Policymakers' horizon and the sustainability of international cooperation

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 93, Issue 3-4, 2009, Pages 549-558

  Conconi, Paola ^a,b   Sahuguet, Nicolas ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITÉ LIBRE DE BRUXELLES   (Belgium)

^b CEPR ^*  (Canada)

^c HEC MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

Author keywords

Re election incentives; Self enforcing cooperation; Term limits

Indexed keywords

EID: 61849099956     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.11.006     Document Type: Article

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