Desires, values, reasons, and the dualism of practical reason

Ratio

Volumn 22, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 98-125

  Smith, Michael ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 61449562122     PISSN: 00340006     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2008.00420.x     Document Type: Article

References (10)

1. Michael Smith. 'Instrumental Desires, Instrumental Rationality', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Vol., 78 (2004), pp. 93-109
2. Derek Parfit, Reasons and. Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984)
3. Christine Korsgaard. The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)
4. T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1998)
5. Mark Johnston. ' Dispositional Theories of Value'. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Vol., 63 (1989), pp. 139 - 74
6. R. Jay Wallace, 'How to Argue about Practical Reason', Mind, 99 (1990), pp. 267-97
7. Michael Smith, 'Exploring the Implications of the Dispositional Theory of Value', Philosophical, Issues, 12 (2002), pp. 329-47
8. David Gauthier in Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986)
9. Ruth Chang, 'The Possibility of Parity', Ethics, 112 (2002), pp. 659-88. 11
10. Michael Smith, 'Neutral and Relative Value after Moore' in Ethics. Centenary Symposium on G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica, 113 (2003), pp. 576 - 598