The logic of the diamond Sutra: A is not A, therefore it is A

Asian Philosophy

Volumn 10, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 213-244

  Nagatomo, Shigenori ^a  

^a TEMPLE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 61649119823     PISSN: 09552367     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09552360020011277     Document Type: Article

References (52)

1. In fact, a renowned specialist, Edward Conze reports his friends complaining that his commentary 'is unhelpful, inconclusive, tedious, uninspiring and positively confusing'. He attributes the failure to the text's 'invincible obtuseness'. See CONZE, EDWARD (1958) Buddhist Wisdom Books (New York, Harper Torch, p. 51
2. The term 'ego-logical' is a neologism proposed by Nathan Levith, a student of political science at Haverford College, Haverford, Pennsylvania. It also appears in HUSSERL, EDMUND (1997) Cartesian Meditations (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff)
3. 'the flow of mind [cittadhārā] is not the flow of mind, and therefore it is the flow of mind', (section 18-b)
4. 'the sentient beings' (section 21-b)
5. 'good dharmas' (section 23)
6. To formulate the 'logic of not' in this way is an issue concerning the universality of this logic. Unless it is formalised in the propositional form: 'A is not A, therefore it is A', however, the 'logic of not' will be confined primarily to the interest of Buddhist scholars, and hence it will not appeal to people beyond its own home ground. Certainly, this is not the intent of the Sutra and we can see it briefly by thinking philosophically through the examples mentioned above as they are framed in the formalised statement. Take Example 1, which reads: 'The world is not the world, and therefore it is the world.' (section 13-c). If we take the category 'world' to mean the most inclusive category in a domain of discourse in which everything excluding none occurs, i.e. it can subsume every other category that is of and in the world, insofar as it is understood from the everyday standpoint, it is evident that this logic is not to be confined locally, since the Sutra applies the 'logic of not' to this category. Especially, when we regard the human being as that which is, to use Heidegger's terminology, 'thrown' into the world, a 'being-in-the-world', who suffers from the fundamental passivity for this reason, anything the human being engages in occurs in this world and it is of this world. HEIDEGGER, MARTIN (1962) Being and Time (JOHN MACQUARRIE ET AL.) (New York: Harper & Row)
7. Now, take Example 2, which reads: 'All dharmas are not all dharmas and therefore they are all dharmas'. In Buddhism, 'dharma' is the most comprehensive category under which both the conditioned and the unconditioned thing-state are subsumed, i.e. anything is either the conditioned or unconditioned dharma, and nothing escapes from this category, where the force of this statement is to break down the distinction between the conditioned and the unconditioned that was upheld by the previous schools of Buddhism (see WALPOLA, RAHULA, (1974) What the Buddha Taught (New York, Grove Press). Given this understanding of dharma and what we have said of the world, it is self-evident that the 'logic of not' is to be expanded universally but not regionally, however A may be construed to mean, insofar as A is of the dharma that is in and of the world. The Sutra's application of the 'logic of not' is in fact relentless, because it is applied to the very goal for which the Sutra is written, i.e. achieving the perfection of wisdom, as it is seen in Example 3. It reads: 'The perfection of wisdom [prajñāpāramitā] is not the perfection of wisdom, and therefore it is the perfection of wisdom'. Moreover, any truth claim one wants to make concerning dharmas or the world is also stated in the same propositional form as is seen in Example 4: 'A thought of truth [bhūtasamjnā] is not a thought of truth, and therefore it is the thought of truth' (section 14-a). In fact, no statement, including self-referential statements, can be excluded from the formulation: 'A is not A, therefore it is not A'. From the preceding analysis, it is clear that the Sutra intends to endow the 'logic of not' with a universal applicability to any statement appearing in any given discourse
8. NAKAMURA HAJIME & KINO KAZUYOSHI (Trans. and Ed.) (1996) Hannyashinkyō, Kong ōhannyakyō (The Heart Sutra and the Diamond Sutra) (Tokyo, Iwanami shoten, p. 195. Since doubt and attachment are depth-psychological issues for the ego-consciousness, I shall deal with them later
9. KANT, IMMANUEL (1965) The Critique of Pure Reason (New York, St Martins Press), p. 633
10. NAKAMURA & KINO, The Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., note 6, p. 17. This interpretation follows the theory that pārami (to reach the other shore) is combined with the abstract noun that indicates a state (tā), wherein the whole phrase pāramitā means 'reaching the other shore'. And hence it means 'perfection'. The other dominant interpretation follows the analysis that pāramitā is the feminine form of the passive past participle pāram (the other shore) that is conjoined with the verb itā (to reach)
11. KAJIYAMA, YŪICHI (1976) Hannya shinkyō (The Prajñāpāramitā Sütra) (Tokyo, Chūō kōron), pp. 100-101
12. also discusses the term pāramitā in two senses and opts for the meaning of 'perfection'. According to Kajiyama, pāramitā can linguistically be analysed in two ways: (1) pāramitā means 'reaching an ultimate or perfection', and it is an abstract compound noun consisting of pārami, which is derived from the adjective parama that means "paramount' and the postposition tā and (2) pāramitā means 'the other shore' and is a compound consisting of (a) pārami, which is the objective case of the noun pāram, meaning 'the other shore' (b) it is conjoined by the norninalisation of the verb i (to go), wherein the whole phase comes to mean 'that which goes to the other shore', when the postposition tā is added to it. He says that linguistically the former is more appropriate than the latter, but he notes that the latter is also widely accepted in view of the dogmatic, philosophical interpretation. Having stated this, however, he seems to opt for the 'perfection', because the 'other shore' means nirvana or satori, which is 'to go to reach the paramount ultimate'. Kanaoka gives the same interpretation on this point, see KANAOKA, SHŪYŪ (1973) Hannya shinky ō (The Heart Sütra) (Tokyo, Kōdansha), pp. 38-39
13. NAKAMURA & KINO, Hannya shinky ō (The Heart Sütra), op. cit., note 6, p. 17. This 'non-discriminatory knowledge' is contrasted with 'discriminatory knowledge' (vijñāna). I shall discuss the difference between 'non-discriminatory knowledge' and 'discriminatory knowledge' in the section dealing with 'dualistic, ego-logical stance' and 'non-dualistic non-egological stance' respectively
14. Compare, for example, Aristotle's hierarchy of knowledge in which wisdom as a knowledge of the universal is placed as the highest form of theoretical knowledge. See ch. 1 of HOPE, RICHARD (1975) Aristotle Metaphysics (Ann Arbor, MI, The University of Michigan Press)
15. or MCKEON, RICHARD (Ed.) (1941) The Basic Works of Aristotle (New York, Random House)
16. YUASA, YASUO (1987) The Body: Toward an Eastern Mind-Body Theory (Trans. SHIGENORI NAGATOMO & T.P. KASULIS) (Albany, NY, State University of New York Press)
17. CONZE, The Body: Toward an Eastern Mind-Body Theory, op. cit., note 2, p. 22
18. In Nakamura's translation, this passage is rendered as: How should a son or daughter of a good family, who turns to the path of a seeker, live, and act, and maintain their mind?' See NAKAMURA & KINO, op. cit., note 6, p. 45. In Kumārajīva's translation: 'set out in the Bodhisattva-vehicle' is rendered as 'set their mind on the unexcelled, supreme enlightenment' (see ibid, p. 44)
19. KAJIYAMA, The Body: Toward an Eastern Mind-Body Theory, op. cit., note 8, p. 121
20. HUSSER, EDMUND (1967) Ideas: A General Introduction to Phenomenology (New York, Collier, 1967), p. 80
21. In this context, the mind specifically means the act aspect of its operation, rather than a general concept of the mind. See HATTORI, MASAAKI (1973) Bukkyō no shisō: Ninshiki to chōetsu (Buddhist Thought: Cognition and Transcendence) (Tokyo; Kadokawa shoten), p. 98
22. If we think that there is experience first à la Nishida (see NISHIDA KITARŌ. (1987) Inquiry Into Good (Trans. ABE MASAO & CHRISTOPHERIVES) (New Heaven, CT, Yale University Press), ch. 1, we will recognise that the idea of a self is a concept that is intellectually abstracted from the experience prior to its separation into the subject and the object relationship
23. JUNG, C.J. (1972) Two Essays on Analytical Psychology (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 128 and 271
24. When the unconscious is seen from the view-point of consciousness, it intersects in its function with the body. Physiologically speaking, for example, the region where emotion is generated is in the hypothalamus below the activity of neoencephalon. Furthermore, the correlativity between the unconscious and the body may be seen in galvanic skin response. Emotion is a modification of the body as Spinoza corrector points out in his Ethics DE SPINOZA, BENEDICT (1955) The Chief Works of Benedict De Spinoza, vol. 2 (trans. R.H.M. ELWES) (New York: Dover Publications, Inc.)
25. See ch. 1 in NAGATOMO, SHIGENORI (1992). Attunement through the Body (Albany, NY, The State University of New York Press)
26. Both Kumarajiva and Nakamura translate 'seizing on' as 'attachment'. See NAKAMURA & KINO, Attunement through the Body, op. cit., note 6, pp. 54-55
27. NAGATOMO, Attunement through the Body, op. cit., note 31, particularly ch. 1 that deals with Ichikawa's concept of the body
28. Conze, Being and Time, op. cit., note 2, p. 25
29. In Conze's translation the word samjñā is translated as 'notion', but it is changed to 'thought' in the quotation. Nakamura has a slightly different rendition of this passage, which reads: 'If anyone entertains a thought of a self [ātman-satpjñā], a living being [sattva-samjñā], an individual soul [jīya-samjñā], a person [pudgala-samjñā], he/she is not a bodhisattva'. See NAKAMURA & KINO, Being and Time, op. cit., note 6; p. 47
30. HUSSERL, Being and Time, op. cit., note 26, Ch 2
31. HUSSERL, EDMUND (1973) Experience and Judgment (Evanston, IL Northwestern University Press), p. 151
32. CONZE, Experience and Judgment, op. cit., note 2, p. 34
33. I follow here Kumarajiva's translation contained in NAKAMURA & KINO, Experience and Judgment, op. cit., note 6, p. 83, for it brings out a philosophical issue more clearly than the translations by Nakamura and Conze
34. SAKABE, Megumi (1989) Kakamino naka no nihongo (The Japanese Language in the Mirror)
35. Although it would be interesting to examine the subjectless sentence of Chinese and Japanese language, I shall for now restrict my analysis to the subject-predicate structure of language. Incidentally, the Chinese or Japanese subjectless sentence is a full sentence, despite the fact that the grammatical subject does not appear. Megumi, Sakabe for example, would call such a construction the description of a proto-personal dimension of experience which is temporally and logically prior to the split between the subject and object. That is, it describes a state in which a subject is so immersed in the world that he/she is forgets both the world and the self, whether the worlds is segmented as a concrete sensible object or as action. See SAKABE, Megumi (1989) Kakamino naka no nihongo (The Japanese Language in the Mirror). This construction is also discussion in YUASA, YAUSO (1995) Kyōjise: no uchūkan (The Synchronistic cosmology) (Kyoto: Jinmon Shoin)
36. WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG (1958) Philosophical Investigations (London, Basil Blackwell & Mott)
37. KAJIYAMA, Philosophical Investigations, op. cit., note 8, pp. 111-112
38. KAWAI, HAYAO (1992) The Buddhist Priest: Mȳœ (trans. MARK UNNO) (Verice, CA, Lapis Press), p. 136ff
39. KAJIYAMA, YŪICHI (1971) Bukkyo no shisō Kūno ronri (The Buddhist Thought: The Logic of Emptiness) (Tokyo, Kadokawa shoten), p. 31
40. NAKAMURA & KINO, Philosophical Investigations, op. cit., note 6, p. 85
41. NISHIDA, KIRARŌ (1965) Mu no jikakuteki gentei (Self-Aware Determination of Nothingness), Complete Works, Vol. 6. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten
42. CONZE, Mu no jikakuteki gentei (Self-Aware Determination of Nothingness), op. cit., note 2, p. 55
43. MOTOYAMA, HIROSHI (1992) Bashoteki ko toshite no kakusha (The Awakened One as the Basho Individual) (Tokyo, Shūkyō shinri shuppan)
44. NISHIDA, Bashoteki ko toshite no kakusha (The Awakened One as the Basho Individual), op. cit., note 68
45. I follow here Kumarajiva's translation contained in NAKAMURA & KINO, Bashoteki ko toshite no kakusha (The Awakened One as the Basho Individual), op. cit., note 6, p. 83, for it brings out the philosophical issue more clearly than the translations by Nakamura and Conze
46. Also see CONZE, Bashoteki ko toshite no kakusha (The Awakened One as the Basho Individual), op. cit., note 2. also in section 4
47. For an application of this idea to Japanese swordsmanship from the standpoint of Zen Master Takuan, see NAGATOMO, SHIGENORI & LEISMAN, GERALD (1966). An East-Asian perspective of mind-body, Journal of Philosophy and Medicine, 21, pp. 439-466
48. For a further characterisation of 'detentionality', see NAGATOMO, Journal of Philosophy and Medicine, op. cit., note 3
49. See section 26-a. CONZE, Journal of Philosophy and Medicine, op. cit., note 2, p. 63
50. NAKAMURA & KINO, Journal of Philosophy and Medicine, op. cit., note 6, p. 57
51. MOTOAYAMA, HIROSHI (n.d.) The Buddha's Satori, (Trans. SHIGENORI NAGATOMO), p. 23, Unpublished monograph
52. Although one might think that the neither-nor formulation applies only to spatial experience, it is not restricted to this. For example, when we look at Dōgen's writing such as the Bendōwa and Uji fascicles, we find multi-directionality in the flow of time. For example, Dōgen writes in Uji (Being-Time) fascicle, 'it [i.e. time] ranges from today to tomorrow, ranges from today to yesterday, ranges from yesterday to today, ranges from today to today, ranges from tomorrow to tomorrow'. Here we can see the multi-directionality of time experience in the state of mediation. As Dōgen theorises his experiential reflection of how one experiences time, that time cannot be experienced apart from a being, it suggests that the multi-directionality of time is also inseparable with the experience of a being in the movements mentioned in this quoted passage. (In this translation, I have used the word 'ranges' where in the original the word 'passes' is used.) See WADELL, N.A. (1979) Being-Time, Eastern Buddhism, XII (1), pp. 120-121