The eternal act

Religious Studies

Volumn 34, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 325-352

  Lodzinski, Don ^a  

^a NONE   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 61949179170     PISSN: 00344125     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0034412598004478     Document Type: Article

References (78)

1. Nicholas Wolterstorff, 'God Everlasting', in C. Orlebeke and L. Smedes, eds., God and the Good: Essays in Honor of Henry Stob (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975), p. 197.
2. Richard Swinburne, Coherence of Theism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), pp. 213-222.
3. Richard Gale, On the Nature and Existence of God (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 92.
4. J. R. Lucas, The Future: An Essay on God, Temporality and Truth (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), pp. 8-9, 43-54, 65-72, 135-139, 176 ff. 193 ff., 220 ff.
5. William Alston, 'Divine-Human Dialogue and the Nature of God', Faith and Philosophy 2 (1985), pp. 7-11.
6. Lucas, op. cit. p. 223.
7. See Carlos Moya for a discussion on plans and intentional action in The Philosophy of Action (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), especially ch. 11.
8. Robert Stalnaker points out that conditional beliefs (e.g. Fido's) may be tacit, unrecognized, inarticulate. Clearly, however, the more rational the being, the more explicit are its beliefs. See his Inquiry (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), p. 104.
9. Victor Weisskopf, 'Of Atoms, Mountains, and Stars: a Study in Qualitative Physics', Science 187 (1975). pp.605-612.
10. John Barrow, & Frank Tipler, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), ch. 1.
11. Charles Hartshorne,' Santayana's Doctrine of Essence', in Paul Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of George Santayana (New York: Tudor, 1951), p. 166;
12. cited in Richard Creel, Divine Impassibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 38.
13. Roger Penrose, The Emperor's New Mind (New York: Penguin Books, 1989), pp.112-116.
14. G. W. Leibniz, Theodicy (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1985), §416.
15. See also Don Lodzinski, 'Leibnizian Freedom and Superessentialism', Studia Leibnitiana 26/2 (1994), pp. 166, 177-180.
16. See D.J. O'Connor, and Brian Carr, Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge (Minneapolis University of Minnesota Press, 1982), ch. 2.
17. William Alston,'Functionalism and Theological Language', in Thomas Morris, ed., The Concept of God, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 21-40.
18. Reprinted from American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (1985), pp. 221-230.
19. Brian Leftow, Time and Eternity (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 307-309.
20. For a discussion of procedural knowledge, see John R. Anderson. Cognitice Psychology and its Implications. (San Francisco: W. F. Freeman and Company, 1980), pp. 235-242.
21. Creel, op. cit. pp. 21, 206.
22. Leibniz (op. cit.) maintained that God would not decide to create a world, unless it was the best. See his Theodicy, §§49, 196, 416.
23. See, for example, Leibniz, op. cit. §§313-320,
24. Richard Brandt, Ethical Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1959), ch. 20;
25. J. L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977), ch. 9,
26. and Elliott Sober, Core Questions in Philosophy (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1991), pp. 299-318.
27. For one analysis of Leibniz's deterministic freedom, see Don Lodzinski, op. cit. pp. 163-186.
28. Leibniz, op. cit. §320.
29. Luis Molina, On Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the Concordia, trans, by Alfred Freddosa, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), q. 14, a.13,
30. William L. Craig, The Only Wise God (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House Co., 1987), ch. 12.
31. Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), pp. 157-62.
32. Robert Adams, 'Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil', American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (1977). pp. 109-111.
33. Craig, op. cit. p. 128.
34. Alvin Plantinga, op. cit. pp. 170-184.
35. See also Gale op. cit. pp. 110-168.
36. See also Sober, op. cit. pp. 296-297.
37. Paul Horwich, Asymmetries in Time (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), pp. 15-28.
38. See also Michael Dummett's, 'A Defence of McTaggart's Proof of the Unreality of Time', Philosophical Review 69 (1960), pp. 497-504.
39. W. L. Reese,' Minkowski, Hermann' in Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1980), p. 360.
40. See also Penrose, op. cit. pp. 193-201.
41. Paul Helm makes a similar distinction. He seems to deny that indeterministic freedom is compatible with what I am calling an Order 2 explanation. See Eternal God: A Study of God Without Time (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), ch. 8 and p. 144.
42. For the role of causation in our knowledge, see Alvin Goldman, 'A Causal Theory of Knowing', in George Pappas & Marshall Swain, eds., Essays on Knowledge and Justification (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), pp. 67-86.
43. Reprinted from The Journal of Philosophy 64 (1967), pp. 355-372.
44. Gale, op. cit. pp. 162-165.
45. Jose M. R. Delgada, Physical Control of the Mind: Toward a Psychocivilized Society (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), p. 114;
46. cited in David G. Myers, The Human Puzzle: Psychological Research & Christian Belief (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), p. 55.
47. See Lucas, op. cit. pp. 30-34.
48. E. Stump, & N. Kretzmann, 'Eternity', in Morris, op. cit. 1987a, pp. 219-254.
49. Reprinted from The Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981), pp. 429-458.
50. Boethius. The Consolation of Philosophy, Book iv, prose 6;
51. De Trinitate, pp. 364.78-366.82;
52. and Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, bk.1, ch. 66;
53. E. Stump, & N. Kretzmann, 'Atemporal Duration', The Journal of Philosophy 84 (1987b), p. 219.
54. Stump & Kretzmann, 1987a, op. cit. p. 242. Since then, Stump & Kretzmann have revised the notion of ET-simultaneity by defining it in terms of direct and immediate causal relations.
55. See 'Eternity, Awareness, and Action', Faith and Philosophy 9 (1992), pp. 477-478. In my opinion, it is more plausible to believe that simultaneity is part of the analysis of causation rather than visa versa.
56. For example, see Katherin Rogers, 'Eternity has No Duration', Religious Studies 30 (1994), pp. 1-16.
57. Stump & Kretzmann. 1987a, op. cit. pp. 232-233.
58. Leftow, op. cit. pp. 265-267, 223 ff.
59. and Helm, op. cit. pp. 116 ff.
60. Creel, op. cit. p. 95.
61. Robert Oakes, 'Does Traditional Theism Entail Pantheism?', in Morris, op. cit. pp. 57-71.
62. Reprinted from American Philosophical Quarterly 20 (1983), pp. 105-112.
63. Bertrand Russell makes this claim in order to make a different point in his' On the Notion of Cause', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 8 (1913), p. 8.
64. Stump & Kretzmann, 1987a, op. cit. pp. 227, 235.
65. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I q.14, a.5-7;
66. in Anton Pegis, ed., Introduction to Thomas Aquinas (New York: The Modern Library, 1948), pp. 134-141.
67. Leftow, op. cit. p. 331
68. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III, Ixix;
69. cited in W. T.Jones, The Medieval Mind, 2nd. ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1969), p. 235.
70. See also Summa Theologica I q.4 a.1 and Jones, p. 225.
71. Swinburne, op. cit., p. 214.
72. Aquinas, Summa Theologica 1 q.3, a.3,4,7;
73. in Pegis (op. cit.), pp. 28-33.
74. See also William Mann, 'Simplicity and Immutability in God', in Morris, op. cit. pp. 255-257, 262;
75. reprinted from International Philosophical Quarterly 23 (1983), pp. 267-276.
76. Stump & Kretzmann, 1987b, op. cit. pp. 214-215.
77. For other arguments against the temporality of God, see Leftow, op. cit. pp. 273 ff.;
78. and Don Lodzinski, 'Empty Time and the Eternality of God', Religious Studies 31 (1995), pp. 187-195.