Optimal second-stage outsourcing

Management Science

Volumn 54, Issue 6, 2008, Pages 1147-1159

  Saouma, Richard ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Incentives; Moral hazard; Optimal outsourcing

Indexed keywords

INCENTIVES; MORAL HAZARD; OPTIMAL OUTSOURCING; OUTSOURCE; PRODUCT ASSEMBLIES;

FRICTION; MANUFACTURE; OPTIMIZATION; OUTSOURCING; RISK MANAGEMENT;

ASSEMBLY;

EID: 61849086899     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: 15265501     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1070.0834     Document Type: Article

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