Product differentiation and cartel stability: Chamberlin versus Hotelling

Annals of Regional Science

Volumn 31, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 259-271

  Rothschild, R ^a  

^a LANCASTER UNIVERSITY MANAGEMENT SCHOOL   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 6244250772     PISSN: 05701864     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001680050048     Document Type: Article

References (9)

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4. Greenhut M, Norman G and Hung C-S (1987) The Economics of Imperfect Competition. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
5. Haltiwanger J, Harrington JE Jnr (1991) The Impact of Cyclical Demand Movements on Collusive Behaviour. Rand J Econ 22: 89-106.
6. Ross TW (1992) Cartel Stability and Product Differentiation. Int J Ind Org 10: 1-13.
7. Rotemberg J, Saloner G (1986) A Supergame-theoretic Model of Price Wars during Booms. Am Econ Rev 76: 390-407.
8. Rothschild R (1992) On the Sustainability of Collusion in Differentiated Duopolies. Econ Lett 40: 33-37.
9. Shubik M (1980) Market Structure and Behavior. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.