The image of the person in the human rights concept

Human Rights Quarterly

Volumn 18, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 594-611

  Brugger, Winfried ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 6144258910     PISSN: 02750392     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/hrq.1996.0034     Document Type: Review

References (49)

1. See 4 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court] 7, 15-16 (1954) [hereinafter BVerfGE].
2. For an overview, see MENSCHENRECHTE: IHR INTERNATIONAL SCHUTZ (Bruno Simma & Ulrich Fastenrath eds., 3d ed. 1992). The documents included in this collection are of different degrees of legal validity, ranging from political declarations to binding covenants and international customary law. See Karl J. Partsch, Vor- und Nachteile einer Regionalisierung des internationalen Menschenrechtsschutzes, 16 EUROPAEISCHE GRUNDRECHTE-ZEITSCHRIFT 1 (1989).
3. For an overview, see MENSCHENRECHTE: IHR INTERNATIONAL SCHUTZ (Bruno Simma & Ulrich Fastenrath eds., 3d ed. 1992). The documents included in this collection are of different degrees of legal validity, ranging from political declarations to binding covenants and international customary law. See Karl J. Partsch, Vor- und Nachteile einer Regionalisierung des internationalen Menschenrechtsschutzes, 16 EUROPAEISCHE GRUNDRECHTE-ZEITSCHRIFT 1 (1989).
4. See Philip Selznick, Sociology and Natural Law, 6 NATURAL LAW FORUM 84, 85-91 (1961). Analogous to Selznick, Thomas Rentsch uses the term Erfuellungsgestalten. See THOMAS RENTSCH, DIE KONSTITUTION DER MORALITAET: TRANSZENDENTALE ANTHROPOLOGIE UND PRAKTISCHE PHILOSOPHIE 106, 113, 176, 184, 192, 243 (1990).
5. See Philip Selznick, Sociology and Natural Law, 6 NATURAL LAW FORUM 84, 85-91 (1961). Analogous to Selznick, Thomas Rentsch uses the term Erfuellungsgestalten. See THOMAS RENTSCH, DIE KONSTITUTION DER MORALITAET: TRANSZENDENTALE ANTHROPOLOGIE UND PRAKTISCHE PHILOSOPHIE 106, 113, 176, 184, 192, 243 (1990).
6. See IMMANUEL KANT, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, in KANT'S POLITICAL WRITINGS 93, 113-14 (Hans Reiss ed. & H. B. Nisbet trans., 2d ed. 1991). [Nature] . . . uses two means to separate the nations and prevent them from intermingling - linguistic and religious differences. These may certainly occasion mutual hatred and provide pretexts for wars, but as culture grows and men gradually move towards greater agreement over their principles, they lead to mutual understanding and peace. And . . . this peace is created and guaranteed by an equilibrium of forces and a most vigorous rivalry. Id.
7. On the history of human rights, see GERHARD OESTREICH, GESCHICHTE DER MENSCHENRECHTE UND GRUNDFREIHEITEN (1968) and Hasso Hofmann, Zur Herkunft der Menschenrechtserklaerungen, 28 JURISTISCHE SCHULUNG 841 (1988). For a critical discussion of the generation concept in the history of human rights, see Eibe H. Riedel, Menschenrechte der dritten Dimension, 16 EUROPAEISCHE GRUNDRECHTE-ZEITSCHRIFT 9 (1989). Pointing to a possible misunderstanding of the generation concept, Riedel stresses the fact that the third generation of human rights by no means is "better" or "higher" than the former generations; it does not "supersede" these generations in the Hegelian sense, but rather represents a novel phase in the history of human rights. Therefore, Riedel prefers the term "dimension" to "generation." Id. at 11.
8. On the history of human rights, see GERHARD OESTREICH, GESCHICHTE DER MENSCHENRECHTE UND GRUNDFREIHEITEN (1968) and Hasso Hofmann, Zur Herkunft der Menschenrechtserklaerungen, 28 JURISTISCHE SCHULUNG 841 (1988). For a critical discussion of the generation concept in the history of human rights, see Eibe H. Riedel, Menschenrechte der dritten Dimension, 16 EUROPAEISCHE GRUNDRECHTE-ZEITSCHRIFT 9 (1989). Pointing to a possible misunderstanding of the generation concept, Riedel stresses the fact that the third generation of human rights by no means is "better" or "higher" than the former generations; it does not "supersede" these generations in the Hegelian sense, but rather represents a novel phase in the history of human rights. Therefore, Riedel prefers the term "dimension" to "generation." Id. at 11.
9. On the history of human rights, see GERHARD OESTREICH, GESCHICHTE DER MENSCHENRECHTE UND GRUNDFREIHEITEN (1968) and Hasso Hofmann, Zur Herkunft der Menschenrechtserklaerungen, 28 JURISTISCHE SCHULUNG 841 (1988). For a critical discussion of the generation concept in the history of human rights, see Eibe H. Riedel, Menschenrechte der dritten Dimension, 16 EUROPAEISCHE GRUNDRECHTE-ZEITSCHRIFT 9 (1989). Pointing to a possible misunderstanding of the generation concept, Riedel stresses the fact that the third generation of human rights by no means is "better" or "higher" than the former generations; it does not "supersede" these generations in the Hegelian sense, but rather represents a novel phase in the history of human rights. Therefore, Riedel prefers the term "dimension" to "generation." Id. at 11.
10. See GEORG JELLINEK, DAS SYSTEM DER SUBJEKTIVEN OEFFENTLICHEN RECHTE 81-193 (2d ed. 1905).
11. Id. at 114.
12. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 10 Dec. 1948, G.A. Res. 217a (III), 3 U.N. GAOR (Resolutions, part 1) at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), reprinted in 43 AM. J. INT'L L. SUPP., 127, preamble (1949) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
13. See Riedel, supra note 6, at 12-21; Winfried Brugger, Menschenrechte im modernen Staat, 114 ARCHIV DES OEFFENTLICHEN RECHTS 537, 540-41 (1989) [hereinafter Menschenrechte].
14. This division exists in MENSCHENRECHTE: IHR INTERNATIONALER SCHUTZ, supra note 3.
15. ERNST-JOACHIM LAMPE, GRENZEN DES RECHTSPOSITIVISMUS, EINE RECHTSANTHROPOLOGISCHE UNTERSUCHUNG 50, 57, 198 (1988).
16. H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 189 (1961).
17. See id. at 189-95. By referring to this approach, I have argued that an unlimited right of asylum, as was granted in Germany up to 1993, cannot be justified. See Winfried Brugger, Fuer Schutz der Fluechtlinge - gegen das Grundrecht auf Asyl!, 48 JURISTENZEITUNG 119 (1993).
18. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 90 (1971).
19. See HEINER BIELEFELDT, NEUZEITLICHES FREIHEITSRECHT UND POLITISCHE GERECHTIGKEIT: PERSPEKTIVEN DER GESELLSCHAFTSVERTRAGSTHEORIEN (1990).
20. See the collection of decisions of the German Federal Constitutional Court in 4 BVerfGE, supra note 2, at 7, 15; see also 65 BVerfGE, supra note 2, at 1, 44 (1984); DONALD KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 39, 245-46, 250, 300, 307, 310, 312-14, 316, 361 (1989); PETER HAEBERLE, DAS MENSCHENBILD IM VERFASSUNGSSTAAT (1988).
21. See the collection of decisions of the German Federal Constitutional Court in 4 BVerfGE, supra note 2, at 7, 15; see also 65 BVerfGE, supra note 2, at 1, 44 (1984); DONALD KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 39, 245-46, 250, 300, 307, 310, 312-14, 316, 361 (1989); PETER HAEBERLE, DAS MENSCHENBILD IM VERFASSUNGSSTAAT (1988).
22. For a thorough discussion and critique of rights absolutism, see MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 18-46 (1991).
23. 4 BVerfGE, supra note 2, at 15-16.
24. Many established human rights include limitation clauses. Even if the text does not mention such limitations, it is always possible that textually unlimited rights of different persons collide.
25. For earlier discussions of this formula, see Winfried Brugger, Menschenrechte, supra note 10, at 578-84 and Winfried Brugger, Stufen der Begruendung von Menschenrechten, 31 DER STAAT 19, 22-27 (1992). For an application to the United States Constitution, see WINFRIED BRUGGER, GRUNDRECHTE UND VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT IN DEN VEREINIGTEN STAATEN VON AMERIKA 418-23 (1987). For an application to the German Constitution, see Winfried Brugger, Elemente liberaler Grundrechtstheorie, 13 JURISTENZEITUNG 633, 637-39 (1987) and Winfried Brugger, Staatszwecke im Verfassungsstaat, 39 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 2425, 2433 (1989).
26. For earlier discussions of this formula, see Winfried Brugger, Menschenrechte, supra note 10, at 578-84 and Winfried Brugger, Stufen der Begruendung von Menschenrechten, 31 DER STAAT 19, 22-27 (1992). For an application to the United States Constitution, see WINFRIED BRUGGER, GRUNDRECHTE UND VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT IN DEN VEREINIGTEN STAATEN VON AMERIKA 418-23 (1987). For an application to the German Constitution, see Winfried Brugger, Elemente liberaler Grundrechtstheorie, 13 JURISTENZEITUNG 633, 637-39 (1987) and Winfried Brugger, Staatszwecke im Verfassungsstaat, 39 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 2425, 2433 (1989).
27. For earlier discussions of this formula, see Winfried Brugger, Menschenrechte, supra note 10, at 578-84 and Winfried Brugger, Stufen der Begruendung von Menschenrechten, 31 DER STAAT 19, 22-27 (1992). For an application to the United States Constitution, see WINFRIED BRUGGER, GRUNDRECHTE UND VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT IN DEN VEREINIGTEN STAATEN VON AMERIKA 418-23 (1987). For an application to the German Constitution, see Winfried Brugger, Elemente liberaler Grundrechtstheorie, 13 JURISTENZEITUNG 633, 637-39 (1987) and Winfried Brugger, Staatszwecke im Verfassungsstaat, 39 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 2425, 2433 (1989).
28. For earlier discussions of this formula, see Winfried Brugger, Menschenrechte, supra note 10, at 578-84 and Winfried Brugger, Stufen der Begruendung von Menschenrechten, 31 DER STAAT 19, 22-27 (1992). For an application to the United States Constitution, see WINFRIED BRUGGER, GRUNDRECHTE UND VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT IN DEN VEREINIGTEN STAATEN VON AMERIKA 418-23 (1987). For an application to the German Constitution, see Winfried Brugger, Elemente liberaler Grundrechtstheorie, 13 JURISTENZEITUNG 633, 637-39 (1987) and Winfried Brugger, Staatszwecke im Verfassungsstaat, 39 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 2425, 2433 (1989).
29. See Selznick, supra note 4, at 90-91.
30. See id. at 85-91.
31. For a Kantian perspective on the relationship between human dignity and human rights, see HEINER BIELEFELDT, AUTONOMY AND REPUBLICANISM: IMMANUEL KANT'S PHILOSOPHY OF FREEDOM, POLITICAL THEORY (forthcoming).
32. As to this distinction, see RAWLS, supra note 15, at 204. The same concern has led the German Federal Constitutional Court to view constitutional rights not only as defensive rights, but also as positive values that the state should support so that every member of society has a chance to actually make use of these rights. For a representative formulation of this view, see the excerpts of the Lueth case in KOMMERS, supra note 17, at 370 (constitutional rights as public values "strongly reinforce . . . the effective power of basic rights").
33. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 7-9 (E.B. Dutton & Co. 1950) (1651) (discussing the theory of physical survival as the supreme political interest in chapter one).
34. For this reason, the German Federal Constitutional Court emphasizes the intrinsic worth of the person. See supra note 17.
35. See FRIEDRICH H. TENBRUCK, DIE KULTURELLEN GRUNDLAGEN DER GESELLSCHAFT 16 (2d ed. 1989).
36. See TERRY PINKARD, DEMOCRATIC LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL UNION 12, 27 (1987).
37. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 23 Mar. 1976), G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.M. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
38. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 3 Jan. 1976), G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
39. See Riedel, supra note 6.
40. Roughly speaking, this is the position taken by Robert Nozick. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
41. This is more or less John Rawls' viewpoint. See RAWLS, supra note 15.
42. For an analysis of Marxism in this respect, see WINFRIED BRUGGER, MENSCHENRECHTSETHOS UND VERANTWORTUNGSPOLITIK: MAX WEBERS BEITRAG ZUR ANALYSE UND BEGRUENDUNG DER MENSCHENRECHTE 115-44 (1980).
43. See, e.g., PHILIP SELZNICK, THE MORAL COMMONWEALTH: SOCIAL THEORY AND THE PROMISE OF COMMUNITY (1992); Winfried Brugger, Menschenrechte von Fluechtlingen in universalistischer und kommunitaristischer Sicht, 80 ARCHIV FUER RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 318 (1994).
44. See, e.g., PHILIP SELZNICK, THE MORAL COMMONWEALTH: SOCIAL THEORY AND THE PROMISE OF COMMUNITY (1992); Winfried Brugger, Menschenrechte von Fluechtlingen in universalistischer und kommunitaristischer Sicht, 80 ARCHIV FUER RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 318 (1994).
45. According to RENTSCH, supra note 4, at 95-96, co-originality means that the elements discussed are (1) not derivable from each other, (2) not deducible in their meaning from each other, and (3) not understandable unless connected with each other.
46. Universal Declaration, supra note 9, art. 30.
47. See Kant, supra note 5.
48. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22-28 (1977).
49. A similar argument can be found in recent German constitutional history. Donald Kommers has made the following comment on the dignity of man formula in Article 1, section 1, of the German Constitution of 1949: "The dignity of man is founded upon eternal rights with which every person is endowed by nature," read the first draft of the Chiemsee conference. Later, in the Main Committee of the Parliamentary Council, Christian Democratic delegates sought to characterize these "eternal rights" as "God-given." Social and Free Democrats resisted the use of such language because of its implications for constitutional interpretation. The result was this succinct and more neutral formulation: "The dignity of man is inviolable." . . . The framers were thus successful in refusing to identify the concept of human dignity with a particular philosophical or religious school of thought. The constitutional text seems fully consistent with a variety of philosophical perspectives. . . .