Heroes and fanatics: Discernment and critique in Hegel's political philosophy

Idealistic Studies

Volumn 34, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 199-214

  Nassar, Dalia ^a  

^a BOSTON COLLEGE   (United States)

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EID: 62449285910     PISSN: 00468541     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5840/idstudies20043427     Document Type: Article

References (39)

1. Rudolf Haym, Vorlesungen über Hegel und seine Zeit (Berlin, 1857), p. 9.
2. Frantz Rosenzweig has done much work to show that Hegel was very close to the Prussian Reform Movement which brought him to Berlin. See Hegel's correspondence with Von Altenstein and the latter's recruitment of Hegel to Berlin. Hegels Briefe, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister and Friedrich Nicolin (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1981), vol. 2.
3. G. W. F. Hegel, Elements in the Philosophy of Right, trans. H. B. Nisbet, ed. Allen Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 20. From here on it will be cited in as PR. § means section number, R means remark, A means addition, and a comma means "and," for example, §21, R means section 21 and the Remark to section 21.
4. In the case of the Preface, a page number will be given, as in this note. The German edition is Hegel: Werke: Theorie Werkausgabe. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970)
5. Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (1821), Werke VII, p. 20.
6. PR, p. 23.
7. GPR, p. 23.
8. PR §3A. While many commentators, most notably Allen Wood, have taken up the possible conservatism of the double-dictum emphasizing the rationality behind Hegel's notion of the ethical and, following Hegel's lead, distinguishing between the "actual" and the "existing" states, thus positing the possibility of change from existence to actuality (and hence toward a more rational state), they have not interrogated the problematic double-dictum from the perspective of Hegel's notion of political change as world-historical change, i. e. , not as change inspired by or from within the institutions of the presents. It is my contention that we cannot address the possibility of critique in Hegel's political philosophy if we do not take into consideration what Hegel means by political change. In his philosophy of history, Hegel provides us with the tools to understand how change takes place. In placing his philosophy of history alongside his ethical and political philosophy, I problematize readings such as Wood's which do not locate the ethical and political within the historical.
9. Cf. Allen Wood, "Hegel's Ethics," especially pp. 227-228
10. and Hegel's Ethical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), especially pp. 219-227. Michael Hardimon also takes up the question of Hegel's conservatism from the perspective of the double-dictum, however, he too does not attempt to address the question of change from the perspective of Hegel's philosophy of history.
11. See Hegel's Social Philosophy: The Project of Reconciliation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 52-83.
12. Hegel's earliest writings from the Tübingen and the Berne years (1793-1796) were primarily concerned with ethical and political issues, especially his concern with "folk religion. " During his Frankfurt years (1797-1799), Hegel's writings were very critical of Kantian moral philosophy. The only period in his life when Hegel was less concerned with these issues was his Jena period (1800-1806) where he was developing his system of speculative philosophy. However, as Allen Wood points out, even then Hegel was concerned with ethical issues and it was in 1802 that he first made a distinction between "morality" (Moralität) and the "ethical life" (Sittlichkeit).
13. Cf. Allen Wood, "Hegel's Ethics," in Cambridge Companion to Hegel, ed. Frederick C. Beiser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 215.
14. PR §340. See also §33.
15. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction: Reason in History, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 28.
16. From here on it will be cited as LPWH. Die Vernunft in der Geschichte, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Verlag von Felix Meiner, 1955), p. 29. From here on, it will be cited as VG, followed by page number. I have chosen to rely on Hoffmeister's edition, and not on the more recent edition in Hegels Werke, as it is more comprehensive.
17. LPWH, p. 62.
18. VG, p. 72.
19. Alan Patten argues that for Hegel the state is in fact self-sufficient. That means that the state as an institution is capable of self-reproduction "[w]hen its normal operations work to secure and reinforce the conditions under which it can continue to operate effectively over time" (Patten, p. 180). Patten's reading is limited insofar as he is only interested in showing how the state actualizes three different forms of freedom. However, if he were to look beyond the outlines of his own project, he would realize that for Hegel, the state is both sovereign and autonomous, but not self-sufficient. It cannot generate out of its self, or on its own ground, the necessary laws by which it can relate to other states - a condition that Hegel considers to be necessary for the very existence of a state. Rather, Hegel locates the possibility of such relation outside of the state, and within the sphere of world-history. See Alan Patten, Hegel's Idea of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
20. PR §270 A.
21. An interesting question regarding what I am attempting to posit as a "world-historical standard," is whether such a standard can be made into international law. The difference, however, is something we must keep in mind. The standard I am attempting to outline is only for philosophical critical purposes - purposes, that is, that do not translate into practical actions such as an international court or international law to which individuals can be held accountable. Hegel's adamant opposition to such supra-national laws and courts, especially in his criticism of Kant's notion of perpetual peace, rests on his belief that such laws can only remain mere obligations so long as the sovereignty of the state is not superseded by another governing body. However, I do not think that this means that Hegel wholly opposes the possibility of a normative super-national standard, or even something beyond that, such as an international court. Hegel's criticism of Kant's perpetual peace is specifically a criticism of the fact that such international law remains determined by and limited to the needs of the sovereign nation-states and the treaties they choose to enter into. Thus, for Hegel, so long as we continue to operate within the paradigm of nation-states, international law as "universal right" remains a mere contradiction (PR, §333).
22. Joachim Ritter, Hegel and the French Revolution, trans. Richard Dien Winfield (Cambridge, Mass. : The MIT Press, 1984), p. 43.
23. Ritter, Hegel and the French Revolution, p. 44.
24. Contrast with Frederick C. Beiser, "Hegel's Historicism," in The Cambridge Companion to Hegel, ed. Frederick C. Beiser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 293-297.
25. Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977).
26. Phenomenology des Geistes (1807), Werke III, §81. From here on it will be cited as PhG.
27. PR, §5A.
28. Hegels Briefe, vol. 1, p. 85
29. G. W. F. Hegel, Hegel: The Letters, trans. Clark Butler and Christine Seiler (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), p. 123.
30. PR §29.
31. PR §258R; last emphasis added.
32. PR §5A; emphasis added.
33. See also PR §258R
34. and PhG §584-593 where Hegel articulates his opposition to the French Revolution on the basis of its abstraction of the will.
35. "Consequently, when these abstractions were invested with power, they afforded the tremendous spectacle, for the first time we know of in human history, of the overthrow of all existing and given conditions within an actual major state" (PR §258R).
36. This notion of freedom follows Aristotle's, who explains in the Metaphysics that freedom is the development of one's own essence, i. e. , self-determination.
37. See Patten, Hegel's Idea of Freedom, p. 86.
38. PR §3A
39. Philosophy in a Time of Terror, ed. Giovanna Borradori (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), p. 34.