Did Wittgenstein speak with the vulgar or think with the learned? Or did he do both?

Philosophy

Volumn 82, Issue 320, 2007, Pages 213-233

  Cook, John W ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 62149136317     PISSN: 00318191     EISSN: 1469817X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0031819107320019     Document Type: Article

References (29)

1. Maurice Cornforth, Marxism and the Linguistic Philosophy (New York International Publishers, 1965), 163
2. This should not surprise us. Drury reports that Wittgenstein described Berkeley as a 'very deep thinker, M. O'C. Drury, Conversations with Wittgenstein' in Recollections of Wittgenstein, ed. Rush Rhees Oxford University Press, 1984, 157 Berkeley as a 'very deep thinker'. M. O'C. Drury, 'Conversations with Wittgenstein' in Recollections of Wittgenstein, ed. Rush Rhees (Oxford University Press, 1984), 157
3. 3rd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1953), §2. This volume will henceforth referred to as PI. be referred to as PI
4. The Big Typescript (Blackwell, 2005), 312. This volume will be referred henceforth as BT. to henceforth as BT
5. Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge 1932-1935 (Chicago University Press 1979), 61. This will henceforth be referred to as WL35. 1979), 61. This volume will henceforth be referred to as WL35
6. This unaccommodating attitude was evident early in Wittgenstein's life In a 1913 letter to Russell he wrote: 'I beg you to think about these matters for yourself, it is INTOLERABLE for me to repeat a written explanation which even the first time I gave only with the utmost repugnance, Quoted by Ray Monk in Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius New York: The Free Press, 1990, 95 In a 1913 letter to Russell he wrote: 'I beg you to think about these matters for yourself, it is INTOLERABLE for me to repeat a written explanation which even the first time I gave only with the utmost repugnance.' (Quoted by Ray Monk in Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 95.)
7. In 1948 he expressed this attitude in a more general way: 'Anything your reader can do for himself, leave to him, Culture and Value University of Chicago Press, 1984, 77, What he expected of his readers was that they should be able, at the very least, to figure out for themselves the most rudimentary philosophical points, such as that people's names are names of bodies. As is well known, he became increasingly resigned to the fact that even those who regarded themselves as his disciples did not understand him. The result was that he turned inward: 'Nearly all my writings are private conversations with myself. Things that I say to myself tête-à-tête, ibid, In writing for himself, of course, there was no need to repeat something he had previously thought or said. This makes it difficult to ferret out his sub-texts reader can do for himself, leave to him' (Culture and Value (University of Chicago Press, 1984), 77). What he expected of his readers was that they should be able, at the very least, to figure out for themselves the most rudimentary philosophical points, such as that people's names are names of bodies. As is well known, he became increasingly resigned to the fact that even those who regarded themselves as his disciples did not understand him. The result was that he turned inward: 'Nearly all my writings are private conversations with myself. Things that I say to myself tête-à-tête' (ibid). In writing for himself, of course, there was no need to repeat something he had previously thought or said. This makes it difficult to ferret out his sub-texts
8. 'Notes for Lectures on "Private Experience" and Philosophical Occasions (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), 228. This will be referred to henceforth as PO. "Sense-data"' reprinted in Philosophical Occasions (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), 228. This volume will be referred to henceforth as PO
9. Elsewhere I have argued at length for this interpretation of Wittgenstein. I did so most recently in 'Did Wittgenstein Practice What He Preached?' Philosophy, 81 (2006), 445-462. Wittgenstein. I did so most recently in 'Did Wittgenstein Practice What He Preached?' Philosophy, 81 (2006), 445-462
10. The whole story is one step more complicated, for Wittgenstein thought of human bodies as being what Wolfgang Kohler called 'perceptual bodies', meaning that they are of a phenomenal, rather than a material, nature. human bodies as being what Wolfgang Kohler called 'perceptual bodies', meaning that they are of a phenomenal, rather than a material, nature
11. Wittgenstein's Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematic: Cambridge 1939 ed. Cora Diamond (Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1976), 203; emphasis added. The will henceforth be referred to in the text as LFM. ed. Cora Diamond (Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1976), 203; emphasis added. The volume will henceforth be referred to in the text as LFM
12. Wittgenstein's Lectures on Philosophical Psychology 1946-47, ed. Peter Geach (Chicago University Press, 1989), 261. This will be referred to henceforth as WL47. Geach (Chicago University Press, 1989), 261. This volume will be referred to henceforth as WL47
13. Philosophical Remarks (University of Chicago Press, 1975), 85; emphasis added
14. The Blue and Brown Books (Blackwell, 1958), 173. The volume will referred to in the text as BB. henceforth be referred to in the text as BB
15. Wittgenstein, Empiricism, and Language (Oxford University Press, 1999) ch. 4
16. Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology II (University of Chicago Press 1980), §203. 1980), §203
17. See chapters 7 and 8 of The Undiscovered Wittgenstein: The Twentieth Century's Most Misunderstood Philosopher (Amherst: Humanity Books, 2005). Century's Most Misunderstood Philosopher (Amherst: Humanity Books, 2005)
18. Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle (Blackwell, 1983), 182-184. This be referred to in the text henceforth as WVC. volume will be referred to in the text henceforth as WVC
19. Wittgenstein gave the following example: 'The man who says "Here is whiteness which is round and the man who says Here is a patch which is white and round say the same thing' (WL35, 129). He added that there would be a difference of meaning only if the two sentences belonged to the same system, so that one could say; 'Either it is - or it is ....' whiteness which is round" and the man who says "Here is a patch which is white and round" say the same thing' (WL35, 129). He added that there would be a difference of meaning only if the two sentences belonged to the same system, so that one could say; 'Either it is - or it is ....'
20. Reprinted in Philosophical Occasions (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), 100-101. WL35, 21. Company, 1993), 100-101. See also WL35, 21
21. Zettel (Blackwell, 1967), §424. Dates of composition of the sections of Zettel have been compiled by André Maury, 'Sources of the Remarks in Wittgenstein's Zettel'hilosophical Investigations, 4, No. 1, 57-74. The date, 1948, of the passage just quoted is significant, for it shows that at that very late date, just three years before his death, Wittgenstein was espousing the central idea of neutral monism. of Zettel have been compiled by André Maury, 'Sources of the Remarks in Wittgenstein's Zettel'hilosophical Investigations, Vol. 4, No. 1, 57-74. The date, 1948, of the passage just quoted is significant, for it shows that at that very late date, just three years before his death, Wittgenstein was espousing the central idea of neutral monism
22. O. K. Bouwsma, Wittgenstein, Conversations 1949-51 (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1986), 37-38
23. I have discussed D in the article mentioned above, 'Did Wittgenstein Practice What He Preached?' E is discussed in Chapter 5 of The Undiscovered Wittgenstein (137-153). Practice What He Preached?' E is discussed in Chapter 5 of The Undiscovered Wittgenstein (137-153)
24. 'If we describe the visual field, no person necessarily comes into it .. [I]ts being mine is not essential to it. That is, it is not an intrinsic property of a visual sensation, or a pain, to belong to someone' (WL35, 22). [I]ts being mine is not essential to it. That is, it is not an intrinsic property of a visual sensation, or a pain, to belong to someone' (WL35, 22)
25. The Analysis of Sensations, 5th ed. (New York: Dover, 1959) 12 and 24
26. Wittgenstein alludes to this book in Philosophical Remarks, 267
27. Notebooks 1914-16 (Blackwell, 1961), 89
28. Misleading translations are partly responsible for the misunderstanding of Wittgenstein. For example, he said that our job is to 'remind ourselves ... of the kind of statement that we make about appearances [Erscheinungen]' (PI, §90), implying that we are constantly talking about appearances. G. E. M. Anscombe misleadingly translated the German word Erscheinungen as 'phenomena'. discussion of this in The Undiscovered Wittgenstein, 44-45 and 53 n.8. of Wittgenstein. For example, he said that our job is to 'remind ourselves ... of the kind of statement that we make about appearances [Erscheinungen]' (PI, §90), implying that we are constantly talking about appearances. G. E. M. Anscombe misleadingly translated the German word Erscheinungen as 'phenomena'. See my discussion of this in The Undiscovered Wittgenstein, 44-45 and 53 n.8
29. See Tractatus Logico Philosophicus (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1961), 6.375, where he says that 'the only impossibility that exists is logical impossibility.' 1961), 6.375, where he says that 'the only impossibility that exists is logical impossibility.'