-
2
-
-
84931406592
-
-
J. B. Schneewind, 'The Misfortunes of Virtue', Ethics, 1990, Vol. 101, pp. 42-63. Schneewind argues that Hume 'seems to have been convinced that the Grotian tradition, in distinguishing between perfect and imperfect duties, had correctly located a definite pattern in the moral approvals and disapprovals constituting his data [of moral phenomena] and that the pattern had to be explained'. Schneewind continues that Hume believed that no natural motives could explain the obligatory force virtues such as justice have; thus, Hume explained the perfect/imperfect distinction along artificial/natural lines. Schneewind's observation clarifies the historical context behind Hume's division between natural and artificial virtues. The psychological basis of the distinction, though, is still to be explained
-
(1990)
The Misfortunes of Virtue, Ethics
, vol.101
, pp. 42-63
-
-
Schneewind, J.B.1
-
3
-
-
0004088235
-
-
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978). The prominence of the natural/artificial virtue distinction in the Treatise is seen most clearly in Hume's discussion of justice. For, the opening section of that discussion immediately raises the issue of whether justice is natural or artificial (T 477). By contrast, the discussion of the utility and agreeability of all virtues, which is central to all sections of the Enquiry, is only briefly analyzed in the Treatise (T 587-91)
-
(1978)
A Treatise of Human Nature
-
-
Hume, D.1
-
5
-
-
79956662103
-
Is Hume a Moral Skeptic?
-
'Is Hume a Moral Skeptic?', Philosophy and Phenomenologtcal Research, 1989, Vol. 50, pp. 89-106
-
(1989)
Philosophy and Phenomenologtcal Research
, vol.50
, pp. 89-106
-
-
-
6
-
-
84859013722
-
-
For an additional formulation of the durability argument see The Letters of David Hume, ed. J. Y. T. Grieg (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932), Vol. I, p. 34
-
(1932)
The Letters of David Hume
, vol.1
, pp. 34
-
-
-
7
-
-
84862561611
-
Passion and Value in Hume's 'Treatise', (Edinburgh: University Press, 1966), pp. 109-133; 'Another Look at Hume's Account of Moral Evaluation'
-
Pall S. Ardal, Passion and Value in Hume's 'Treatise', (Edinburgh: University Press, 1966), pp. 109-133; 'Another Look at Hume's Account of Moral Evaluation', Journal of the History of Philosophy, 1977, Vol. 15, pp. 405-421
-
(1977)
Journal of the History of Philosophy
, vol.15
, pp. 405-421
-
-
Ardal, P.S.1
-
9
-
-
79956698183
-
-
New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company
-
T. H. Green, Locke and Hume, (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1968), p. 360
-
(1968)
Locke and Hume
, pp. 360
-
-
Green, T.H.1
-
10
-
-
79956662110
-
Essays on the Active Powers of Man
-
ed. William Hamilton Edinburgh: Maclachlan and Stewart
-
Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man, in The Works of Thomas Reid, ed. William Hamilton (Edinburgh: Maclachlan and Stewart, 1877), Vol. 11, p. 652
-
(1877)
The Works of Thomas Reid
, vol.11
, pp. 652
-
-
Reid, T.1
-
11
-
-
79956701258
-
-
The Critical Review, 1788, Vol. 66, p. 487
-
(1788)
The Critical Review
, vol.66
, pp. 487
-
-
-
13
-
-
79956619769
-
An Examination of Hume's Essay on Justice
-
'An Examination of Hume's Essay on Justice', in European Magazine and London Review, 1793, Vol. 24, pp. 422-4
-
(1793)
European Magazine and London Review
, vol.24
, pp. 422-424
-
-
-
15
-
-
0004101434
-
-
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul
-
J. L. Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), p. 76
-
(1980)
Hume's Moral Theory
, pp. 76
-
-
MacKie, J.L.1
-
16
-
-
79956698172
-
Artificial Virtue, Self-interest and Acquired Social Concern
-
April
-
'Natural virtue is attributable to those sentiments and passions which, if acted upon, generally tend to yield pleasing results to ourselves or others. On the other hand, we ascribe artificial virtue to actions which constitute a certain practice, the observance of which tends towards the good of mankind'. Ted Ponko, 'Artificial Virtue, Self-interest and Acquired Social Concern', Hume Studies, Vol. IX, Number 1, April 1983, 46-58
-
(1983)
Hume Studies
, vol.9
, Issue.1
, pp. 46-58
-
-
Ponko, T.1
-
17
-
-
79956619746
-
Hume's Distinction between the Natural and Artificial Virtues'
-
Ken O'Day, 'Hume's Distinction between the Natural and Artificial Virtues', Hume Studies, 1994, Vol. 20, pp. 121-42
-
(1994)
Hume Studies
, vol.20
, pp. 121-142
-
-
O'Day, K.1
-
18
-
-
79956701205
-
Thirst, lust and other bodily appetites also give rise to direct impressions of reflection (T 439). for a more detailed account of how bodily appetites give rise to direct impressions of reflection, see James Fieser, 'Hume's Classification of the Passions and its Precursors'
-
Hunger, thirst, lust and other bodily appetites also give rise to direct impressions of reflection (T 439). For a more detailed account of how bodily appetites give rise to direct impressions of reflection, see James Fieser, 'Hume's Classification of the Passions and its Precursors', Hume Studies, 1992, Vol. 18, pp. 9-12
-
(1992)
Hume Studies
, vol.18
, pp. 9-12
-
-
Hunger1
-
23
-
-
78951470031
-
Hume's Pyrrhonism: A Developmental Interpretation
-
For Hume, ideas come from two sources: the memory and the imagination (T 8). The imagination produces ideas in two ways: through reason (judgments about truth and falsehood), and the fancy (re-assembling ideas to form fictions; cf. T 10, 117-18 fn. 1). See James Fieser, 'Hume's Pyrrhonism: A Developmental Interpretation', Hume Studies, 15 (1989), 96-7
-
(1989)
Hume Studies
, vol.15
, pp. 96-97
-
-
Fieser, J.1
-
24
-
-
84880851660
-
Hume's Noble Lie: An Account of his Artificial Virtues
-
Marcia Baron, 'Hume's Noble Lie: An Account of his Artificial Virtues', in Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 12 (1982), 541
-
(1982)
Canadian Journal of Philosophy
, vol.12
, pp. 541
-
-
Baron, M.1
|