Reservation in Stoic ethics

Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie

Volumn 82, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 149-177

  Brennan, Tad ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 61249724750     PISSN: 00039101     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1515/agph.2000.82.2.149     Document Type: Article

References (8)

1. Brad Inwood, Reason and Human Action in Early Stoicism, Oxford 1985.
2. Martha C. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire, Princeton 1994, esp. p. 399;
3. A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, Cambridge 1987, esp. vol. 2 p. 417.
4. I have elaborated this view in "The Old Stoic Theory of the Emotions", in: J. Sihvola and T. Engberg-Pedersen, eds., The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy, Dordrecht 1998, 21-70.
5. I am inclined to think that the best route lies in taking advantage of the work done on conditional obligation, especially the recent contributions made by the theory of non-monotonic logics, e. g. John F. Horty "Moral Dilemmas and Nonmonotonic Logic", Journal of Philosophical Logic 23, pp. 35-65, 1994.
6. "Reasonable Impressions in Stoicism", Phronesis vol. XVI/3, 1996, pp. 318-334.
7. The most recent discussion is that of Jonathan Barnes, "The Logical Investigations of Chrysippus", in the Jahrbuch for 1984/85 of the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin, pp. 19-29. I am grateful to Charles Brittain for calling it to my attention. A new edition of the papyrus is being prepared by Catherine Atherton for the Clarendon Later Ancient Philosophers series.
8. E. g. A. Bonhöffer, Die Ethik des Stoikers Epiktet, Stuttgart 1894, p. 86, glossing the phrase "meth' hupexaireseôs": "d. h. so, dass man dabei nicht die äussere Thätigkeit selbst, die ja durch allerlei Umstände gehemmt werden kann, sondern die innere Thätigkeit des richtigen Wollens sich zum eigentlichen Ziele setze".