Competence with demonstratives

Nous-Supplement: Philosophical Perspectives

Volumn 16, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 13-16

  Higginbotham, James ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 62449088006     PISSN: 15208583     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (27)

1. B1urge, T. (1974). "Demonstrative Constructions, Reference, and Truth." The Journal of Philosophy 71. pp. 205-223
2. Burge, T. (1978). "Self-Reference and Translation." F. Guenthner and M. Geunthner-Reutter (eds.), Meaning and Translation. New York: NYU Press, pp. 137-153
3. Crimmins, M. (1992). Talk About Beliefs. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. A Bradford book
4. Davidson, D. (1979). "Moods and Performances." A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel
5. Reprinted in Davidson, Inquiries Into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984, pp. 109-121
6. Evans, G. (1981). "Understanding Demonstratives." H. Parret and J. Bouveresse (eds.), Meaning and Understanding. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter
7. Reprinted in Evans, Collected Papers. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985. pp. 291-321
8. Higginbotham, J. (1986). "Linguistic Theory and Davidson's Program in Semantics." E. LePore (ed.), Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. pp. 29-48
9. Higginbotham, J. (1988). "Contexts, Models, and Meanings: A Note on the Data of Semantics." R. Kempson (ed.), Mental Representations: The Interface Between Language and Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 29-48
10. Higginbotham, J. (1991). "Belief and Logical Form." Mind and Language 6. pp. 344-369
11. Higginbotham, J. (1994). "Priorities in the Philosophy of Thought." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume. pp. 85-106
12. Kaplan, D. (1977). "Demonstratives." Published with Afterthoughts in J. Almog et al. (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. pp. 481-614
13. Kaplan, D. (1995). "Meaning and Use." Gareth Evans Memorial Lecture, University of Oxford
14. Lewis, D. (1970). "General Semantics." Synthese 22
15. Reprinted in Lewis, Philosophical Papers, Vol. I, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1983. pp. 189-232
16. Lewis, D. (1979) "Attitudes de dicto and de se." The Philosophical Review 88
17. Reprinted in Lewis, Philosophical Papers, Vol. I. pp. 133-159
18. Montague, R. (1968). "Pragmatics." Reprinted in R. Thomason, (ed.), Formal Philosophy. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 95-118
19. Perry, J. (1993). Postscript to "Frege on Demonstratives." The Problem of the Essential Indexical and Other Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 26-32
20. Richard, M. (1983). "Direct Reference and Ascriptions of Belief." Journal of Philosophical Logic 12. pp. 425-452
21. Richard, M. (1990). Prepositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe Them. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
22. Salmon, N. (1986). Frege's Puzzle. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. A Bradford book
23. Schiffer, S. (1977). "Naming and Knowing." P. French, T. Uehling, Jr., and H. Wettstein (eds.), Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 61-74
24. Schiffer, S. (1987). "The 'Fido'-Fido Theory of Belief." J. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives I: Metaphysics. Altascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Company, pp. 457-480
25. Stalnaker, Robert (1981). "Indexical Belief." Synthese 49
26. Reprinted in Stalnaker, Context and Content, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, pp. 130-149
27. Weinstein, S. (1974). "Truth and Demonstratives." Nous 8. pp. 179-184