The information content of business combination disclosure level

Accounting Review

Volumn 84, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 239-270

  Shalev, Ron ^a  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Business combinations; Disclosure; Goodwill; Performance

Indexed keywords

EID: 61349109356     PISSN: 00014826     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2308/accr.2009.84.1.239     Document Type: Article

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