'Ought' implies 'can' and the derivation of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities

Analysis

Volumn 68, Issue 297, 2008, Pages 67-75

  Copp, David ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 61249744899     PISSN: 00032638     EISSN: 14678284     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/analys/68.1.67     Document Type: Review

References (11)

1. Copp, D. 1997. Defending the Principle of Alternate Possibilities moral responsibility blameworthiness and moral responsibility. Nous 31: 441-56
2. Copp, D. 2003. 'Ought' implies 'can', blameworthiness, and alternative possibilities. In Moral Responsibility and Alternate Possibilities, ed. D. Widerker and M. McKenna, 265-99. Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate
3. Fischer, J. M. 2006. Free will and moral responsibility. In The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, ed. D. Copp, 321-54. New York: Oxford University Press
4. Frankfurt, H. 1969. Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility Journal of Philosophy 66: 828-39
5. Haji, I. 1998. Moral Appraisability: Puzzles, Proposals, and Perplexities. New York: Oxford University Press
6. Haji, I. 2002. Deontic Morality and Control. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
7. Schnall, I. M. 2001. The principle of alternate possibilities and 'ought' implies 'can'. Analysis 61: 333-40
8. Widerker, D. 1991. Frankfurt on 'ought implies can' and alternative possibilities. Analysis 51: 222-24
9. Yaffe, G. 1999. 'Ought' implies 'can' and the principle of alternate possibilities. Analysis 59: 218-22
10. Yaffe, G. 2005. More on 'ought' implies 'can' and the principle of possibilities alternate possibilities. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29: 307-12
11. Zimmerman, M. 1988. An Essay on Moral Responsibility. Totowa, N.J. Rowman and Littlefield