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457-69; 20 (1911), 161-80
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H. W. B. Joseph. 'The Psychological Explanation of the Development of the Perception of External Objects', Mind. 19 (1910): 306-21 & 457-69; 20 (1911), 161-80. This series of papers was mainly an attack on views expressed by Stout.
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Joseph, H.W.B.1
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See G. F. Stout, 'Reply to Mr. Joseph', Mind. 20 (1911): 1-14.
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H. W. B. Joseph, 'A Comparison of Kanfs Idealism with that of Berkeley', in Essays in Ancient and Modern Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1935), 209-31.
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H. H. Price, 'Critical Notice: Knowledge and Perception. Essays and Lectures by H. A. Prichard', Mind, 60 (1951), 103-21, p. 103. Price's critical notice is one of the rare discussions of the later Prichard on perception.
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Price, H.H.1
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Harold Arthur Prichard. 1871-1947
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His obituary of Prichard is another valuable source: H. H. Price, 'Harold Arthur Prichard. 1871-1947', Proceedings of the British Academy. 33 (1947). 331-50.
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J. D. Mabbott, Oxford Memories (Oxford: Thorntons of Oxford, 1986) 76.
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Mabbott, J.D.1
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G. Ryle, 'Paper Read to the Oxford Philosophical Society 500th Meeting. 1968', in Aspects of Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993) 101-7. p. 102.
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On the institution of the 'Wee Teas' see G. Ryle, 'Autobiographical', in O. P. Wood and G. Pitcher (eds) Ryle (London: Macmillan, 1970) 1-15, pp. 5-6;
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Ryle, G.1
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0004261565
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It is only after the Second World War that analytical philosophers made a breakthrough at University level: Gilbert Ryle replaced Collingwood as the Waynflete Professor of Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy in 1945 (the chair had been vacant since 1941) and John Austin replaced H. J. Paton as White's Professor of Moral Philosophy in 1952. (Ayer came in later, becoming Wykeham Professor of Logic only in 1958.) Readerships were awarded to S. E. Toulmin in Philosophy of Science (1949)
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Philosophy of Science
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Toulmin, S.E.1
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23
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79956405720
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and J. L. Ackrill in Ancient Philosophy (1951). The new generation of post-war lecturers included G. A. Paul, H. P. Grice who joined Mabbott at St. John's, P. F. Strawson who was to replace Ryle in 1968 as the Waynflete Professor
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Ancient Philosophy
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Ackrill, J.L.1
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and J. O. Urmson. who was close to Austin and who wrote a manifesto of ordinary language philosophy: Philosophical Analysis. Its Development Between the Two World Wars (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1956). It is also during those post-war years that well-known philosophers such as G. E. M. Anscombe - who introduced Wittgenstein to Oxford P. Foot. R. M. Hare, and G. J. Warnock began lecturing.
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Its Development Between the Two World Wars
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Urmson, J.O.1
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25
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79956386284
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Clarity Is Not Enough
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H. H. Price. 'Clarity Is Not Enough'. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 19 (1945): 1-31. Price wanted to defend Oxford Realists and their offspring against the accusation that, in the inter-war period, they did not fulfil their moral and political role within the society, thus helping the situation to deteriorate.
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Price, H.H.1
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Oxford, Clarendon Press
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For example, Collingwood in his Autobiography. written at the eve of the Second World War, directly accused Oxford Realists of having contributed to the rise of fascism: 'I know now that the minute philosophers of my youth, for all their profession of a purely scientific detachment from practical affairs, were the propagandists of a coming fascism' (An Autobiography, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1939, p. 167).
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An Autobiography
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27
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79956405711
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London: Allen & Unwin
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Needless to say, this accusation is completely gratuitous. Price's lecture was reprinted in a collection of essays of the same title. H. D. Lewis, Clarity is not enough. London: Allen & Unwin, 1963.
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For more on the life of Price, see J. Harrison, 'Henry Habberley Price. 1899-1984', Proceedings of the British Academy, 80 (1993): 473-91.
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Harrison, J.1
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Notes for Lectures on "Private Experience"' and "Sense-data
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for example, the lecture notes of 1934-6: L. Wittgenstein, 'Notes for Lectures on "Private Experience"' and "Sense-data" ', Philosophical Review, 77 (1968): 275-320. George Paul published a noticeable paper in 1936. which bears the influence of Wittgenstein.
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Philosophical Review
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Wittgenstein, L.1
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31
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See G. A. Paul, 'Is There a Problem about Sense-Data?', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 15 (1936): 61-77. Surprisingly, there is no systematic study of Wittgenstein on sense-data in the extensive secondary literature on the Austrian philosopher. The arguments set forth by Wittgenstein (and Paul) to undermine the notion of sense-data are of a quite different nature than those found in the writings of Oxonians. As a matter of fact. Wittgenstein was much more sympathetic to the notion than his Oxonian interpreters would like us to believe. Be this as it may, their common rejection of sense-datum theories was one of the points of contact between Oxford Philosophy and Wittgenstein, which facilitated his reception in that University. On the reception of Wittgenstein in post-war Oxford.
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(1936)
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary
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Paul, G.A.1
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G. Ryle, 'Systematically Misleading Expressions', in Collected Papers, 2 vols., reprint (Bristol. Thoemmes, 1990) vol. 2, 39-62.
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2 vols., reprint (Bristol: Thoemmes
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G. Ryle. Collected Papers, 2 vols., reprint (Bristol: Thoemmes, 1990) vol. 1. 197-214.
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Collected Papers
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H. H. Price. 'Reality and Sensible Appearance'. Mind, 33 (1924): 20-43.
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Mind
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H.H. Price, Perception (London: Methuen, 1932) sec. ed., 1950.
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Price, H.H.1
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reprint (Harmondsworth: Penguin chap. 7
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G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind, reprint (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980) chap. 7.
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(1980)
The Concept of Mind
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45
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There is also a chapter on perception in G. Ryle, Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954) 93-110.
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J. D. Mabbott, 'Our Direct Experience of Time', Mind, 60 (1951): 153-67.
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Mind
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Mabbott, J.D.1
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48
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For a presentation of the notion of 'specious present', see C. D. Broad, Scientific Thought (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul) 1923. pp. 348-51.
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Scientific Thought
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51
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J. Cook Wilson, Statement and Inference. 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1926) 545.
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Statement and Inference
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Cook Wilson, J.1
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A year before ' "If", "So" and "Because" ', Ryle published The Concept of Mind where he coined the expression: 'Law-statements are true or false but they do not state truths or falsehood of the same type as those asserted by the statements of fact to which they apply or are supposed to apply. They have different jobs. The crucial difference can be brought out in this way. At least part of the point of trying to establish laws is to find out how to infer from particular matters of fact to other particular matters of fact, how to explain particular matters of fact by reference to other matters of fact, and how to bring about or prevent states of affairs. A law is used as, so to speak, an inference-ticket (a season ticket) which licenses its possessors to move from asserting factual statements to asserting other factual statements' (The Concept of Mind, pp. 116-17).
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P. T. Geach, Logic Matters (Oxford: Blackwell. 1972) 254-5.
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J. O. Urmson, 'Prichard and Knowledge', in J. Dancy, J. M. E. Moravcsik, C. C. W. Taylor (eds.). Human Agency. Language, Duty, and Value (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1988) 11-24, p. 11.
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John Langshaw Austin. 1911-60
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p. 356n.
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Burton Dreben, who had just obtained his Ph. D. from Harvard under the supervision of W. V.O. Quine, spent the academic year 1951 in Oxford. He should be given credit for introducing logic to a generation of Oxonians, Austin in particular. Together they devised and played a card-game, known as 'Symboli' to help learning formal logic. (For some reason, this card-game is also referred to as 'Case' by Warnock in his obituary to Austin: G. J. Warnock, 'John Langshaw Austin. 1911-60', Proceedings of the British Academy, 49 (1963): 345-63, p. 356n.) After Dreben left Oxford. Austin continued improving and playing the game, as he was apparently convinced that this was the only way he could teach logic to his colleagues.
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Warnock, G.J.1
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58
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Oxford: Oxford University Press
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William Kneale. who was White's Professor of Moral Philosophy from 1960 to 1966. knew modern logic, but did not teach it. He wrote in collaboration with his wife Martha an excellent history of logic: W. C. Kneale & M. Kneale, The Development of Logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962. Kneale had studied the theory probability before the Second World War and he published Probability and Induction a few years after it. But his book was not, as is clearly stated in the preface, a contribution to mathematics. Kneale never directly contributed to mathematical logic, but recent work in 'multiple-conclusion logic' is inspired by his ideas. On this
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(1962)
The Development of Logic
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Kneale, W.C.1
Kneale, M.2
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60
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Oxford: Oxford University Press Ayer also admitted, en passant
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A. J. Ayer also admitted, en passant, his lack of technical knowledge in logic, in Part of my Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1977) p. 162.
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Part of my Life
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Ayer, A.J.1
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61
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A Propositional Calculus with Denumer-able Matrix
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Michael Dummett, who replaced Wang as Reader in Philosophy of Mathematics from 1961 to 1975 and eventually became Wykeham Professor of Logic at New College from 1979 to 1992, was the first Oxford philosopher with working knowledge of logic: two of his earliest papers were technical ones: M. A. E. Dummett, 'A Propositional Calculus with Denumer-able Matrix', Journal of Symbolic Logic, 24 (1959): 97-106.
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Journal of Symbolic Logic
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M. A. E. Dummett & E. J. Lemmon, 1959. 'Modal Logics between S 4 and S 5', Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik, 5 (1959): 250-64. More importantly, he was the first to assimilate fully the revolution in philosophical logic brought about by Frege. There is a sense in which authors such as Ryle, Austin, and Strawson belong to the old Aristotelian paradigm. Mark Glouberman gives a very good example of this.
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(1959)
Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik
, vol.5
, pp. 250-264
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Dummett, M.A.E.1
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See M. Glouberman, 'P. F. Strawson and the Ghost of F. H. Bradley', lyyun, 43 (1994): 243-63. His point is that Strawson's reply to Bradley's paradox about predication betrays a pre-Fregean, not to say Cook Wilsonian understanding of predication.
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lyyun
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See P. F. Strawson, Individuals. An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (London: Methuen. 1959) 167]. Strawson even calls one type of non-relational ties 'attributive' in honour of Cook Wilson (ibidem, p. 168). Incidentally, the only other reference to Cook Wilson in Individuals occurs in an attempt at criticizing. Frege and Geach on subject and predicate (ibid., p. 144). Dummett is perfectly aware of Strawson's pre-Fregean stance, as is clear from a remark in Frege.
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Individuals. An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics
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Strawson, P.F.1
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Philosophy of Language (London: Duckworth, 1981) 32. Dummett was in this sense the first of a new generation of Oxford philosophers; his influence on philosophy at Oxford since the 1960s is perhaps more considerable than that of Cook Wilson in his days. This point, however, cannot be argued for within the context of this paper.
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Philosophy of Language
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H. A. Prichard. 'A Criticism of the Psychologists' Treatment of Knowledge', Mind, 16 (1907): 27-53.
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79956382716
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Hart, perhaps the greatest British legal philosopher of the century, came up to New College with a scholarship in 1926 and was tutored in philosophy by Joseph and Smith, who steered him towards Cook Wilson's realism. He returned to New College after the war (where he gave tuition from 1945 to 1952) but at that time he moved towards analytical philosophy under the influence of his friends Austin, Berlin. Hampshire, Ryle, and Waismann. Along with many others of his generation, he attended the famous 'Saturday Mornings' discussion group organized by Berlin and Austin. Closer to them, he remained distrustful of logical positivism, his style remained more Aristotelian. On the other hand, he, at least, took over from Waismann the notion of 'open-textured concepts'. On this see P. M. S. Hacker, 'Wittgenstein and Post-War Philosophy at Oxford', p. 103.
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I, Berlin, 'Austin and the Early Beginnings ot Oxford Philosophy', in Essays on J. L. Austin (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973).
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For Berlin's own explanations, see. e.g. Concepts and Categories, pp. vii-viii. I have discussed Berlin's move away from philosophy in 'Berlin on Historical Understanding and Values', to appear.
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77
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79956374830
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I. Berlin, 'Empirical propositions and Hypothetical Statements', in Concepts and Categories, pp. 32-55. This paper, which originally appeared in Mind, represents Berlin's contribution to a debate about phenomenalism which took place largely in the pages of the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.
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Concepts and Categories
, pp. 32-55
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Berlin, I.1
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84
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October 10th
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The source of this story is M. A. E. Dummett. 'Views of Wittgenstein', The Tablet, October 10th, 1992.
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The Tablet
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86
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J. L. Austin, Philosophical Papers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970) 182.
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Austin, J.L.1
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87
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79956379525
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D. G. C. Macnabb, 'Phenomenalism', p. 68. Phenomenalism can be taken here, and in the debate referred to in footnote 113 above, as the theory that states 'that a proposition about material objects (e.g. there is a clock on the mantelpiece now) is to be analysed into a conjunction (an infinite conjunction) of hypothetical propositions of the form If certain conditions are fulfilled, sense-data belonging to a certain 'family of sense-data' will be sensed'
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London: Routledge & Kegan Paul
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It should be pointed out that this view has an ancestor in some remarks by Moore in his 1914 paper on 'The Status of Sense-Data' (Philosophical Studies (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1922) 168-96). where Moore claims that 'our knowledge of physical propositions can be based on our experience of sensibles' (p. 190). When discussing knowledge that given coins 'existed before I saw them'. Moore remarked that 'All that I know will be simply that, if certain unrealised conditions had been realised, I should have had certain sensations that I have not had' and that, therefore, 'to say of a physical object that it existed at a given time will always consist merely in saying of some sensible, not that it existed at the time in question, but something quite different and immensely complicated' (p. 191).Moore remained, however, uncommitted to this sort of position and phenomenalism should not be attributed to him. See T. Baldwin. G. E. Moore (London: Routledge, 1990) 190.
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H. A. Prichard, Moral Obligation (London: Oxford University Press, 1968) vii.
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H. A, Prichard, 'The Obligation to Keep a Promise'. Moral Obligation, pp. 169-79.
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H. P. Grice. Studies in the Way of Words (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989) 381.
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C. Travis, The Uses of Sense (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) xii.
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D. Pears. 'Philosophy and the History of Philosophy', in E. Margalit & A. Margalit (eds). Isaiah Berlin. A Celebration (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991) 31-9, p. 32.
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101
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pp. 466-87
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See especially Putnam's second Dewey lecture: H. Putnam, 'Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses: An Inquiry into the Powers of the Human Mind'. Journal of Philosophy, 91 (1994): 445-517, pp. 466-87.
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For Cavell's reading see, e.g. S. Cavell, Philosophical Passages: Wittgenstein, Emerson, Austin, Derrida (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995).
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K. T. Fann (ed.) London: Routledge & Kegan Paul
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I am in general agreement here with the line taken by David Pears in 'An Original Philosopher', in K. T. Fann (ed.). Symposium on J. L. Austin (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969) 49-58.
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Putnam provides us with another example of this sort of ploy in his Dewey lectures, where he enrols Austin in his own attempt, against his former representationalist self, to revive realism about perception under the name of 'natural realism', which, incidentally, he takes 'from James's expressed desire for a view of perception that does justice to "the natural realism of the common man"' ('Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses: An Inquiry into the Powers of the Human Mind', p. 454). The 'common', 'plain', or 'ordinary' man's view of perception, etc., when fleshed out, is merely a philosophical view amongst others. And it is no use here to fabricate vacuous concepts such as Cavell's 'ordinary' or Putnam's 'second naiveté. Compare Cavell's comment on his own paper as proposing Austin's and Wittgenstein's originality in the way they take up the cause of what they call the ordinary against what I have described as philosophy's metaphysical flight from the ordinary' (Philosophical Passages: Wittgenstein, Emerson, Austin, Derrida, p. 46).
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when Cavell writes that 'there is hardly less doubt in my mind that Derrida had not read Sense and Sensibilia, for he would have recognized it to be Austin's dismantling of the English empiricist tradition's view of presence' (Philosophical Passages: Wittgenstein, Emerson, Austin, Derrida, p. 71), he is clearly misreading both Austin and Derrida, as Austin's position is rooted in a tradition (Reid, Cook Wilson) leading back to Aristotle, which is. as a matter of fact, not only 'empiricist' but part and parcel of what Derrida claims to be the 'metaphysics of presence' and which he claims to be deconstructing. Such rapprochements are just a travesty.
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