Forced flexibility: A migrant woman's struggle for settlement

China Journal

Volumn , Issue 61, 2009, Pages 51-76

  Mun, Young Cho ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ELECTION; HUMAN SETTLEMENT; LANDOWNER; MIGRANT WORKER; MIGRATION; RURAL POPULATION; TELECOMMUNICATION; VOTING BEHAVIOR;

ASIA; CHINA; EURASIA; FAR EAST; HARBIN; HEILONGJIANG;

EID: 62749192525     PISSN: 13249347     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (106)

1. Li Zhang, Strangers in the City: Reconfigurations of Space, Power, and Social Networks within China's Floating Population (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 32.
2. Biao Xiang and Shen Tan, "Does Migration Research Matter in China? A Review of Migration Research and Its Relations to Policy since the 1980s" (Unpublished Paper), Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, Oxford University (2005), p. 13.
3. To cite just a few examples, see Dorothy Solinger, Contesting Citizenship in Urban China: Peasants, Migrants, the State, and the Logic of the Market (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999);
4. Feng Xu, Women Migrant Workers in China's Economic Reform (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000);
5. Li Zhang, Strangers in the City;
6. Qiang Li, Nongmingong yu Zhongguo shehui fenceng (Rural Migrants and China's Social Stratification) (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxuan Chubanshe, 2004);
7. Arianne M. Gaetano and Tamara Jacka, On the Move: Women and Rural-to-Urban Migration in Contemporary China (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004);
8. Biao Xiang, Transcending Boundaries: Zhejiangcun: The Story of a Migrant Village in Beijing (Leiden: Brill, 2005);
9. Pun Ngai, Made in China: Women Factory Workers in a Global Workplace (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005);
10. Tamara Jacka, Rural Women in Urban China: Gender, Migration and Social Change (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2006).
11. For more detail, see Biao Xiang and Shen Tan, "Does Migration Research Matter in China?", p. 8;
12. Gloria Davies and Gaby Ramia, "Governance Reform towards 'Serving Migrant Workers' : The Local Implementation of Central Government Regulations", The China Quarterly, No. 193 (March 2008), p. 142.
13. During his inspection trip to Chongqing in October 2003, Wen Jiabao met Xiong Deming, wife of a migrant worker, who told him that her husband's boss had held up 2,300 yuan of his salary (equivalent to about US$300). Xiong's husband was reimbursed within six hours of her conversation with the premier. People's Daily Online (12 November 2003), http://english.peopledaily.com. cn/200311/12/eng20031112-128143.shtml, last accessed 3 March 2008.
14. Announced in 2006 in Harbin, the governmental decision that guarantees the equal treatment (especially school expenses) of migrant children in cities is the principal reform affecting the quality of life of rural migrants. However, this reform is limited to access to free primary education. After nine years of schooling, migrants must return to their homes in order to avoid paying more than twice as much for their children's education as other citizens do.
15. Analyzing migrants' familial, regional, and ethnic networks, scholars have criticized public accounts that view the flow of migrants as directionless (mangliu). For instance, see Li Zhang, Strangers in the City; Lei Guang, "Rural Taste, Urban Fashions: The Cultural Politics of Rural/Urban Difference in Contemporary China", Positions, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2003), p. 620. Nevertheless, the "flexibility" in the lives of migrants has often been taken for granted. This tendency has, unwittingly, led us to assume that their in-between lives are based on their voluntary choice.
16. Kam Wing Chan, Cities With Invisible Walls: Reinterpreting Urbanization in Post-1949 China (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1994);
17. Mark Selden and Tiejun Cheng, "The Origins and Social Consequences of China's Hukou System", The China Quarterly, No. 139 (September 1994), pp. 644-68;
18. Dorothy J. Solinger, "The Floating Population in the Cities: Chances for Assimilation?", in Deborah Davis, Richard Kraus, Barry Haughton and Elizabeth J. Perry (eds), Urban Spaces in Contemporary China: The Potential for Autonomy and Community in Post-Mao China (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), pp. 113-39;
19. Delia Davin, Internal Migration in Contemporary China (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999);
20. Kam Wing Chan and Li Zhang, "The Hukou System and Rural-Urban Migration in China: Processes and Changes", The China Quarterly, No. 160 (December 1999), pp. 818-55.
21. James Ferguson, Expectations of Modernity: Myths and Meanings of Urban Life on the Zambian Copperbelt (Berkeley: California University Press, 1999), p. 38. In his ethnography, Ferguson traces the lives of urban workers who live and work for years in the Copperbelt but have little choice but to return to rural areas in the wake of Zambia's economic crisis.
22. James Ferguson, Expectations of Modernity, pp. 80, 128.
23. In this article, except for large places such as Harbin, Binxian and Hadong, all names of places, persons and government offices are pseudonyms.
24. Personal narratives have often been used to add a human dimension to academic arguments. For instance, Chun Lin, as a Chinese intellectual, explores key moments in her own life history as a means of participating in arguments over whether 1949 should be considered a watershed year for attaining gender equality in China. Chun Lin, "Toward a Chinese Feminism: A Personal Story", in Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom (ed.), Twentieth-Century China: New Approaches (New York: Routledge, 2003), pp. 66-80.
25. João Biehl, Vita: Life in a Zone of Social Abandonment (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), p. 13.
26. Under the One Child Policy, Aunt Sun paid a fine of 1,200 yuan (about US$155) upon the birth of her second child. Sun says, "In those days, life was better than now. Though my family fell into debt due to the fine, it was worth trying. I got a boy!"
27. In administration, Hadong includes 11 communities (shequ) of the Hexing street office (jiedao banshichu) with about 60,000 people. Four out of 11 communities belong to northern areas of Hadong, with 18,310 people (as of July 2007) (data from shequ officials of each community).
28. Respecting advice from my informants, I will avoid referring to the products of this factory.
29. Local government officials explain that the bankruptcy came late because the decision to close the factory had to be made by the central government, due to political factors. One official said, "The factory belongs to the state (guojiade dongxi). You cannot-and should not-close it of your own accord."
30. Wang demonstrates that, in the recent reform (1997-2002) of the hukou system, this relaxation targeted certain selected groups of people such as "elderly parents, children, and highly educated 'talented people' and skilled workers". In particular, the localized practice often called "hukou for talents and investments" has further been polished and nationally encouraged. See Fei-Ling Wang, Organizing through Division and Exclusion (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), pp. 86-112,
31. and Fei-Ling Wang, "Reformed Migration Control and New Targeted People: China's Hukou System in the 2000s", The China Quarterly, No. 177 (March 2004), p. 119.
32. Li Zhang, "Spatiality and Urban Citizenship in Late Socialist China", Public Culture, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2002), p. 319.
33. This amount is equivalent to approximately US$20,000. Internal material of Harbin police bureau. The policy began in January 1998.
34. See Li Zhang, Strangers in the City,
35. and Biao Xiang, Transcending Boundaries.
36. For example, see Julia Paley, Marketing Democracy: Power and Social Movements in Post-Dictatorship Chile (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001);
37. Daniel M. Goldstein, The Spectacular City: Violence and Performance in Urban Bolivia (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004);
38. Mun Young Cho, From "Power to the People " to "Civil Empowerment ": The Making of Neoliberal Governmentality in Grassroots Movements for the Urban Poor in South Korea. East-West Center International Graduate Student Conference Series, No. 13 (2005).
39. Data as of July 2007. From one shequ official who implements the One Child Policy at one community in northern Hadong, I have found a statistical record corresponding to the locally common narrative, though the record remains unofficial. In her own research in late 2006, the number of migrants (400 households) and urban residents (435 households) is almost the same.
40. For instance, surveys conducted by the Heilongjiang Academy of Social Sciences in 2003 and 2004 and by the Social Security Research Group of the Heilongjiang Party Committee in 2007 focused only on work environments of migrants in factories and construction sites. See Tianfei Wu and Jiabao Xiu, "Jincheng nü nongmingong 20sui jiu tuixiu" (Migrant Women Retire Only at the Age of 20), Harbin ribao (Harbin Daily) (22 December 2003);
41. Yu Tian, "Heilongjiang sheng nongmingong quanyi baozhang zhuangkuang fenxi" (Analysis of the Labor Conditions of Rural Migrant Workers in Heilongjiang), in Shuqin Ai (ed.), 2005 nian Heilongjiang sheng shehui xingshi (Social Conditions in Heilongjiang in 2005) (Harbin: Heilongjiangsheng Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 2005); the Social Security Research Group of the Heilongjiang Party, "Heilongjiang sheng nongmin gong shehui baozhang wenti yanjiu" (Study on the Social Security of Rural Migrants in Heilongjiang) (Unpublished paper, 2008).
42. Hongyang Dong, Heitudi wenhua (Culture of Black Soil) (Harbin: Heilongjiangsheng Chubanshe, 2006). In this book, Dong links the regional culture of "black soil" to the quality (suzhi) of people in the northeast.
43. Kai Bing, "Dongbei ren: ni cha nar le?" (Northeasterners: Where are the Differences?), Xiandai shangye yinhang (Modern Commercial Banking) No. 2 (2004), pp. 20-21;
44. Liping Sun, Shiheng; duanlie shehui de yunzuo luoji (Imbalance: The Logic of a Fractured Society) (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2004), pp. 178-202;
45. Quanzhi Zhang, "Zhenxing dongbei, shouxian yao zhenxing dongbeiren de jingshen" (The Revitalization of Northeast People Should Precede the Project of Revitalizing the Northeast), Xianlun guancha (Theory Observe) Vol. 26, No. 2 (2004), pp. 11-12;
46. Shumao Wang, "Tiaoshi dongbeiren de shehui xinli" (Adjustment Problems in the Social Psychology of People in the Northeast), Gongchan dangyuan (Communist Party Member) No. 7 (2004), p. 25.
47. In her insightful analysis of the experience of migrant youths in China, Yan is against "the transfer of surplus rural labor power", a term often used by scholars and the Chinese government when they describe labor migration from the countryside to the cities. She argues: "the irony is that the migrants, rather than 'surplus' labor, consist mostly of better educated rural youth who are most needed for innovative agricultural production". Hairong Yan, "Specialization of the Rural: Reinterpreting the Labor Mobility of Rural Young Women in Post-Mao China", American Ethnologist, Vol. 30, No. 4 (2003), p. 586.
48. The average annual rent of land near Hadong is 300 yuan per mu. Migrants farming near Hadong have rented out their land to their neighbors or relatives in the countryside at much lower rates, for only 100-150 yuan per mu (1 mu = 0.1647 acres).
49. Aunt Sun and most rural migrants whom I met in Hadong still call themselves "peasants" regardless of how long they have spent in the city.
50. William Hurst and Kevin O'Brien, "China's Contentious Pensioners", The China Quarterly, No. 170 (June 2002), p. 350.
51. Laid-off workers received a lump sum representing about 1,570 yuan (about US$215) for each year of service in the factory.
52. The poverty line in Harbin was adjusted to 100 yuan per month in 1997, 140 yuan in 1998, 182 yuan in 1999-2000, 200 yuan in 2001-06, and 245 yuan after 2007. (This brings the present level to about US$34.)
53. Sun's argument should not be interpreted to mean that no pension scheme exists in China's countryside. After the market reform, both the collapse of communes and the crisis of familial support - partly driven by the One Child Policy - led the state to consider the implementation of a rural pension scheme as early as the beginning of the 1990s (see Shih-Jiunn Shi, "Left to Market and Family - Again? Ideas and the Development of the Rural Pension Policy in China", Social Policy and Administration, Vol. 40, No. 7 [December 2006], pp. 791-806).
54. Furthermore, the extensive expropriation of rural land by local governments in recent years increased the need for a pension scheme. See Wenjie Zhou and Sujin Zhao, "Zhongguo nongcun yanglao baozhang wenti yanjiu" (Study on China's Rural Pension Scheme), Journal of Jilin College of Finance and Taxation, No. 78 (January 2006), pp. 67-70;
55. Weidong Dai, "Zhongguo nongcun yanglao baoxian zhidu yanjiu shuping" (Critique of China's Rural Pension Scheme), China Rural Survey (January 2007), pp. 71-79.
56. However, Shi demonstrates that the policy is still in a morass due to "the dominant idea that land, family, and market provision should remain the chief pillars of rural old-age security". Shih-Jiunn Shi, "Left to Market and Family - Again?", p. 800. Insufficient financial backing for the system as well as less-than-adequate coverage have been noted as problems of the rural pension scheme. In Heilongjiang in 2006, for instance, the number of basic pension insurance participants was 1,807,000 in the countryside and 8,010,000 in the city. This means that 95 per cent of urban employed persons and only 19 per cent of rural employed persons participated in the pension scheme. China Statistical Yearbook 2007 (Beijing: China Statistics Books, 2007), p. 903, p. 908;
57. Heilongjiang Statistical Yearbook 2007 (Beijing: China Statistics Books, 2007), p. 63.
58. By this narrative, I do not mean to suggest that filial piety has been a permanent value in rural China. In his study of a rural village in north China, Yan discusses the decline of familial support in contrast to the argument that the market reform and the restoration of family farming will lead to a return of patriarchal power. In response to the introduction of values associated with the market economy, the position of the aged has been more vulnerable "once the mystified image of parental superiority collapsed and the younger generation rejected the principle of filial piety". Yunxiang Yan, Private Life Under Socialism: Love, Intimacy, and Family Change in a Chinese Village, 1949-1999 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 188.
59. Regarding changing mores for support of the elderly in post-Mao China, see Deborah Davis and Stevan Harrell, Chinese Families in the Post-Mao Era (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993);
60. Martin King Whyte, "The Fate of Filial Obligations in Urban China", The China Journal, No. 38 (July 1997), pp. 1-31;
61. Yunxiang Yan, Private Life Under Socialism;
62. Lihua Pang, Alan De Brauw and Scott Rozelle, "Working Until You Drop: The Elderly of Rural China", The China Journal, No. 52 (July 2004), pp. 73-94;
63. Charlotte Ikels (ed.), Filial Piety: Practice and Discourse in Contemporary East Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).
64. I agree with Ikels, who argues that the actual practice of filial piety is situationally dependent and that expectations of filial behavior are subject to contestation. Charlotte Ikels, "Introduction" in Charlotte Ikels (ed.), Filial Piety, pp. 1-15.
65. Without adequate funding for governance, even this labor-oriented policy was not fully implemented at the local level. See Gloria Davies and Gaby Ramia, "Governance Reform towards 'Serving Migrant Workers'", pp. 140-49. Davies and Ramia introduce the case of Harbin in addressing difficulties encountered in the local implementation of central regulations.
66. As of August 2007, the cleaning fee (weisheng fei) which residents are required to pay is 3.6 yuan per quarter and the security fee (zhian fei) is 12 yuan per year. The security fee has recently been renamed as the community management fee (shequ guanli fei) because many residents have refused to pay it because of frequently occurring robbery within the community. Community officials tend to collect a year's total sum (26.4 yuan) especially from rural migrants, who they believe may leave the community at any time.
67. To understand how rural poverty is attributed to the "low suzhi" of peasants, see Hairong Yan, "Neoliberal Governmentality and Neohumanism: Organizing Suzhi/Value Flow through Labor Recruitment Networks", Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 18, No. 4 (2003), pp. 493-507;
68. Andrew Kipnis, "Suzhi: A Keyword Approach", The China Quarterly, No. 186 (June 2006), pp. 295-313.
69. This argument should not be misunderstood as underestimating the difficulties of urban laid-off workers and pensioners. As Solinger indicates, many urban laid-off workers are not prepared to plunge into private and informal work; this is in contrast to rural migrants, who have often found their niche in that realm on the basis of their origin and aspirations. Dorothy J. Solinger, "Labor Market Reform and the Plight of the Laid-off Proletariat", The China Quarterly, No. 170 (June 2002), pp. 304-26. What intrigues me is that urban laid-off workers and rural migrants do not so much form a common identity through shared economic difficulty and social marginalization as differentiate themselves from each other by focusing on whose condition is more disadvantageous.
70. To understand how the political rhetoric of "peasants" has been changed in the PRC, see Andrew B. Kipnis, "Within and Against Peasantness: Backwardness and Filiality in Rural China", Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 37, No. 1 (January 1995), pp. 110-35.
71. Myron Cohen, "Cultural and Political Inventions in Modern China: The Case of the Chinese 'Peasant'", Daedalus, Vol. 122, No. 2 (Spring 1993), p. 27. In his work, Cohen argues that the creation of "the peasant" as comprising a distinct and backward cultural category is related less to the culture of the country's rural inhabitants and more to an élite antitraditionalism. In this article, however, my emphasis is not upon who is to be blamed for creating this view of "the peasant", but rather on how rural migrants have come to embrace the term themselves.
72. Article 5: "Members of the collective economic organizations in rural areas shall, according to law, have the right to undertake rural land contracts with their own collective economic organizations that give out the contracts. No organizations or individuals may deprive the members of the rural collective economic organizations of their right to undertake contracts or illegally restrict such right." A person is a member of the collective as far as his/her hukou belongs to the collective. Law of the People's Republic of China on Land Contracts in Rural Areas (hereafter "Law on Land Contracts"). The law was adopted at the 29th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People's Congress on 29 August 2002 and went into effect as of 1 March 2003.
73. Fuquan Wang, '"Shidi nongmin' ruoshi qunti liyi baohu de lifa quexian" (Legal Deficiency in Protecting the Rights of "Displaced Peasants"), Journal of Henan Business College, Vol. 19, No. 5 (September 2006), p. 88.
74. Peter Ho, "Who Owns China's Land? Property Rights and Deliberate Institutional Ambiguity", The China Quarterly, No. 166 (June 2001), pp. 394-421;\
75. Loren Brandt, Jikun Huang, Guo Li and Scott Rozelle, "Land Rights in Rural China: Facts, Fictions and Issues", The China Journal, No. 47 (January 2002), pp. 67-97;
76. Xiwen Chen, "Xianxing tudi zhengce de zhengjie" (Deadlock of the Current Land Policy), Nongcun hezuo jingji jingying guanli (Management and Administration on Rural Cooperative Economy), Vol. 12 (2002).
77. For example, see Xiaolin Guo, "Land Expropriation and Rural Conflicts in China", The China Quarterly, No. 169 (March 2002), pp. 422-39;
78. Yongshun Cai, "Collective Ownership or Cadre's Ownership? The Non-agricultural Use of Farmland in China", The China Quarterly, No. 171 (September 2003), pp. 662-80;
79. Gui-hua Cao and Wei-juan Yu, "Jiejue shidi nongmin wenti de guanjian: wanshan tudi zhengyong zhidu" (Improving the System of Land Expropriation and Requisition to Resolve the Problems of the Farmers Losing their Lands), Resources Administration and the Legal System (November 2006), pp. 27-29.
80. Zhaojun Liu and Yuqing Chen, "Lun nongmingong tudi quanyi de falü baohu" (Legal Protection of Rural Migrants' Land Rights), Faxue yu shijue (Legal Science and Practice) (April 2006), pp. 44-46.
81. Ching Kwan Lee, Against the Law: Labor Protests in China's Rustbelt and Sunbelt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), p. 209.
82. Ellen Judd, "Land Divided, Land United", The China Quarterly, No. 130 (June 1992), pp. 338-56;
83. Ellen Judd, Gender and Power in Rural North China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996);
84. Tamara Jacka, Women's Work in Rural China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997);
85. Zongmin Li, Women's Land Rights in Rural China: A Synthesis (Beijing: Ford Foundation Office, 2002);
86. Jennifer Brown, Protecting Women's Land Rights Through RLCL Implementing Regulations (Seattle: Rural Development Institute, 2003);
87. Denise Hare, Li Yang and Daniel Englander, "Land Management in Rural China and Its Gender Implications", Feminist Economics, Vol. 13, No. 3-4 (July/October 2007), pp. 35-61;
88. Junjie Chen and Gale Summerfield, "Gender and Rural Reforms in China: A Case Study of Population Control and Land Rights Policies in Northern Liaoning", Feminist Economics, Vol. 13, No. 3-4 (July/October 2007), pp. 63-92.
89. Ellen Judd, "Land Divided, Land United", p. 346;
90. Ellen Judd, Gender and Power in Rural North China, pp. 23-59.
91. Denise Hare, Li Yang and Daniel Englander, "Land Management in Rural China", pp. 35-61;
92. Junjie Chen and Gale Summerfield, "Gender and Rural Reforms in China", pp. 63-92 (esp. No. 11).
93. Zongmin Li, Women's Land Rights in Rural China.
94. Article 16(2): The contractor shall enjoy the right to enjoy "in accordance with lawful right to obtain appropriate compensation for the contracted land that is requisitioned or occupied according to law" (in "Law on Land Contract").
95. As unbearable peasant burdens provoked widespread riots, the central government implemented a major tax reform in 2002, completely rescinding compulsory fees for farmers, except for the basic agricultural tax. This major reform, in turn, was followed by the repeal of the agricultural tax in 2006. See An Chen, "The Dilemma of Governance in the Chinese Countryside", Harvard International Review (7 September 2007).
96. Article 20 in "Law on Land Contract".
97. As far as administration goes, Binxian belongs to Harbin as one of its seven satellite counties.
98. Sally Sargeson, "Subduing 'the Rural House-Building Craze': Attitudes towards Housing Construction and Land Use Controls in Four Zhejiang Villages", The China Quarterly, No. 169 (March 2002), pp. 927-55.
99. The major difference between the two groups is that most urban residents own their own housing in Hadong while rural migrants are their tenants. When the factory in Hadong officially announced its bankruptcy in 2005, its workers - including retirees - obtained full ownership rights to their housing, which had been allocated to them in the 1950s, after paying 70 yuan per square meter.
100. As of the December of 2007, the average price (per square meter) of housing in Harbin is 3,688 yuan (about US$500). This amount is much lower than that in rich cities such as Beijing (14,470 yuan), Shanghai (10,292 yuan) and Shenzhen (10,226 yuan), while it is higher than that in poor cities in the West such as Lanzhou (2,591 yuan) and Xining (2,911 yuan). Data from the National Development and Reform Commission ("www.sdpc.gov.cn), accessed 7 February 2008.
101. Pingfang, a typical form of public housing in the Mao period, did not merely reflect a physical form of urban architecture. As Zhang emphasized, it was intended to "to create a collective form of social life and egalitarian social relationships through spatial reorganization, while maximizing the use of space and minimizing construction costs". Li Zhang, "Privatizing Urban Housing and Governmentality in Reform-Era China" (2004), Unpublished Paper. Zhang traces the shift from public housing controlled by work-units to the predominance of commercially developed, consumer-oriented private housing in China.
102. Lisa Rofel, Desiring China: Experiments in Neoliberalism, Sexuality, and Public Culture (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), p. 24.
103. Xueguo always showed reluctance whenever his mother tried to take back his family's lost land or to purchase a new house in the city. In this sense, he would seem to act against the conventional expectation that a son should make a claim for property rights in place of his late father. As a temporary worker in the city for almost ten years, however, he has found that it is useless for "poor people like his family" - in his own words - to make such a claim. Instead, he has devoted himself to saving money in order to get married and to care for his aging mother.
104. Agamben asserts that what characterizes modern politics is not so much the inclusion of bare life in the sphere of polis as its entry into a zone of irreducible indistinction between exclusion and inclusion. Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 1-22.
105. Holston and Appadurai explain this state of exclusion in terms of a significant gap between formal and substantive citizenship. Formal citizenship refers to a person's legal standing (for example, the right to vote), while substantive citizenship indicates the de facto ability to enjoy public access. James Holston and Arjun Appadurai, "Cities and Citizenship", Public Culture, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1996), pp. 187-204.
106. Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer, p. 105.