Antigone's final speech

Greece and Rome

Volumn 44, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 138-160

  Cropp, Martin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY   (Canada)

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EID: 61449202094     PISSN: 00173835     EISSN: 14774550     Source Type: Journal    
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References (124)

1. The text is as printed by Lloyd-Jones and Wilson, the translation my own. Developing versions of this paper were given to the Classical Association of Canada (Victoria, B.C., 1990), to the conference Greek Drama II (Universities of Canterbury and Sydney; Christchurch, N.Z., 1992), and at the Universities of Calgary (1991), Washington (1993), California at Berkeley (1995), and California at Santa Cruz (1995). I have benefited from the comments of many members of these audiences. I owe particular thanks for assistance or advice to Desmond Conacher, Mark Griffith, Christiane Sourvinou-Inwood, Wolfgang Rösler, and Mary Whitlock Blundell
2. I have cited very selectively from the vast literature on Antigone. The following are cited by authors' names. Editions etc.: F. Schneidewin and A. Nauck, Sophokles, IV: Antigone, 11th ed. rev. by E. Bruhn (Berlin, 1913)
3. R. C. Jebb, Sophocles, III: The Antigone (Cambridge, 3rd ed., 1900)
4. G. Müller, Sophokles: Antigone (Heidelberg, 1967)
5. J. C. Kamerbeek, The Plays of Sophocles, III: Antigone (Leiden, 1978)
6. A. L. Brown, Sophocles: Antigone (Warminster, 1987)
7. H. Lloyd-Jones and N. G. Wilson, Sophoclis Fabulae (Oxford, 1990)
8. H. Lloyd-Jones, Sophocles: Antigone etc. (Cambridge, Mass.: Loeb Classical Library, 1994)
9. M. Griffith, Sophocles: Antigone (Cambridge, forthcoming). Studies: A. L. W. Jacob, Sophocleae Quaestiones, I (Warsaw, 1821)
10. G. Kaibel, De Sophoclis Antigona (Göttingen, 1897)
11. C. Knapp, 'A point in the interpretation of Sophocles' Antigone', AJP 37 (1916), 300-16
12. T. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Die dramatische Technik des Sophokles (Berlin, 1917)
13. G. Perrotta, Sofocle (Messina, 1935)
14. V. Ehrenberg, Sophocles and Pericles (Oxford, 1954)
15. G. M. Kirkwood, A Study of Sophoclean Drama (Ithaca, 1958)
16. K. von Fritz, 'Haimons Liebe zu Antigone', in Antike und moderne Tragödie (Berlin, 1962), 227-40
17. B. M. W. Knox, The Heroic Temper (Berkeley, 1966)
18. A. A. Long, Language and Thought in Sophocles (London, 1968)
19. M. Ostwald, Nomos and the Beginnings of Athenian Democracy (Oxford, 1969)
20. H. Lloyd-Jones, The Justice of Zeus (Berkeley, 1971: 2nd ed., 1983)
21. D. A. Hester, 'Sophocles the unphilosophical', Mnemosyne 24 (1972), 11-59
22. G. F. Else, The Madness of Antigone (Heidelberg, 1976)
23. J. Dalfen, 'Gesetz ist nicht Gesetz und fromm ist nicht fromm: die Sprache der Personen in der sophokleischen Antigone', WS 90 (1977), 5-26
24. H. Neitzel, - Leitwort der aischyleischen Tragödie?', Gymnasium 87 (1980), 283-93
25. W. Rösler, Polis und Tragödie (Konstanz, 1980)
26. C. P. Segal, Tragedy and Civilisation: an interpretation of Sophocles (Cambridge, Mass., 1981)
27. T. Szlezák, 'Bemerkungen zur Diskussion um Sophokles, Antigone 904-920', RM 124 (1981), 108-42
28. M. Lefkowitz, 'Influential women', in A. Cameron and A. Kuhrt (eds.), Images of Women in Antiquity (London, 1983), 49-64
29. W. Rösler, 'Der Chor als Mitspieler: Beobachtungen zur "Antigone"', Antike und Abendland 29 (1983), 107-24
30. G. Steiner, Antigones (Oxford, 1984)
31. B. M. W. Knox, Introduction to R. Fagles (tr.), Sophocles: the three Theban Plays (Harmondsworth, 1984)
32. M. Ostwald, From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law (Berkeley, 1986)
33. S. Goldhill, Reading Greek Tragedy (Cambridge, 1986)
34. S. Murnaghan, 'Antigone 904-920 and the institution of marriage', AJP 107 (1986), 192-207
35. C. W. Oudemans and A. Lardinois, Tragic ambiguity. Anthropology, Philology and Sophocles' Antigone (Leiden, 1987)
36. M. Whitlock Blundell, Helping Friends and Harming Enemies (Cambridge, 1989)
37. V. J. Rosivach, 'The interpretation of Sophocles Antigone 926', CP 84 (1989), 116-19
38. C. Sourvinou-Inwood, 'Sophocles Antigone 904-920: a reading', AION (filol.), 9-10 (1987-8), 19-35
39. eadem, 'Assumptions and the creation of meaning: reading Sophocles' Antigone', JHS 109 (1989), 134-48
40. S. de Bouvrie, Women in Greek Tragedy (Oslo, 1990)
41. M. Neuburg, 'How like a woman: Antigone's "inconsistency"', CQ 40 (1990), 54-76
42. L. J. Bennett and W. B. Tyrrell, 'Sophocles' Antigone and funeral oratory', AJP 111 (1990), 441-56
43. J. Mikalson, Honor Thy Gods: Popular Religion in Greek Tragedy (Chapel Hill, 1991)
44. P. Riemer, Sophokles, Antigone: Götterwille und menschliche Freiheit (Stuttgart, 1991)
45. E. Lefèvre, 'Die Unfähigkeit, sich zu erkennen: Sophokles' Antigone', WJA 18 (1992), 89-123
46. H. Foley, 'The politics of tragic lamentation', in A. H. Sommerstein et al. (eds.), Tragedy, Comedy and the Polis (Bari, 1993), 101-43
47. W. Rösler, 'Die Frage der Echtheit von Soph. Ant. 904-920 und die politischen Funktion der attischen Tragödie', ibid. 81-99
48. M. F. Fresco, 'Antigone und Anthropologie', Mnemosyne 47 (1994), 289-318
49. C. P. Segal, Sophocles' Tragic World: Divinity, Nature, Society (Harvard, Mass., 1995)
50. Jebb xiii-xiv. Jebb 262 objects to interpreting 904-20 as 'self-defence'
51. Müller, 196
52. Knox (1984), 48; cf. (1966), 105: '... she struggles with her own emotions in a self-absorbed passion which totally ignores the presence of those around her.'
53. Jacob, 365-8
54. T. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, 45-50
55. Schadewaldt, 82-8
56. Steiner, 277, 279-80 ('The Gethsemane-moment - Hegel's audacious analogy is not baseless - is upon her')
57. That the speech is first and foremost a self-justification is also seen by e.g. Kaibel 10 ff., Neuburg 58. Foley 111-13 suggests that throughout her final scene Antigone is 'using lamentation to make a public and politically-motivated display of injustice'
58. For surveys of the debate in the 19th Century see S. Reiter, ZöG 49 (1898), 961 ff., and up to 1980 Szlezák. Important since then: Murnaghan, Sourvinou-Inwood (1987/8), Neuburg, Riemer 41-8, Rösler (1993). Why the passage should have been fabricated in the first place and soon accepted as Sophoclean by such readers as Aristotle (Rhet. 1417a29-33) has never been convincingly explained
59. Only 909-12 pose syntactical difficulties (the dangling genitive absolute in 909; the reference of in 910; 'there is no brother who could ever be born', 912). Some allowance should perhaps be made for the fact that Sophocles was compressing a piece of 'casuistic ratiocination' (Kamerbeek, p. 22) into a handful of lines
60. For the emphasis see J. D. Denniston, The Greek Particles (Oxford, ed. 2, 1954), 473
61. Soph. Track. 819-20, 'Let her go on her way rejoicing and herself enjoy the pleasure she is giving to my father'. Similar conclusive wishes for requital, though without the sarcasm: Trach. 1039-40 and (if genuine) Aj. 839-40
62. 9 s.v. II.1; A. C. Moorhouse, The Syntax of Sophocles (Leiden, 1982), 260; and many commentators
63. He finds no parallels for as 'become conscious that ...' without a reflexive indirect object, or as 'acknowledge' with a participle rather than infinitive as object; and notes that this verb and its cognates regularly mean 'forgive' elsewhere in Sophocles and Euripides. Rosivach's discussion is mentioned without comment in H. Lloyd-Jones and N. G. Wilson, Sophoclea (Oxford, 1990), 138, and reflected in Lloyd-Jones's Loeb translation. For other such interpretations see Rosivach, 117 n. 6 and (unapproving) Hester, 37
64. For verbal and rhetorical links between 904-20 and the rest of the speech see Kaibel, 1-8
65. Cf. Rosivach, 118, Neuburg, 58 n. 13
66. J. D. Denniston, Euripides: Electra (Oxford, 1939), p. 180 on El. 1045
67. We may prefer to think of this idea as 'proverbial' rather than 'Hesiodic' (the idea certainly had proverbial status, e.g. Pl. Symp. 222b5-7), but the evocation of the whole Hesiodic thought-pattern and the appearance in Ant. of other closely related reminiscences of Hesiod's Works (see below) suggest that the latter is being invoked
68. In this play note especially 523, 'The natural thing for me is not to hate them together but to love them together'; also 41, 66, 266, 279, 537, 541, 846. See Long 52 and 59 n. 109 on (66, 279), and in general Whitlock Blundell, 103-4 (on Ajax) and other references in her index
69. This usage occurs in Hdt. 1.91.6, Croesus 'agreed that the fault was his own and not the god's'; similarly 1.89.3, 6.92.2. A participle as object-clause is appropriate in Ant. 926 since it concerns acceptance of a perception
70. Bruhn on 926; Kamerbeek, ad loc.; S. M. Adams, Phoenix 9 (1955), 59
71. R. Minadeo, Arethusa 18 (1985), 152
72. Cf. the translations of R. E. Braun (Oxford, 1973) and Don Taylor (London, 1986). Griffith on 925-8 adds that 928 evokes the proverbial idea that the doer must suffer (e.g. Aesch. Cho. 313)
73. In Ag. 176-8 the way of understanding and righteousness is contrasted with the way of foolish injustice leading to disaster, suffering and learning. Schol. M Ag. 177 compares Works 218
74. See Lloyd-Jones (1971/1983), 86-8 and JHS 76 (1956), 62-3
75. M. Gagarin, Aeschylean Drama (Berkeley, 1976), 139-50
76. Neitzel 283-93 and Hermes 106 (1978), 411-13 stressing that Aeschylus like Hesiod describes two moral 'routes'
77. 'If you were not an old man, you would learn through suffering to recognize your presumption.'
78. Cf. Eur. Supp. 580 (where Collard lists similar phrases with different verbs), Hcld. 65; in 3rd Person, e.g. Eur. Andr. 1006, HF 840
79. Cf. Fraenkel on Aesch. Ag. 1649
80. A. Rzach, Hesiodi carmina (Leipzig, 1902), listed reminiscences of Hesiod in later poetry including these two. M. L. West's supplement, Philologus 113 (1969), 1-9 and 130 (1986), 1-7, adds nothing from Ant
81. In addition to Works 213-18 cf. Works 30, 'Goods are not for seizing'; 324, 'when profit deludes one's mind'; 352, 'Do not make evil profits; evil profits amount to ruin'; 356, 'Gift is good; seizure is bad ...'. On the varying definitions of 'profit' in Ant. (esp. 326, 464, 1036-9, 1045-7, 1055-6, 1063) see Goheen, 14-19; Dalfen, 21-3
82. It is seen as proper by Calder, 400 n. 48, Oudemans-Lardinois, 185, and its impiety (proclaimed by Tiresias, 1068-76) is minimized by Sourvinou-Inwood (1989), 146
83. Else, 66 n. 52
84. Works 265-6, 'a man who does ill to another does ill to himself; ill counsel is most ill for its deviser', seems to reverberate through the ending of the play (esp. 1050-1, 1242-3, 1259-60, 1269-70)
85. cf. Antigone's remark about suffering from her own ill-counsel (95-6). The 'gods' swift-footed Harms' (1104) recall Hesiod's Curse which 'runs along with crooked judgments' (Works 219). Works 214-16 (quoted above, p. 141) seems to be recalled in Creon's self-condemnation, Ant. 1272-4, 'I have learned, low as I am. Upon my head a god struck me, holding a great weight, and hurled me into savage ways'
86. West on Works 220-4 explains the imaging there of Justice as victim, then avenger
87. See esp. Knapp, 300-16 (he regarded 904-20 as an interpolation) and e.g. Goheen, 75 ff., Kirkwood, 233-6, Long, 50-3, Else, 51, 69, Goldhill, 173-8, Whitlock Blundell, 130-6, Mikalson, 179, 278 n. 22, Bennett and Tyrrell, 447, Lefèvre, 94-9
88. Knox (1966), 12-26 surveys the relevant vocabulary throughout Sophocles' plays
89. Electra's devotion to her father and Antigone's to her brother are debated in very similar terms: see esp. Soph. El. 307-9, 328-50, 523-9, 549-50, 992-1057
90. and cf. T. C. W. Stinton, Collected Papers on Greek Tragedy (Oxford, 1990), 476-8 (= M. Cropp et al. [eds.], Greek Tragedy and its Legacy [Calgary, 1986], 82-4). is explicitly linked with the observance of natural duties in 'the most prudent birds' of El. 1058ff. (cf. Antigone's screeching like a mother-bird whose nest has been robbed, Ant. 423-7)
91. Cf. also Eur. Bacch. 268-9, 310-12, 326-32, 479-85 etc. (another play in which a Theban ruler new to power fails in understanding of the divine)
92. I have found little mention of it in the Commentaries of Müller (see on 383, 1261) or Brown (see on 1242-3). Kamerbeek mentions it occasionally (e.g. on 95-7, 683-4, 707-9, 726-7), but not in his list of 'Recurrent metaphors and motifs' (pp. 33-5)
93. Line 99 is still often misinterpreted as if Ismene is saying 'I still love you despite your foolishness'. This lacks point, and misses the obvious antithesis between. For the correct interpretation commentators compare Eur. I.T. 610
94. However understood, the miraculous appearance of the burial (249-58) and the later whirlwind (417-21) establish this and suggest a revulsion of nature against the exposure of the body, anticipating the real revulsion reported by Tiresias (998-1022)
95. (479) is an obvious indication of Creon's tyrannical and transgressive temper, like his threat to torture the guards (308-14; see n. 26) and his summary condemnation of Ismene (486-90). Antigone rejects the classification of Polynices as a slave, 517
96. 557-8: 'On your arguments (cf. ... ..., 556) you thought you were being prudent; on mine I thought I was.' - 'Yes, and the error is equal for each of us'. Commentators have often supposed that 557 refers to the opinions of others (Creon and/or the living vs. Polynices and/or the dead, or [reading] Ismene herself vs. Polynices and the dead) and that 558 refers to Ismene's claim to share Antigone's guilt. But 559-60 make no sense as a response if 558 is taken in this way
97. Lloyd-Jones, CQ 4 (1954), 93 (cf. Sophoclea 135) conjectures for in 753, and this appears in the new Oxford text. Thus 'What kind of threat is it for me to acquaint you with my resolutions', rather than 'What kind of threat is it for me to speak against empty opinions?' This removes the point from Creon's next response ('You'll regret your advising ...') and its follow-up ('... empty-witted as you are yourself')
98. Creon characteristically uses himself, or political authority, rather than divine authority, as the reference-point for eusebeia: cf. Dalfen, 14-16
99. On the overt level of meaning see Foley, 111-12. Segal (1995), 119-37 shows how Eurydice's role in the play mirrors Antigone's and exhibits the effects of Creon's blindness to her realm of values
100. On the Chorus's impact on Antigone in the amoibaion see e.g. Perrotta, 79, von Fritz, 238-40, Kirkwood, 164. On their integration in the action of the play and relationships with Creon and Antigone, see Rösler (1983)
101. Creon does likewise (cf. Griffith on 883-90, 935-6), as does the Chorus, 929-30
102. These words of the Chorus contradict Antigone's assurance (511) that 'there is nothing shameful in treating piously (sebein) those born from the same womb'. 'Piety' includes fundamental duties towards other people as well as the gods (cf. e.g. Dalfen, 14-15). In 872-4 the Chorus are saying that Antigone's observance of her duty towards her brother has conflicted with another, superior duty sanctioned by the gods, i.e. obedience to a ruler's authority. In 165-7 Creon notes that they have always revered the powers of their rulers. In 213-14 they assure him that every nomos is at his disposal, whether it concerns the living or the dead
103. Good remarks in Kirkwood, 236-8 and Dalfen, 14-20 on differing priorities for eusebeia and conflicting opinions about the eusebeia of Antigone's action (note especially 300-1, 511-16, 730-3, 744-5, 777-80, 1349-50)
104. The repetition has been thought to indicate interpolation: e.g. Müller ad loc., Else, 109. Griffith on 904-15 notes several points of ring-composition within this passage
105. See e.g. Jebb, p. 259
106. See e.g. Segal (1981), 154-5, 170-3. Dalfen 9-14 collects the relevant passages. See also Ostwald (1986), 148-61 - though I think he exaggerates the legitimacy which its status as a nomos gives to Creon's burial-prohibition, and therefore the degree to which Sophocles was portraying a conflict between equally valid obligations. Antigone is not allowing the charge of impiety in 74 and 923-4 (as Ostwald 155-6 and n. 56 suggests), and in 921 she is not saying that she has adhered only to the Justice of the dead (Ostwald 153). in 921 has the same connotations as in (e.g.) 77
107. Rösler (1993), 91-4; see also Müller ad loc., Lesky, 207, Dalfen, 10 n. 8, Szlezák, 133
108. Cf. Rösler (1980)
109. is a strong term. Creon uses it of crimes in general (300), linking it with impiety in 301. On the counterpoint between 74 (with 68) and 300-1 see Goheen, 127-8 n. 2
110. It is hard to see any dramatic purpose for this passage if what Haimon says in 692-700 is not supposed to be largely true, though Sourvinou-Inwood (1989, 144) questions this. Haimon confirms Antigone's claim that she has unspoken support (509). Creon accepts this when he retorts that the polis at large has no authority (734-8)
111. Cf. Whitlock Blundell, 147. Rösler argues that Antigone separates the Chorus from the polîtai by ceasing to address them as polîtai once she recognizes their lack of sympathy. He contrasts 806 with 842-3 and 940. But 842-3, 'O city, O wealthy men of our city', does not separate the community from its elders. The phrasing conveys that she feels abandoned by both of them (cf. Müller p. 187), for she then turns away from both and is reduced, like the isolated Philoctetes (Phil. 936-9, 986-8), to calling on the natural environment (844-6) to witness that she has no philoi and is a victim of unjust nomoi
112. Ostwald (1969), 24-5. But it does not follow that this nomos is wholly arbitrary and self-contained, as he suggests elsewhere (1969, 53; 1986, 154 n. 49). If Antigone adduces a nomos here, and complains about Creon's misvaluation of it (913-14), this surely serves to relate her argument at this point to the earlier arguments about nomos. Riemer 44-8 also seems to exaggerate the privateness of Antigone's reasoning
113. See e.g. Segal (1981), 183-5, de Bouvrie, 186-7. The opposition between blood-ties and marriage-ties is of course thematically relevant at this point in other ways, as Murnaghan and Neuburg in particular have pointed out. Antigone's normal future in marriage is being destroyed by her devotion to her brother, and her intended husband is the son of her persecutor. Creon will be punished through the loss of son and wife. Murnaghan sees Antigone in the final speech as seeking 'justification and consolation for her loss of marriage' (205) and describes her as overvaluing phusis and the unwritten laws against culture and the polis, dissociating herself from marriage as an institution (198-201, 207). This risks exaggerating the degree to which the text makes Antigone responsible for the conflict. The text tells us little about her character, principles, and vision that is not tied to the immediate issue of her obligation to defy Creon's decree, and nothing about Antigone in normal times except that she had a strong personality and was eager to marry Haimon (570). It does not make her exclusive focus on the family a cause of the problem in the same way that Creon's decree is
114. Aristotle understood Antigone's appeal to the divine nomima as an appeal to Nature (Rhet. 1373b4-13; cf. 1375a31 ff.)
115. See e.g. G. B. Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement (Cambridge, 1980), 113, in a useful survey of the nomos-physis controversy
116. Cf. especially Goheen, 76-93 on this point and on the reflection of Antigone's moral awareness in a language of intuition and feeling. Note especially how her renewed complaint about Creon's nomoi in the amoibaion (847) is addressed to the world of nature (cf. n. 35 above) and linked with her loss of philoi, and of course how Creon finally recognizes that he has breached 'the established nomoi' (1114-15)
117. This has been argued recently, from somewhat differing premisses, by Oudemans and Lardinois (1987) and Sourvinou-Inwood (1987-8; 1989). Oudemans and Lardinois suggest that Sophocles was adhering to an 'integrative cosmology' typical of archaic Greece. Creon has acted responsibly and is right to suppose that as its ruler he embodies the polis, but he has the tragic handicap of having to rule without knowing fully what the gods approve or disapprove. Antigone's claims to know about the gods' wishes and about justice are unjustified (166, 168-9); in 904-20 she is admitting that her preference for her brother was flawed but refusing to abandon it (187 ff.), and in 921-8 she is admitting that the gods are against her but refusing to agree with them. Fresco provides an extensive critique of this position. Sourvinou-Inwood argues that Sophocles and his audience would have had much more sympathy than we do for Creon's political values and would have seen Antigone as a subversive figure who 'does the right thing for the wrong reasons' after Creon has unfortunately done a wrong thing (upsetting the cosmic order by a false ritual move) for the right reasons (wanting to humiliate a traitor by dishonouring his body). Only from Tiresias do we learn that he has done wrong, and his wrongness does not cancel the wrongness of Antigone's motivations in resisting him; she is no more than 'part of the disorder unleashed into the city as a result of the offence against the gods and the cosmic order' (1989, 148). In this reading, lines 904-20 are inconsistent with Antigone's earlier arguments and show her to be challenging the polis for personal reasons, subordinating marital ties to blood-ties in an unAthenian way, and usurping a male role in undertaking the actual burial of Polynices. Her claims to piety are unsubstantiated, and she has no claim to authority as a source of value in conflict with the polis (1989, 142-3). My own analysis has suggested that the text advertises the deficiencies of Creon's actions and character earlier and more persistently than Sourvinou-Inwood allows, and gives correspondingly more authority to Antigone's position, in spite of the attractions of some of Creon's principles in Athenian eyes and of some admitted negativities in Antigone's conduct and situation
118. See e.g. Knox (1966), Calder, Sourvinou-Inwood (1989), 135, 141-2. On the whole, the text appears to portray Creon as leading the polis into error and danger for a mixture of reasons, some 'good' and some 'bad' according to the polis-ideology of democratic Athens. Even 'good' reasons (security, discipline, loyalty to the state, male dominance, etc.) were hardly exempt from examination by a tragic poet, and I doubt if Sophocles would have been regarded as 'a subversive, a challenger of the values of the polis' (Sourvinou-Inwood [1989], 147) for problematizing them
119. Cf. especially Ehrenberg ch. 2-4 (with too much emphasis on the particular application to Pericles); Knox (1966), 75-102; Hester; Ostwald (1986), 148-61
120. Cf. Dalfen, 12
121. Cf. Whitlock Blundell, 130 ff., though I do not share her perception of a 'spurious rationality' (134) in Antigone's argument at 904 ff
122. This heredity seems to me to be relevant to Antigone's motivation and to our sense of her tragic fate (cf. 1-6, 49-60, 463-4, 559-60, 594-603, 857-71, 891-6). But this is not to say that she is a victim of âtê arising from the curse on her family, as Lloyd-Jones (1971/1983), 113-16 suggests. Âtê-induced behaviour must surely be irrational and self-destructive. Antigone behaves self-destructively but by no means irrationally. When the Chorus say in 853-6 that she has 'tripped against the high platform of Justice' and is 'paying off an inherited ordeal', the Justice referred to is the justice envisaged by Creon and the Chorus (cf. pp. 12-13), and the remark about her inherited guilt does no more than suggest that in what is happening to her there is some justice derivable from this source
123. Greek tragedy avoids the moral or religious outrage which would be caused by the suffering of an extremely virtuous and innocent person. See T. C. W. Stinton, CQ 25 (1975), 238-42 (= Collected Papers on Greek Tragedy [Oxford, 1990], 164-8), with reference to Aristotle's theory of hamartia
124. But not unfemale. As Lefkowitz, 52 puts it, 'Antigone must be female for the dramatic action to occur in the first place, because only a mother or a sister would have felt so strongly the obligation to bury the dead'. In Sophocles' portrayal it is Antigone's elemental female qualities (ultimately shared by her sister, 536 ff., and echoed in Eurydice's suicide) which cause her to act on her obligation