Ruth Anna Putnam and the fact-value distinction

Philosophy

Volumn 74, Issue 289, 1999, Pages 431-437

  Smart, J J C ^a  

^a AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 62949231043     PISSN: 00318191     EISSN: 1469817X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s0031819199000480     Document Type: Review

References (11)

1. Ruth Anna Putnam, 'Creating Facts and Values', Philosophy 60, No. 232 (April 1985), 187-204
2. 'Weaving Seamless Webs', Philosophy 62, No. 240 (April 1987), 207-220
3. and 'Perceiving Facts and Values', Philosophy 73, No. 283 (January 1998), 5-19
4. 'True to the Facts', in Donald Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984)
5. 'Perceiving Facts and Values', p. 14
6. For my defence of metaphysical realism see J.J.C. Smart, 'Realism v. Idealism', Philosophy, 61 (1986), 295-312
7. 'A Form of Metaphysical Realism', Philosophical Quarterly, 45 (1995), 301-15
8. See J. J. C. Smart, 'Why Philosophers Disagree', in Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplement, 19 (1993), 69-82
9. See J. J. C. Smart, 'Utilitarianism and Punishment', Israel Law Review, 25 (1991), 360-75, especially pp. 364-65
10. M. Zimmerman, 'The "Is-ought" Barrier: an unnecessary dualism', Mind 71 (1962), 53-61
11. See D. H. Monro, Empiricism and Ethics (London: Cambridge University Press, 1967)