Sen's theorem and externalities

Economica

Volumn 64, Issue 255, 1997, Pages 375-386

  Campbell, Donald E ^a   Kelly, Jerry S ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 6244269348     PISSN: 00130427     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0335.00086     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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