On separating the intellect from the body: Aristotle's De Anima III.4, 429a10-b5

Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie

Volumn 81, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 249-267

  Sisko, John E ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 61249569573     PISSN: 00039101     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1515/agph.1999.81.3.249     Document Type: Article

References (29)

1. Myles Burnyeat has argued that, for Aristotle, there is no physiological change (or material alteration) involved in the process of perceiving. See his "Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible? A Draft", in Nussbaum and Rorty, Essays on Aristotle's De Anima, Clarendon Press, Oxford (1992), pp. 15-26,
2. and "Aristote voit du rouge et entend un «do»: combien se passe-t-il de choses? Remarques sur le «De Anima», II, 7-8", Revue Philosophique, 1993, n. 2, pp. 263-280
3. (This paper has also been published in English as an Additional Paper, "How much happens when Aristotle sees red and hears middle C?", in the 1995 paperback edition of Nussbaum and Rorty, pp. 421-434.)
4. I have argued against Bumyeat's thesis in my "Material Alteration and Cognitive Activity in Aristotle's De Anima", Phronesis, XLI (1996), n. 2, pp. 138-157.
5. T. K. Johansen argues in support of Burnyeat's thesis. See his Aristotle on the Sense-Organs, Cambridge University Press, 1998.
6. Also see my review of Johansen in Classical Review, XLIX, n. 1 (1999), pp. 122f.
7. This exemplification thesis has been forcefully argued by Richard Sorabji. See both his "Body and Soul in Aristotle", Philosophy, 49 (1974), pp. 63-89;
8. and his "Intentionality and Psychological Processes: Aristotle's Theory of Sense-Perception" in Nussbaum and Rorty, 1992, pp. 195-225.
9. Stephen Everson has argued in support of the exemplification thesis in his Aristotle on Perception, Oxford University Press, 1997.
10. I discuss Everson's principal arguments in my "Alteration and Quasi-Alteration", Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, XVI (1998), pp. 331-352.
11. The opposed encoding thesis has been argued by Deborah Modrak (Aristotle: The Power of Perception, University of Chicago Press, 1987)
12. and Jonathan Lear (Aristotle and the Desire to Understand, Cambridge University Press, 1988).
13. Kathleen Wilkes, Physicalism, Humanities Press, 1978. See especially pp. 115 f.
14. Werner Jaeger, Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of his Development, Oxford University Press, 1934, pp. 332-334
15. and W. D. Ross "The Development of Aristotle's Thought", Proceedings of the British Academy, 43 (1957), pp. 65-67.
16. Michael Wedin, Mind and Imagination in Aristotle, Yale University Press, 1988, especially chapter 5. Wedin's thesis directly concerns the active intellect of DA III.5. However, since Wedin holds that the discussion in DA III.5 constitutes a refinement of the account in DA III.4, he is committed to the view that Aristotle explains the thesis (argued for in III.4) that intellect is separable in terms of the separability of active intellect (in III.5).
17. Jonathan Barnes, "Aristotle's Concept of Mind", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 72 (1971-72), pp. 101-114.
18. In DA II.3, Aristotle sets out a hierarchical nesting of the psychic capacities. He holds that all perceivers must function nutritively and that all thinkers must function perceptually (see 414b28-415a13). This nesting shows that within the DA Aristotle is not interested in accounting for the life of God, since his God (that is, his prime mover) is neither capable of perceiving nor capable of functioning nutritively (see Metaphysics XII.9).
19. Wedin argues that the separability of active intellect is akin to the separability of mathematical objects: active intellect is not actually separate from matter, but it can be thought of as if it were (see Wedin, 1988, pp. 191-193). In Metaphysics VI.1, Aristotle claims that mathematical objects can be thought of as if they were changeless (αcombining comma abovecursive Greek chiίνητα) (1026a9). Further, he glosses 'changeless' with 'eternal' (αcombining comma aboveιcombining greek dialytikaδιον) (1026a9f.). Wedin asserts that this is the sort of eternality that Aristotle ascribes to active intellect (at DA III.5, 430a23). There are at least two problems with this view. First, Aristotle does not claim that active intellect is as-if eternal, he simply says that it is eternal. Second (and more importantly), active intellect is the efficient cause of thought. (This is required by Aristotle's claim that active intellect is related to passive intellect as art is related to matter; see DA III.5, 430a10-13.) Active intellect, thus, plays a role in the pursuit of an end (τέλος). Abstractions, however, do not seek an end (see Parts of Animals (PA) I.1 641b11-15). They are not productive. Thus, active intellect cannot be adequately understood as an abstraction.
20. On the FFO condition, see Wedin, 1988, pp. 13ff.
21. See Metaphysics VI.1 and Nicomachean Ethics VI. 1-7.
22. Christopher Shields has recently emphasized the importance of bringing the distinction between encoding and exemplifying to bear in assessing Aristotle's treatment of intellect. (See his "Intentionality and Isomorphism in Aristotle", Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium on Ancient Philosophy (BACAP) XI (1997), pp. 307-330.)
23. Shields holds that the distinction itself derives from Brentano's treatment of the difference between taking on a quality physically and taking on a quality objectively (Shields, p. 319). Martin argues that the distinction between encoding and exemplifying is not the distinction that concerns Brentano. (See his "Commentary on Shields", BACAP (1997), pp. 331-334.) Whether or not the distinction has a heritage in Brentano is of no consequence to the modern debate. Encoding and exemplifying theses have been important foci in the contemporary debate over Aristotle's theory of perception. (See note 3, above.) And, given that Aristotle many times claims that perception and thought are similar, it makes perfect sense for us, in studying Aristotle's account of thought, to consider the possibility that theses of encoding or exemplification play a role in Aristotle's analysis.
24. Aristotle's argument here is markedly similar to Anaxagoras' argument in support of the claim that intellect is unmixed. Anaxagoras states, "Mind [...] is mixed with nothing [...] for if it were not by itself, but was mixed with anything else [...] the things that were with it would hinder it so that it could rule nothing" (DK 59B12). In each of these arguments the unmixedness of intellect follows from the supposition that if it were mixed its capacity would be limited. Cherniss suggests that Aristotle is not justified in interpreting Anaxagoras' "ruling all things" to mean "knowing all things" (see his Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy, Cornell University Press, 1935, p. 172, n. 122). But one must question whether this is an apt criticism, for in DK 59B12 Anaxagoras does explicitly associate the ability of intellect to rule all things with its ability to knows all things.
25. Christopher Shields supposes that, if Aristotle's justification for the claim that intellect grasps all things is directed upon the range of its potential objects, then his overriding concern is with the problem of blind-spots. Accordingly, Shields argues that Aristotle's argument would rest on the thin observation that "if nous is structured, there will be one form it cannot acquire" (Shields, 1997, p. 325; my emphasis).
26. This consideration, Shields contends, does not seem forceful enough to motivate Aristotle's claim that intellect is separable from the body (especially when the form that intellect could not acquire would be the form that it already has and, thus, it would become unclear why intellect needs to acquire that form in order to think that very same form; see Shields, p. 329). This is one reason why Shields rejects the view that it is a concern over the range of potential objects of intellect that motivates Aristotle's claim that intellect grasps all things. Aristotle, however, is concerned not only with the possibility of blindspots (a constraint (1) concern). He is concerned with issues connected with constraint (2) and constraint (3). These concerns (as we shall see) do ultimately motivate his claim that intellect is separable from the body.
27. Pace Shields, 1997, pp. 320-322 & 329.
28. See my 1996, pp. 147-157.
29. th annual meeting of the Virginia Philosophical Association, Newport News, Virginia (October, 1998), and the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, Berkeley, California (April 1999). I would like to thank Rob Bolton for his sustained criticism and encouragement and Sarah Broadie for helpful discussion on issues addressed on this paper.