Performance measurement in Chinese local governments : Guest editors' introduction

Chinese Law and Government

Volumn 41, Issue 2-3, 2008, Pages 4-9

  Chan, Hon S ^a   Gao, Jie ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 61849169635     PISSN: 00094609     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2753/CLG0009-4609410200     Document Type: Review

References (11)

1. See, for example, OECD, Overview of Result-focused Management and Budgeting in OECD Member Countries (Paris: OECD/PUMA, 2002); The UK Audit Commission, "On Target: The Practice of Performance Indicators" (2000), available atwww.audit-commission.gov.uk/Products/NATlONAL-REPORT/ 266D51B7-0C33-4b4b-9832-7484511275E6/archive-mptarget.pdf., accessed October 1, 2008; General Accountability Office, Managing for Results: Enhancing Agencies Use of Performance Information for Decision Making (Washington, DC: GAO, 2005).
2. See for example, George Boyne and Jennifer Law, "Setting Public Service Outcome Targets: Lessons from Local Public Service Agreements," Public Money & Management 25, no. 4 (August 2005): 253-260; Isabella Proeller, "Outcome-Orientation in Performance Contracts: Empirical Evidence from Swiss Local Governments," International Review of Administrative Sciences 73, no. 1 (2007): 95-111; Maria Edin, "State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre Management from a Township Perspective," China Quarterly, no. 173 (2003): 35-52.
3. These organizations are categorized into four types according to areas of responsibilities.
4. See Kenneth Lieberthal, Central Documents and Politburo Politics in China (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1978); Guoguang Wu, "Documentary Politics: Hypotheses, Process, and Case Studies," in Decision-Making in Deng's China, Perspectives from Insiders, ed. Carol Lee Harmin and Suisheng Zhao (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), pp. 24-38.
5. Ngok Kinglun and Hon S. Chan, eds., "The 1998 Administrative Reform of the State Council of the People's Republic of China," Chinese Law and Government 36, no. 1 (January/February 2003).
6. See Melanie Manion, ed., "Cadre Recruitment and Management in the People's Republic of China," Chinese Law and Government 17, no. 3 (1984); John Burns, ed., "Contemporary China's Nomenklatura System," Chinese Law and Government 20, no. 4 (Winter 1987-88); Hon S. Chan, "Cadre Personnel Management in China: The Nomenklatura System, 1990-1998," China Quarterly, no. 179 (2004): 703-734.
7. The item of "Party building" refers to political commitment efforts on the part of the Party leadership, with a special emphasis placed on maintaining and strengthening the Party's monitoring and enforcement capacity. It comprises five general targets: ideology education, construction of leadership corps, construction of democratic dictatorship, construction of Party branches, and dealing with corruption.
8. For example, one target under the performance item of "economic development" is "agricultural production and rural economic development." This target is measured by three indicators, namely, "acreage of farming lands," "production of major rural products and increasing the rate of production," and "acreage of irrigation lands."
9. Selections 4 through 7 represent organizations from (1) the Party organizations, (2) organizations responsible for comprehensive management work, (3) organizations responsible for economic management affairs, and (4) townships.
10. Because environmental protection was not adopted by the county's performance measurement system until after 2003, it is not stipulated in Selections 2 and 3.
11. For discussion of China's inverse accountability system, see Shukai Zhao, "The Accountability System of Township Government," Chinese Sociology and Anthropology 29, no. 2 (Winter 2006-7): 64-73.