Earning the right to realism or relativism in ethics

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Volumn 36, Issue SUPPL., 2002, Pages 264-285

  Rovane, Carol ^a  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals

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EID: 61449118937     PISSN: 00294624     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0068.36.s1.9     Document Type: Review

References (13)

1. There is a large and varied literature on moral realism that is more or less sympathetic to this proposal. For two central examples, see Peter Railton, "Moral Realism," Philosophical Review, 95 (1986)
2. and William Lycan, "Moral Facts and Moral Knowledge," Southern Journal of Philosophy 24, Supplement (1986: Spindel Conference).
3. For reasons of space, I must ignore the fact that there are rival accounts of scientific realism, as well as the fact that there are important objections to scientific realism. I must also forego any detailed account of attempts on the part of ethical theorists to extend the scientific realist position to ethics. The upshot, I fear, will be that I appear insufficiently critical of scientific realism in general and, yet, at the same time, overly critical of its particular bearing in ethics. As I've said, I hope to remedy these deficiencies elsewhere. Here I mean only to say enough to clarify the point of departure for my positive suggestions in this paper, which depart significantly from the scientific realist picture altogether.
4. See J. L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (New York: Penguin, 1977).
5. I realize, of course, that those who propose to model ethical realism on scientific realism are aware of these obvious differences between ethics and science.
6. See his "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 67 (1973-74).
7. See his "What is a Theory of Meaning? (II)" in G. Evans and J. McDowells, eds. , Truth and Meaning: Essays in Semantics, Oxford University Press (Oxford: 1976).
8. See his Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1982).
9. See his "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" in Philosophical Writings of Peirce, ed. J. Buchler (New York: Dover Publications, 1955).
10. See his "Moral Relativism Defended," Philosophical Review 84 (1975).
11. I've assembled this defense mainly from two sources: "The Truth in Relativism" in his Moral Luck (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981)
12. and Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1985).
13. I'd like to thank Stefan Baumrin, Akeel Bilgrami, Patricia Blanchette, Donald Davidson, Michael Della Rocca, Jerrold Katz, Philip Kitcher, Isaac Levi, Achille Varzi, Stephen White, Meredith Williams, Michael Williams, and Susan Wolf for discussing the issues of this paper with me.