A new look at the logic of the 'is'-'ought' relation

Philosophy

Volumn 80, Issue 313, 2005, Pages 343-359

  Kupperman, Joel J ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 62449240829     PISSN: 00318191     EISSN: 1469817X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0031819105000331     Document Type: Article

References (37)

1. See especially Philippa Foot, 'Moral Arguments', Mind 67 (1958)
2. reprinted in Philippa Foot, Virtues and Vices (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978), 96-109
3. Foot, 'Moral Beliefs', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1958-9)
4. reprinted in Virtues and Vices, 110-31
5. MacIntyre, 'Hume on "Is" and "Ought"', Philosophical Review 68 (1959)
6. reprinted in The Is/Ought Question, ed. W. D. Hudson (London: Macmillan, 1969), 35-50
7. Searle, 'How To Derive "Ought" From "Is"', Philosophical Review 73 (1964), 43-58
8. reprinted in The Is/Ought Question, 120-34
9. R. M. Hare, 'The Promising Game', Revue Internationale de Philosophie 70 (1964), 398-412
10. James Thomson and Judith Thomson, 'How Not To Derive "Ought" From "Is"', Philosophical Review 73 (1964)
11. reprinted in The Is/Ought Question, 163-7
12. Strawson, 'Truth', Supplementary Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 24 (1950), 129-156
13. reprinted in Truth, George Pitcher (ed.) (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1964), 32-53, where the phrase quoted occurs on 37
14. Rundle, Facts (London: Duckworth, 1993), 10
15. This line of thought is pursued in J. Kupperman, 'How Values Congeal Into Facts', Ratio 13 (2000), 37-53
16. Anscombe, 'Modern Moral Philosophy', Philosophy 33 (1958), 1-10
17. 'On Brute Facts', Analysis 18 (1958), 69-72
18. Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 18
19. Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 445
20. J. Kupperman, 'Metaphysics as Prologomenon to Ethics', Midwest Studies in Philosophy 24 (2000), 1-16
21. For the psychology of happiness, see Michael Argyle, The Psychology of Happiness (London: Methuen, 1987)
22. and Martin Seligman, Authentic Happiness (New York: Free Press, 2002)
23. Papers by many of the leading researchers of subjective well-being are collected in Well-Being. The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology, eds. Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener, and Norbert Schwartz (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1999)
24. See also Daniel Kahneman, P. P. Wakker, and R. Sarin, 'Back to Bentham? Explorations of Experienced Utility', Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (1997), 375-405. In relation to all of this material, let me express my gratitude to the Positive Psychology Network for inviting me to its conferences at Akumal in January 2001, and for its support of a discussion group that met subsequently in New York and Philadelphia
25. Argyle, The Psychology of Happiness, 124
26. See P. Brickman and D. T. Campbell, 'Hedonic Relativism and Planning the Good Society', in Adaptation-Level Theory: A Symposium (New York: Academic Press, 1971), 287-302
27. P. Brickman, D. Coates, and R. Janoff-Bulman, 'Lottery Winners and Accident Victims: Is Happiness Relative?', Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 37 (1978), 917-27
28. For fuller discussion, see J. Kupperman, 'Comfort, Hedonic Treadmills, and Public Policy', Public Affairs Quarterly 17 (2003), 17-28
29. and 'Philosophical and Social Science Investigations of Value', Conference on the 90th Anniversary of Philosophy Department, Peking University, May 2004
30. R. M. Hare, Review of Stephen Toulmin, An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics. Philosophical Quarterly 1 (1950-51), 372-5
31. Toulmin, An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics, 145
32. For an especially good development of this point, see Alan Donagan, The Theory of Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), Chapters 2 and 3
33. See also the treatment of defeasibility in H. L. A. Hart, 'The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights', in Essays in Logic and Language, ed. Anthony Flew (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor, 1965), 151-74
34. R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 46-7
35. Philippa Foot, 'Moral Beliefs', in Virtues and Vices, 110-1
36. This is to concur with a central claim of Oswald Hanfling, 'Learning About Moral Right and Wrong: Ethics and Language', Philosophy 78, No. 303 (January 2003), 25-41
37. Hare, Freedom and Reason, 16