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Volumn 5, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 373-388

Hume's motivational distinction between natural and artificial virtues

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EID: 61249587037     PISSN: 09608788     EISSN: 14693526     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09608789708570972     Document Type: Review
Times cited : (3)

References (24)
  • 2
    • 84931406592 scopus 로고
    • J. B. Schneewind, 'The Misfortunes of Virtue', Ethics, 1990, Vol. 101, pp. 42-63. Schneewind argues that Hume 'seems to have been convinced that the Grotian tradition, in distinguishing between perfect and imperfect duties, had correctly located a definite pattern in the moral approvals and disapprovals constituting his data [of moral phenomena] and that the pattern had to be explained'. Schneewind continues that Hume believed that no natural motives could explain the obligatory force virtues such as justice have; thus, Hume explained the perfect/imperfect distinction along artificial/natural lines. Schneewind's observation clarifies the historical context behind Hume's division between natural and artificial virtues. The psychological basis of the distinction, though, is still to be explained
    • (1990) The Misfortunes of Virtue, Ethics , vol.101 , pp. 42-63
    • Schneewind, J.B.1
  • 3
    • 0004088235 scopus 로고
    • David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978). The prominence of the natural/artificial virtue distinction in the Treatise is seen most clearly in Hume's discussion of justice. For, the opening section of that discussion immediately raises the issue of whether justice is natural or artificial (T 477). By contrast, the discussion of the utility and agreeability of all virtues, which is central to all sections of the Enquiry, is only briefly analyzed in the Treatise (T 587-91)
    • (1978) A Treatise of Human Nature
    • Hume, D.1
  • 5
  • 6
    • 84859013722 scopus 로고
    • For an additional formulation of the durability argument see The Letters of David Hume, ed. J. Y. T. Grieg (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932), Vol. I, p. 34
    • (1932) The Letters of David Hume , vol.1 , pp. 34
  • 7
    • 84862561611 scopus 로고
    • Passion and Value in Hume's 'Treatise', (Edinburgh: University Press, 1966), pp. 109-133; 'Another Look at Hume's Account of Moral Evaluation'
    • Pall S. Ardal, Passion and Value in Hume's 'Treatise', (Edinburgh: University Press, 1966), pp. 109-133; 'Another Look at Hume's Account of Moral Evaluation', Journal of the History of Philosophy, 1977, Vol. 15, pp. 405-421
    • (1977) Journal of the History of Philosophy , vol.15 , pp. 405-421
    • Ardal, P.S.1
  • 9
    • 79956698183 scopus 로고
    • New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company
    • T. H. Green, Locke and Hume, (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1968), p. 360
    • (1968) Locke and Hume , pp. 360
    • Green, T.H.1
  • 10
    • 79956662110 scopus 로고
    • Essays on the Active Powers of Man
    • ed. William Hamilton Edinburgh: Maclachlan and Stewart
    • Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man, in The Works of Thomas Reid, ed. William Hamilton (Edinburgh: Maclachlan and Stewart, 1877), Vol. 11, p. 652
    • (1877) The Works of Thomas Reid , vol.11 , pp. 652
    • Reid, T.1
  • 11
    • 79956701258 scopus 로고
    • The Critical Review, 1788, Vol. 66, p. 487
    • (1788) The Critical Review , vol.66 , pp. 487
  • 13
    • 79956619769 scopus 로고
    • An Examination of Hume's Essay on Justice
    • 'An Examination of Hume's Essay on Justice', in European Magazine and London Review, 1793, Vol. 24, pp. 422-4
    • (1793) European Magazine and London Review , vol.24 , pp. 422-424
  • 15
    • 0004101434 scopus 로고
    • London: Routledge and Kegan Paul
    • J. L. Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), p. 76
    • (1980) Hume's Moral Theory , pp. 76
    • MacKie, J.L.1
  • 16
    • 79956698172 scopus 로고
    • Artificial Virtue, Self-interest and Acquired Social Concern
    • April
    • 'Natural virtue is attributable to those sentiments and passions which, if acted upon, generally tend to yield pleasing results to ourselves or others. On the other hand, we ascribe artificial virtue to actions which constitute a certain practice, the observance of which tends towards the good of mankind'. Ted Ponko, 'Artificial Virtue, Self-interest and Acquired Social Concern', Hume Studies, Vol. IX, Number 1, April 1983, 46-58
    • (1983) Hume Studies , vol.9 , Issue.1 , pp. 46-58
    • Ponko, T.1
  • 17
    • 79956619746 scopus 로고
    • Hume's Distinction between the Natural and Artificial Virtues'
    • Ken O'Day, 'Hume's Distinction between the Natural and Artificial Virtues', Hume Studies, 1994, Vol. 20, pp. 121-42
    • (1994) Hume Studies , vol.20 , pp. 121-142
    • O'Day, K.1
  • 18
    • 79956701205 scopus 로고
    • Thirst, lust and other bodily appetites also give rise to direct impressions of reflection (T 439). for a more detailed account of how bodily appetites give rise to direct impressions of reflection, see James Fieser, 'Hume's Classification of the Passions and its Precursors'
    • Hunger, thirst, lust and other bodily appetites also give rise to direct impressions of reflection (T 439). For a more detailed account of how bodily appetites give rise to direct impressions of reflection, see James Fieser, 'Hume's Classification of the Passions and its Precursors', Hume Studies, 1992, Vol. 18, pp. 9-12
    • (1992) Hume Studies , vol.18 , pp. 9-12
    • Hunger1
  • 23
    • 78951470031 scopus 로고
    • Hume's Pyrrhonism: A Developmental Interpretation
    • For Hume, ideas come from two sources: the memory and the imagination (T 8). The imagination produces ideas in two ways: through reason (judgments about truth and falsehood), and the fancy (re-assembling ideas to form fictions; cf. T 10, 117-18 fn. 1). See James Fieser, 'Hume's Pyrrhonism: A Developmental Interpretation', Hume Studies, 15 (1989), 96-7
    • (1989) Hume Studies , vol.15 , pp. 96-97
    • Fieser, J.1
  • 24
    • 84880851660 scopus 로고
    • Hume's Noble Lie: An Account of his Artificial Virtues
    • Marcia Baron, 'Hume's Noble Lie: An Account of his Artificial Virtues', in Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 12 (1982), 541
    • (1982) Canadian Journal of Philosophy , vol.12 , pp. 541
    • Baron, M.1


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