using Fantasy Documents to Tame Disaster (Chicago, 1999); Irving L. Janis, Groupthink (Boston, 1982).
67. Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organizations, 3rd ed. (New York, 1976); James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York, 1958); J. G. March, ed. Decisions and Organizations (London, 1988); Scott Sagan, Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons; Martha S. Feldman, Order without Design: Information Production and Policy Making (Stanford, Calif., 1989); Martha S. Feldman and James G. March, "Information in Organizations as Sign and Symbol," Administrative Science Quarterly 26 (1981): 171-84; David A. Bella, "Organizations and Systematic Distortion of Information," Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering 113 (1987): 360-70; Paul R. Schulman, "The 'Logic' of Organizational Irrationality," Administration and Society 31 (1989): 31-53; Vaughan, "Challenger" Launch Decision; Diane Vaughan, "The Role of Organizations in the Production of Techno-Scientific Knowledge," Social Studies of Science 29 (1999): 913-43; Lee Clarke, Acceptable Risk? Making Decisions in a Toxic Environment (Berkeley, Calif., 1989), and Mission Improbable: Using Fantasy Documents to Tame Disaster (Chicago, 1999); Irving L. Janis, Groupthink (Boston, 1982).
68. Maury Silver and Daniel Geller, "On the Irrelevance of Evil: The Organization and Individual Action," Journal of Social Issues 34 (1978): 125-36; Graham Button and Wes Sharrock, "The Organizational Accountability of Technological Work," Social Studies of Science 28 (1998): 73-102; Karl E. Weick and Karlene H. Roberts, "Collective Mind in Organizations: Heedful Interrelating on Flight Decks," Administrative Science Quarterly 38 (1993): 357-81; Mark Granovetter, "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness," American Journal of Sociology 92 ((1985): 481-510; Lee Clarke and James F. Short Jr., "Social Organization and Risk: Some Current Controversies," Annual Review of Sociology 19 (1993): 375-99; Vaughan, "Challenger" Launch Decision; Diane Vaughan, "Rational Choice, Situated Action, and the Social Control of Organizations," Law and Society Review 32 (1998): 23-61.
69. Maury Silver and Daniel Geller, "On the Irrelevance of Evil: The Organization and Individual Action," Journal of Social Issues 34 (1978): 125-36; Graham Button and Wes Sharrock, "The Organizational Accountability of Technological Work," Social Studies of Science 28 (1998): 73-102; Karl E. Weick and Karlene H. Roberts, "Collective Mind in Organizations: Heedful Interrelating on Flight Decks," Administrative Science Quarterly 38 (1993): 357-81; Mark Granovetter, "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness," American Journal of Sociology 92 ((1985): 481-510; Lee Clarke and James F. Short Jr., "Social Organization and Risk: Some Current Controversies," Annual Review of Sociology 19 (1993): 375-99; Vaughan, "Challenger" Launch Decision; Diane Vaughan, "Rational Choice, Situated Action, and the Social Control of Organizations," Law and Society Review 32 (1998): 23-61.
70. Maury Silver and Daniel Geller, "On the Irrelevance of Evil: The Organization and Individual Action," Journal of Social Issues 34 (1978): 125-36; Graham Button and Wes Sharrock, "The Organizational Accountability of Technological Work," Social Studies of Science 28 (1998): 73-102; Karl E. Weick and Karlene H. Roberts, "Collective Mind in Organizations: Heedful Interrelating on Flight Decks," Administrative Science Quarterly 38 (1993): 357-81; Mark Granovetter, "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness," American Journal of Sociology 92 ((1985): 481-510; Lee Clarke and James F. Short Jr., "Social Organization and Risk: Some Current Controversies," Annual Review of Sociology 19 (1993): 375-99; Vaughan, "Challenger" Launch Decision; Diane Vaughan, "Rational Choice, Situated Action, and the Social Control of Organizations," Law and Society Review 32 (1998): 23-61.
71. Maury Silver and Daniel Geller, "On the Irrelevance of Evil: The Organization and Individual Action," Journal of Social Issues 34 (1978): 125-36; Graham Button and Wes Sharrock, "The Organizational Accountability of Technological Work," Social Studies of Science 28 (1998): 73-102; Karl E. Weick and Karlene H. Roberts, "Collective Mind in Organizations: Heedful Interrelating on Flight Decks," Administrative Science Quarterly 38 (1993): 357-81; Mark Granovetter, "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness," American Journal of Sociology 92 ((1985): 481-510; Lee Clarke and James F. Short Jr., "Social Organization and Risk: Some Current Controversies," Annual Review of Sociology 19 (1993): 375-99; Vaughan, "Challenger" Launch Decision; Diane Vaughan, "Rational Choice, Situated Action, and the Social Control of Organizations," Law and Society Review 32 (1998): 23-61.
72. Maury Silver and Daniel Geller, "On the Irrelevance of Evil: The Organization and Individual Action," Journal of Social Issues 34 (1978): 125-36; Graham Button and Wes Sharrock, "The Organizational Accountability of Technological Work," Social Studies of Science 28 (1998): 73-102; Karl E. Weick and Karlene H. Roberts, "Collective Mind in Organizations: Heedful Interrelating on Flight Decks," Administrative Science Quarterly 38 (1993): 357-81; Mark Granovetter, "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness," American Journal of Sociology 92 ((1985): 481-510; Lee Clarke and James F. Short Jr., "Social Organization and Risk: Some Current Controversies," Annual Review of Sociology 19 (1993): 375-99; Vaughan, "Challenger" Launch Decision; Diane Vaughan, "Rational Choice, Situated Action, and the Social Control of Organizations," Law and Society Review 32 (1998): 23-61.
73. Maury Silver and Daniel Geller, "On the Irrelevance of Evil: The Organization and Individual Action," Journal of Social Issues 34 (1978): 125-36; Graham Button and Wes Sharrock, "The Organizational Accountability of Technological Work," Social Studies of Science 28 (1998): 73-102; Karl E. Weick and Karlene H. Roberts, "Collective Mind in Organizations: Heedful Interrelating on Flight Decks," Administrative Science Quarterly 38 (1993): 357-81; Mark Granovetter, "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness," American Journal of Sociology 92 ((1985): 481-510; Lee Clarke and James F. Short Jr., "Social Organization and Risk: Some Current Controversies," Annual Review of Sociology 19 (1993): 375-99; Vaughan, "Challenger" Launch Decision; Diane Vaughan, "Rational Choice, Situated Action, and the Social Control of Organizations," Law and Society Review 32 (1998): 23-61.
74. Maury Silver and Daniel Geller, "On the Irrelevance of Evil: The Organization and Individual Action," Journal of Social Issues 34 (1978): 125-36; Graham Button and Wes Sharrock, "The Organizational Accountability of Technological Work," Social Studies of Science 28 (1998): 73-102; Karl E. Weick and Karlene H. Roberts, "Collective Mind in Organizations: Heedful Interrelating on Flight Decks," Administrative Science Quarterly 38 (1993): 357-81; Mark Granovetter, "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness," American Journal of Sociology 92 ((1985): 481-510; Lee Clarke and James F. Short Jr., "Social Organization and Risk: Some Current Controversies," Annual Review of Sociology 19 (1993): 375-99; Vaughan, "Challenger" Launch Decision; Diane Vaughan, "Rational Choice, Situated Action, and the Social Control of Organizations," Law and Society Review 32 (1998): 23-61.
75. The Quebec Bridge and Railway Company was managed by a shareholder's board, several members serving as the company's officers. Its president, Simon-Napoléon Parent, had been Quebec's premier and Quebec City's mayor. Dictionary of Canadian Biography, s.v. "Parent, Simon-Napoléon. "
76. Quebec Bridge Inquiry (n. 3 above), 1:15.
77. The Phoenix Bridge Company's original name, Clark, Reeves and Company, was changed in 1884.
78. Winpenny (n. 2 above). The Phoenix Bridge Company was a wholly owned subsidiary of Phoenix Iron, and the two companies shared the same address.
79. The Phoenix Bridge Company did the preliminary work on the design prior to 1903, but did not undertake the detailing and preparation of strain sheets until Canadian government financing was assured in the spring of 1903. Quebec Bridge Inquiry, 1:20-21, 37, 57-8, 62.
80. Ibid., 1:12-56. Two other organizations were also involved in the project. The Canadian firm M. P. Davis constructed the bridge's foundations between 1900 and 1903, but this work did not contribute to the disaster, so will not be considered here. The other organization was the Canadian Department of Railways and Canals. It had to approve all the plans and specifications because the bridge was part of a transcontinental railway project initiated by Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier in 1903. Yet the Department of Railways exercised this authority only nominally: it rubber-stamped whatever Cooper approved. Originally, the Department of Railways had intended to exercise active oversight of the project by retaining a bridge expert to review all the plans. Under pressure by QBRC, PBC, and Cooper, however, Laurier's government passed an Order in Council that released the Department of Railways from actively exercising this oversight.
81. The Royal Commission recognized the project's organizational uniqueness relative to other long-span bridges. Comparing the Quebec Bridge with five other long-span cantilever bridges, it found that all "were designed by independent engineers except the Quebec bridge." Quebec Bridge Inquiry 1:146; see also 2:50-51, 67-70, 345, 385-86, 399.
82. The Royal Commission recognized the project's organizational uniqueness relative to other long-span bridges. Comparing the Quebec Bridge with five other long-span cantilever bridges, it found that all "were designed by independent engineers except the Quebec bridge." Quebec Bridge Inquiry 1:146; see also 2:50-51, 67-70, 345, 385-86, 399.
83. Select Committee Report (n. 9 above), 66-69; Quebec Bridge Inquiry (n. 3 above), 1:12-55, 2:378; Quebec Bridge and Railway Company Minute Book, 25 November 1897, RG 43, vol. 698, file 28, NAC.
84. Select Committee Report (n. 9 above), 66-69; Quebec Bridge Inquiry (n. 3 above), 1:12-55, 2:378; Quebec Bridge and Railway Company Minute Book, 25 November 1897, RG 43, vol. 698, file 28, NAC.
85. Select Committee Report (n. 9 above), 66-69; Quebec Bridge Inquiry (n. 3 above), 1:12-55, 2:378; Quebec Bridge and Railway Company Minute Book, 25 November 1897, RG 43, vol. 698, file 28, NAC.
86. Select Committee Report (n. 9 above), 66-69; Quebec Bridge Inquiry (n. 3 above), 1:12-55, 2:378; Quebec Bridge and Railway Company Minute Book, 25 November 1897, RG 43, vol. 698, file 28, NAC.
87. The letters, proposals, and contracts establishing the project all emphasized economy and efficiency. Cooper, for example, could alter the specifications as long as the "efficiency" of the structure was maintained (meaning no increase in unit costs).
88. Richard Dobell, letter to Simon-Napoléon Parent, 26 April 1899, Wilfrid Laurier Papers, Correspondence, vol. 109, 33008, NAC.
89. Report of the Board of Engineers for the Quebec Bridge, 20 November 1918, RG 43, box 458, file 12630-2, NAC. The cost for the replacement superstructure included over one million dollars in expenses by the Board of Engineers. Inflation during World War I explains part of this price gap, but by no means all, particularly since much of the money was already spent before the war's outbreak.
90. Quebec Bridge Inquiry, 1:146.
91. Ibid., 1:150.
92. Ibid., 1:142.
93. The Quebec Bridge and Railway Company obtained government approval of its call for tenders on the basis of a PBC design provided without charge. The Royal Commission noted that QBRC's call for tenders, given the company's circumstances, "meant that each bridge company was asked to spend several thousand dollars on the preparation of plans and ... in return it was given an opportunity to bid for a contract to be let by a company of weak financial standing." It criticized this approach as "not satisfactory in view of the magnitude of the work." Quebec Bridge Inquiry (n. 3 above), 1:14, 35, 56; 2:387.
94. The Quebec Bridge and Railway Company obtained government approval of its call for tenders on the basis of a PBC design provided without charge. The Royal Commission noted that QBRC's call for tenders, given the company's circumstances, "meant that each bridge company was asked to spend several thousand dollars on the preparation of plans and ... in return it was given an opportunity to bid for a contract to be let by a company of weak financial standing." It criticized this approach as "not satisfactory in view of the magnitude of the work." Quebec Bridge Inquiry (n. 3 above), 1:14, 35, 56; 2:387.
95. Winpenny (n. 2 above), 77, notes PBC's reputation for "working cheap."
96. Petroski, Engineers of Dreams (n. 2 above), mentions Cooper's view of the Firth of Forth Bridge. Quebec Bridge Inquiry 1:40, 2:400; Board of Engineers, Quebec Bridge, Report No. 3, 4 December 1908, RG 43, box 443, NAC.
97. Petroski, Engineers of Dreams (n. 2 above), mentions Cooper's view of the Firth of Forth Bridge. Quebec Bridge Inquiry 1:40, 2:400; Board of Engineers, Quebec Bridge, Report No. 3, 4 December 1908, RG 43, box 443, NAC.
98. Petroski, Engineers of Dreams (n. 2 above), mentions Cooper's view of the Firth of Forth Bridge. Quebec Bridge Inquiry 1:40, 2:400; Board of Engineers, Quebec Bridge, Report No. 3, 4 December 1908, RG 43, box 443, NAC.
99. Petroski, Engineers of Dreams (n. 2 above), mentions Cooper's view of the Firth of Forth Bridge. Quebec Bridge Inquiry 1:40, 2:400; Board of Engineers, Quebec Bridge, Report No. 3, 4 December 1908, RG 43, box 443, NAC.
100. Carl Gayler, "Bridge Designing," Journal of the Association of Engineering Societies 42 (1909): 112.
101. Stresses were easier to calculate in pin-connected trusses. Pin connections also simplified manufacture and eliminated the skilled labor required for field riveting. Winpenny traces the history of the Phoenix Bridge Company within this broader context of a shift toward mass production in bridge building.
102. "Throughput" refers to the volume of work completed per unit of time, whether it be design work, computational work, manufacturing work, or erection work.
103. John Sterling Deans, Annual Report, Stockholders' Minute Book, 9 December 1902, ACC #916, vol. 386, Phoenix Bridge Company Papers, Hagley Museum and Library, Wilmington, Delaware.
104. Charles Scheidl of PBC did the detailing for the Quebec Bridge under Szlapka's direction. Quebec Bridge Inquiry (n. 3 above), 1:56-68, 2:378-98.
105. Charles Scheidl of PBC did the detailing for the Quebec Bridge under Szlapka's direction. Quebec Bridge Inquiry (n. 3 above), 1:56-68, 2:378-98.
106. In line with PBC's approach and the project's emphasis on thrift, no empirical tests or reverification of empirical formulas were made to double-check the design of the compression chords, even though these chords significantly exceeded the limits of previous experience.
107. George H. Thomson, "American Bridge Failures: Mechanical Pathology, Considered in Its Relation to Bridge Design," Engineering 46 (14 September 1888): 294.
108. Gayler (n. 34 above), 110.
109. Gayler (115-16) noted that the compression members of the Quebec Bridge "were admirably adapted to the work in the shop-what more desirable shape for shop work could be designed than the four-webbed compression members, each web consisting of 4 plates, 4 ft. wide, with angles at the ends and connected by lacing? Of real 'designing' there was practically none; the exigencies of the shop seem to have overshadowed everything."
110. The Memphis bridge was not built by PBC. Edgar Marburg, "Typical Compression Members in Long Span Bridges," Engineering Record 62 (3 September 1910): 256-58.
111. Arnold Koerte, Two Railway Bridges of an Era: Firth of Forth and Firth of Tay-Technical Progress, Disaster, and New Beginning in Victorian Engineering (Basel, 1992); Roland Paxton, ed., 100 Years of the Forth Bridge (London, 1990); Petroski, Engineers of Dreams (n. 2 above), 70-92. Like the compression chords of the Eads Bridge, those of the Firth of Forth Bridge were tubular structures.
112. Arnold Koerte, Two Railway Bridges of an Era: Firth of Forth and Firth of Tay-Technical Progress, Disaster, and New Beginning in Victorian Engineering (Basel, 1992); Roland Paxton, ed., 100 Years of the Forth Bridge (London, 1990); Petroski, Engineers of Dreams (n. 2 above), 70-92. Like the compression chords of the Eads Bridge, those of the Firth of Forth Bridge were tubular structures.
113. Arnold Koerte, Two Railway Bridges of an Era: Firth of Forth and Firth of Tay-Technical Progress, Disaster, and New Beginning in Victorian Engineering (Basel, 1992); Roland Paxton, ed., 100 Years of the Forth Bridge (London, 1990); Petroski, Engineers of Dreams (n. 2 above), 70-92. Like the compression chords of the Eads Bridge, those of the Firth of Forth Bridge were tubular structures.
114. Quebec Bridge Inquiry (n. 3 above), 1:9.
115. Ibid., 1:58.
116. The origin of the weight error has been obscured not only by the Royal Commission's report but also by historical misunderstanding. John Tarkov claimed it arose because the weight was not recalculated after deciding to increase the main span length from 1,600 feet to 1,800 feet. This conclusion is incorrect. When PBC submitted its tender for a 1,600-foot span length, the weight was estimated at forty-six million pounds. The estimate was revised to fifty-seven million pounds in December 1901, eighteen months after the decision was made to increase the main span to 1,800 feet. It was revised again in 1903 to around sixty-three million pounds, because the figure depended on the unit stresses allowed and Cooper altered these stress limits in July 1903. When the Royal Commission faulted Szlapka for not recomputing the bridge's weight, it did not mean that he failed to recalculate the original 1899 estimate, but rather that he failed to recalculate the 1903 estimate once all detail drawings for the bridge were completed. The Royal Commission noted in an appendix to its report (1:58) that the recalculation could have been undertaken beginning in 1905, once the anchor arm drawings were nearly complete. See Tarkov (n. 2 above), 14; Quebec Bridge Inquiry, 1:16, 57; 2:560.
117. The origin of the weight error has been obscured not only by the Royal Commission's report but also by historical misunderstanding. John Tarkov claimed it arose because the weight was not recalculated after deciding to increase the main span length from 1,600 feet to 1,800 feet. This conclusion is incorrect. When PBC submitted its tender for a 1,600-foot span length, the weight was estimated at forty-six million pounds. The estimate was revised to fifty-seven million pounds in December 1901, eighteen months after the decision was made to increase the main span to 1,800 feet. It was revised again in 1903 to around sixty-three million pounds, because the figure depended on the unit stresses allowed and Cooper altered these stress limits in July 1903. When the Royal Commission faulted Szlapka for not recomputing the bridge's weight, it did not mean that he failed to recalculate the original 1899 estimate, but rather that he failed to recalculate the 1903 estimate once all detail drawings for the bridge were completed. The Royal Commission noted in an appendix to its report (1:58) that the recalculation could have been undertaken beginning in 1905, once the anchor arm drawings were nearly complete. See Tarkov (n. 2 above), 14; Quebec Bridge Inquiry, 1:16, 57; 2:560.
118. The origin of the weight error has been obscured not only by the Royal Commission's report but also by historical misunderstanding. John Tarkov claimed it arose because the weight was not recalculated after deciding to increase the main span length from 1,600 feet to 1,800 feet. This conclusion is incorrect. When PBC submitted its tender for a 1,600-foot span length, the weight was estimated at forty-six million pounds. The estimate was revised to fifty-seven million pounds in December 1901, eighteen months after the decision was made to increase the main span to 1,800 feet. It was revised again in 1903 to around sixty-three million pounds, because the figure depended on the unit stresses allowed and Cooper altered these stress limits in July 1903. When the Royal Commission faulted Szlapka for not recomputing the bridge's weight, it did not mean that he failed to recalculate the original 1899 estimate, but rather that he failed to recalculate the 1903 estimate once all detail drawings for the bridge were completed. The Royal Commission noted in an appendix to its report (1:58) that the recalculation could have been undertaken beginning in 1905, once the anchor arm drawings were nearly complete. See Tarkov (n. 2 above), 14; Quebec Bridge Inquiry, 1:16, 57; 2:560.
119. Reaching a correct weight estimate was incompatible with a process of segmenting design and construction because the weight of each segment depended on the weights of the other segments. Holgate showed that he understood the organizational nature of the weight estimate error in testimony before a Select Committee of the Canadian House of Commons: "Had the plans of the bridge been made complete before the construction was begun ... the serious error of assuming too little dead load would have been avoided. This course was not followed." Select Committee Report (n. 9 above), 139.
120. For example, the south anchor arm components were all manufactured by the end of January 1905, but the stress sheets for the cantilever arm were only finalized four months later, in May 1905. Quebec Bridge Inquiry, 1:61-63.
121. When Szlapka was asked by the Royal Commission, "Why was not the whole scheme of the bridge fully considered in detail before shop work commenced?" he replied that this method of working "followed the usual course of business in such cases". Later he repeated that this course of action followed "the ordinary rule, which is imperative in all cases." He explained that he was instructed by Deans "to generally arrange the office work so as to insure continuous working on the bridge, in the shops and in the field." Ibid., 2:391.
122. Quebec Bridge Inquiry (n. 3 above), 1:62, 2:525. Significantly, Hoare's urgent request to PBC for a final weight figure in March 1907 was because of cost rather than safety concerns: the greater the weight, the greater the cost to QBRC. See also "Mr. Szlapka's Notebook," entry for 18 April 1904, RG 33, vol. 4, NAC.
123. Quebec Bridge Inquiry (n. 3 above), 1:62, 2:525. Significantly, Hoare's urgent request to PBC for a final weight figure in March 1907 was because of cost rather than safety concerns: the greater the weight, the greater the cost to QBRC. See also "Mr. Szlapka's Notebook," entry for 18 April 1904, RG 33, vol. 4, NAC.
124. Quebec Bridge Inquiry (n. 3 above), 1:62, 2:525. Significantly, Hoare's urgent request to PBC for a final weight figure in March 1907 was because of cost rather than safety concerns: the greater the weight, the greater the cost to QBRC. See also "Mr. Szlapka's Notebook," entry for 18 April 1904, RG 33, vol. 4, NAC.
125. Quebec Bridge Inquiry, 2:398.
126. Ibid., 1:31; Parent to Wilfrid Laurier, 25 April 1908, Wilfrid Laurier Papers, Correspondence, vol. 516, 139626-7; Alexander Johnson to John Deans, 11 April 1908, Wilfrid Laurier Papers, Correspondence, vol. 516, 139650.
127. Ibid., 1:31; Parent to Wilfrid Laurier, 25 April 1908, Wilfrid Laurier Papers, Correspondence, vol. 516, 139626-7; Alexander Johnson to John Deans, 11 April 1908, Wilfrid Laurier Papers, Correspondence, vol. 516, 139650.
128. Ibid., 1:31; Parent to Wilfrid Laurier, 25 April 1908, Wilfrid Laurier Papers, Correspondence, vol. 516, 139626-7; Alexander Johnson to John Deans, 11 April 1908, Wilfrid Laurier Papers, Correspondence, vol. 516, 139650.
129. Quebec Bridge Co., General Specifications for the Construction of the Superstructure of the St.-Lawrence Bridge, 1 September 1898, ACC #916, box 940, Phoenix Bridge Company Papers.
130. Quebec Bridge Inquiry, 2:457. The 1908 deadline coincided with celebrations for Quebec's Tercentenary, although these were eventually held over until the summer of 1909 to insure that the bridge's opening could be made a focal point of the festivities. See H. V. Nelles, The Art of Nation-Building: Pageantry and Spectacle at Quebec's Tercentenary (Toronto, 1999). Weather also played a role in scheduling. The building season for the Quebec Bridge ran from April through November.
131. Quebec Bridge Inquiry, 2:457. The 1908 deadline coincided with celebrations for Quebec's Tercentenary, although these were eventually held over until the summer of 1909 to insure that the bridge's opening could be made a focal point of the festivities. See H. V. Nelles, The Art of Nation-Building: Pageantry and Spectacle at Quebec's Tercentenary (Toronto, 1999). Weather also played a role in scheduling. The building season for the Quebec Bridge ran from April through November.
132. Quebec Bridge Inquiry, 2:352; Theodore Cooper, "American Railroad Bridges," Transactions of the American Society of Civil Engineers 21 ((1889): 22.
133. Quebec Bridge Inquiry, 2:352; Theodore Cooper,"American Railroad Bridges," Transactions of the American Society of Civil Engineers 21 ((1889): 22.
134. Dictionary of American Biography, s.v. "Cooper, Theodore." Cooper's longest bridge was the Sixth Street Bridge, built in 1892 over the Allegheny River in Pittsburgh. It had two spans of 439 feet each. See http://www.pghbridges.com/pittsburghW/0584-4477/sixth1892.htm. The Second Avenue Bridge over the Harlem River in New York City, which he designed before 1887, was a drawbridge whose longest span was 246 feet. Three other bridges he is known to have designed are not mentioned in leading engineering journals (Engineering News, Engineering Record) during the period Cooper was active, which suggests they were not long-span bridges.
135. Dictionary of American Biography, s.v. "Cooper, Theodore." Cooper's longest bridge was the Sixth Street Bridge, built in 1892 over the Allegheny River in Pittsburgh. It had two spans of 439 feet each. See http://www.pghbridges.com/pittsburghW/0584-4477/sixth1892.htm. The Second Avenue Bridge over the Harlem River in New York City, which he designed before 1887, was a drawbridge whose longest span was 246 feet. Three other bridges he is known to have designed are not mentioned in leading engineering journals (Engineering News, Engineering Record) during the period Cooper was active, which suggests they were not long-span bridges.
136. Quebec Bridge Inquiry (n. 3 above), 2:348.
137. "Biographical Sketch: J. A. L. Waddell," in Memoirs and Addresses of Two Decades by Dr. J. A. L. Waddell, ed. Frank W. Skinner (Easton, Pa., 1928), 7-18. Although Waddell was an active designing engineer, the bulk of his work involved routine bridges. He did not establish a reputation as a leading long-span bridge designer. J. A. L. Waddell, Bridge Engineering, 2 vols. (New York, 1916), 1:39.
138. "Biographical Sketch: J. A. L. Waddell," in Memoirs and Addresses of Two Decades by Dr. J. A. L. Waddell, ed. Frank W. Skinner (Easton, Pa., 1928), 7-18. Although Waddell was an active designing engineer, the bulk of his work involved routine bridges. He did not establish a reputation as a leading long-span bridge designer. J. A. L. Waddell, Bridge Engineering, 2 vols. (New York, 1916), 1:39.
139. Quebec Bridge and Railway Company Minute Book, 25 November 1897, RG 43, vol. 698, file 28, NAC; Theodore Cooper, letters to Ulrich Barthe, 26 November 1900 and 23 August 1901, letter to Edward Hoare, 26 July 1901, RG 33, vol. 3, NAC; Records of the Board of Engineers, Quebec Bridge Reconstruction, RG 43, vols. 448, 458, 508, NAC; Quebec Bridge Inquiry, 2:569.
140. Quebec Bridge and Railway Company Minute Book, 25 November 1897, RG 43, vol. 698, file 28, NAC; Theodore Cooper, letters to Ulrich Barthe, 26 November 1900 and 23 August 1901, letter to Edward Hoare, 26 July 1901, RG 33, vol. 3, NAC; Records of the Board of Engineers, Quebec Bridge Reconstruction, RG 43, vols. 448, 458, 508, NAC; Quebec Bridge Inquiry, 2:569.
141. Quebec Bridge and Railway Company Minute Book, 25 November 1897, RG 43, vol. 698, file 28, NAC; Theodore Cooper, letters to Ulrich Barthe, 26 November 1900 and 23 August 1901, letter to Edward Hoare, 26 July 1901, RG 33, vol. 3, NAC; Records of the Board of Engineers, Quebec Bridge Reconstruction, RG 43, vols. 448, 458, 508, NAC; Quebec Bridge Inquiry, 2:569.
142. Quebec Bridge and Railway Company Minute Book, 25 November 1897, RG 43, vol. 698, file 28, NAC; Theodore Cooper, letters to Ulrich Barthe, 26 November 1900 and 23 August 1901, letter to Edward Hoare, 26 July 1901, RG 33, vol. 3, NAC; Records of the Board of Engineers, Quebec Bridge Reconstruction, RG 43, vols. 448, 458, 508, NAC; Quebec Bridge Inquiry, 2:569.
143. Quebec Bridge and Railway Company Minute Book, 25 November 1897, RG 43, vol. 698, file 28, NAC; Theodore Cooper, letters to Ulrich Barthe, 26 November 1900 and 23 August 1901, letter to Edward Hoare, 26 July 1901, RG 33, vol. 3, NAC; Records of the Board of Engineers, Quebec Bridge Reconstruction, RG 43, vols. 448, 458, 508, NAC; Quebec Bridge Inquiry, 2:569.
144. Waddell, Bridge Engineering, 1:40.
145. For Schneider's comments, see Quebec Bridge Inquiry, 1:154.
146. Waddell, Bridge Engineering, 1:37. The rivet problems on the compression chords of the Quebec Bridge involved not only stress levels but also the quantity of rivets used. Schneider's technical report for the Royal Commission concluded that specific lattice bars on the chords required eight rivets, whereas only two were used. The Royal Commission hypothesized that the collapse may have been triggered by the "shearing of lattice rivets." Quebec Bridge Inquiry (n. 3 above), 1:99, 199.
147. Waddell, Bridge Engineering, 1:37. The rivet problems on the compression chords of the Quebec Bridge involved not only stress levels but also the quantity of rivets used. Schneider's technical report for the Royal Commission concluded that specific lattice bars on the chords required eight rivets, whereas only two were used. The Royal Commission hypothesized that the collapse may have been triggered by the "shearing of lattice rivets." Quebec Bridge Inquiry (n. 3 above), 1:99, 199.
148. Memoirs and Addresses of Two Decades by Dr. J. A. L. Waddell (n. 59 above), 873.
149. Waddell, Bridge Engineering (n. 59 above), 1:38.
150. Quebec Bridge Inquiry, 2:385.
151. Ibid., 1:146.
152. Gayler (n. 34 above), 116.
153. Quebec Bridge Inquiry (n. 3 above), 1:61, 2:347.
154. Quebec Bridge Inquiry (n. 3 above), 1:61, 2:347.
155. Cooper's agreement to act informally as chief engineer effectively increased his degree of responsibility, which left him more open to blame. The president of QBRC used this informal agreement to absolve QBRC management of responsibility for the consequences of its organizational decisions. Noting that he regarded Cooper as "in fact chief engineer of the enterprise ... though nominally only consulting engineer" and that Cooper had "absolute control of the work," Parent suggested that any problems with the design and specifications were Cooper's responsibility alone. He recalled that Cooper was behind "the few changes which may have been made in the plans and in the specifications" and that "the board relied entirely upon Mr. Cooper for the proper execution of the work." The fact that Cooper's formal title, job description, and pay, as well as his inability to travel to Quebec and inadequate technical support staff were all inconsistent with Parent's interpretation of Cooper's job description did not bother Parent in the least. Quebec Bridge Inquiry, 2:422-23.
156. Engineering News 60 (17 September 1908): 307. The technical issues raised by the Quebec Bridge collapse were also significant. The disaster revealed areas of inadequate technical knowledge that occupied engineers for years after the event. Dozens of articles appeared in Engineering News, Engineering Record, Engineer, and other technical journals investigating theory of columns, theory of latticing, empirical testing of columns, strength of specialty steels, and so on.
157. The Phoenix Bridge Company claimed publicly that "the Phoenix Bridge Company and the Phoenix Iron Company are exonerated of contributing in any way to the cause of the disaster, the defects being placed in fundamental errors in design)." See "The Collapse of the Quebec Bridge," Bulletin of the American Iron and Steel Association 42 (1 April 1908): 26.
158. In view of Johnson's report, Parent estimated that "three or four years would elapse before a single member of the new superstructure could be put in place on the bridge." Parent to Wilfrid Laurier, 25 April 1908, Wilfrid Laurier Papers, Correspondence, vol. 516, 139626-7, NAC. See also Articles of Agreement between the Phoenix Bridge Company and the Quebec Bridge and Railway Company, 21 April 1908, Wilfrid Laurier Papers, Correspondence, vol. 516, 139631-5; Alexander Johnson to John Deans, 11 April 1908, Wilfrid Laurier Papers, Correspondence, vol. 516, 139650.
159. In view of Johnson's report, Parent estimated that "three or four years would elapse before a single member of the new superstructure could be put in place on the bridge." Parent to Wilfrid Laurier, 25 April 1908, Wilfrid Laurier Papers, Correspondence, vol. 516, 139626-7, NAC. See also Articles of Agreement between the Phoenix Bridge Company and the Quebec Bridge and Railway Company, 21 April 1908, Wilfrid Laurier Papers, Correspondence, vol. 516, 139631-5; Alexander Johnson to John Deans, 11 April 1908, Wilfrid Laurier Papers, Correspondence, vol. 516, 139650.
160. In view of Johnson's report, Parent estimated that "three or four years would elapse before a single member of the new superstructure could be put in place on the bridge." Parent to Wilfrid Laurier, 25 April 1908, Wilfrid Laurier Papers, Correspondence, vol. 516, 139626-7, NAC. See also Articles of Agreement between the Phoenix Bridge Company and the Quebec Bridge and Railway Company, 21 April 1908, Wilfrid Laurier Papers, Correspondence, vol. 516, 139631-5; Alexander Johnson to John Deans, 11 April 1908, Wilfrid Laurier Papers, Correspondence, vol. 516, 139650.
161. Select Committee Report (n. 9 above), 140.
162. One modification of this system was that, in addition to bidding on the board's design, tendering companies could submit their own designs, as long as they followed the board's detailed specifications. Some companies used this opportunity to modify the board's design to overcome certain manufacturing and erection problems it posed. The organizational system thus allowed a creative interaction between the board's engineers and the manufacturers' engineers, and in fact a Canadian company's adapted design won the board's final approval. But the board still closely oversaw every detail of the design and construction of the bridge. See Middleton's account of the rebuilding project (n. 2 above), 105-74. See also correspondence and reports of the board of engineers, RG 43, vol. 402, file 8419.1; RG 43, vol. 448, file 12.630.1; RG 43, vol. 458, file 13,258; RG 43, vol. 508, file 15,666, NAC.
163. One modification of this system was that, in addition to bidding on the board's design, tendering companies could submit their own designs, as long as they followed the board's detailed specifications. Some companies used this opportunity to modify the board's design to overcome certain manufacturing and erection problems it posed. The organizational system thus allowed a creative interaction between the board's engineers and the manufacturers' engineers, and in fact a Canadian company's adapted design won the board's final approval. But the board still closely oversaw every detail of the design and construction of the bridge. See Middleton's account of the rebuilding project (n. 2 above), 105-74. See also correspondence and reports of the board of engineers, RG 43, vol. 402, file 8419.1; RG 43, vol. 448, file 12.630.1; RG 43, vol. 458, file 13,258; RG 43, vol. 508, file 15,666, NAC.
164. One modification of this system was that, in addition to bidding on the board's design, tendering companies could submit their own designs, as long as they followed the board's detailed specifications. Some companies used this opportunity to modify the board's design to overcome certain manufacturing and erection problems it posed. The organizational system thus allowed a creative interaction between the board's engineers and the manufacturers' engineers, and in fact a Canadian company's adapted design won the board's final approval. But the board still closely oversaw every detail of the design and construction of the bridge. See Middleton's account of the rebuilding project (n. 2 above), 105-74. See also correspondence and reports of the board of engineers, RG 43, vol. 402, file 8419.1; RG 43, vol. 448, file 12.630.1; RG 43, vol. 458, file 13,258; RG 43, vol. 508, file 15,666, NAC.
165. One modification of this system was that, in addition to bidding on the board's design, tendering companies could submit their own designs, as long as they followed the board's detailed specifications. Some companies used this opportunity to modify the board's design to overcome certain manufacturing and erection problems it posed. The organizational system thus allowed a creative interaction between the board's engineers and the manufacturers' engineers, and in fact a Canadian company's adapted design won the board's final approval. But the board still closely oversaw every detail of the design and construction of the bridge. See Middleton's account of the rebuilding project (n. 2 above), 105-74. See also correspondence and reports of the board of engineers, RG 43, vol. 402, file 8419.1; RG 43, vol. 448, file 12.630.1; RG 43, vol. 458, file 13,258; RG 43, vol. 508, file 15,666, NAC.
166. One modification of this system was that, in addition to bidding on the board's design, tendering companies could submit their own designs, as long as they followed the board's detailed specifications. Some companies used this opportunity to modify the board's design to overcome certain manufacturing and erection problems it posed. The organizational system thus allowed a creative interaction between the board's engineers and the manufacturers' engineers, and in fact a Canadian company's adapted design won the board's final approval. But the board still closely oversaw every detail of the design and construction of the bridge. See Middleton's account of the rebuilding project (n. 2 above), 105-74. See also correspondence and reports of the board of engineers, RG 43, vol. 402, file 8419.1; RG 43, vol. 448, file 12.630.1; RG 43, vol. 458, file 13,258; RG 43, vol. 508, file 15,666, NAC.
167. H. E. Vautelet, Report to George P. Graham, Minister of Railways and Canals, 17 June 1909, RG 43, vol. 448, file 12.630.1, NAC.
168. Waddell, Bridge Engineering (n. 59 above), 1:30.
169. J. A. L. Waddell, "The Present Status of the Engineering Profession and How It May Be Improved," in Addresses to Engineering Students, ed. J. A. L. Waddell and John Lyle Harrington, 2nd ed. (Kansas City, Mo., 1912), 282.
170. Select Committee Report, xviii-xx.
171. John McMahon to Prime Minister Laurier, 10 October 1908, Wilfrid Laurier Papers, Correspondence (microfilm), reel C-867, p. 145805, NAC. The newspaper article (from the Toronto Globe) was included with McMahon's letter.
172. Middleton (n. 2 above), 105. Despite its official "exoneration, " PBC never fully recovered from the blow to its reputation. See Winpenny (n. 2 above).
173. Middleton (n. 2 above), 105. Despite its official "exoneration, " PBC never fully recovered from the blow to its reputation. See Winpenny (n. 2 above).
174. Sharon Beder, "Toward a More Representative Engineering Education," Journal of Applied Engineering Education 5 (1989): 173-82.
175. See Hughes's recent book Rescuing Prometheus: Four Monumental Projects that Changed the Modern World (New York, 1998).