Indian conceptions of human personality

Asian Philosophy

Volumn 6, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 93-107

  Werner, Karel ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 61249342877     PISSN: 09552367     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09552369608575432     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (17)

1. Some materials and conclusions in this article are based on or derived from the following three previous research papers of mine: WERNER, KAREL (1978) The Vedic concept of human personality and its destiny, Journal of Indian Philosophy. 5, pp. 275-289;
2. WERNER, KAREL (1986) Personal identity in the Upanisads and Buddhism, in: Victor C. Hayes (Ed.) Identity Issues and World Religions. Selevted Proceedings of the Fifteenth Congress of the International Association for the History of Religions, (Bedford Park: Australian Association fo the Study of Religions at Start Campus) pp. 24-33;
3. WERNER, KAREL (1988) Indian concepts of human personality in relation to the doctrine of the soul, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, No. 1, pp. 73-97. For detailed references and more extensive argumentation at least the first and the third paper should be consulted.
4. DRIESCH, HANS (1929) Grundprobleme der Psychologie, 2nd edn; previously also in: Philosophic des Organischen, (1909; 2nd edn, 1921)
5. Cf. PARRINDER, GEOFFREY (1973) Indestructible Soul. The Nature of Man and Life after Death in Indian Thought (London).
6. Tanū is often translated as 'body' like rūpa, but both really mean the recognisable 'shape' and are used also for the appearance ('subtle bodies') of gods and other beings in higher spheres of existence. Cf. entries in: GRASSMANN, H. (1873) Wörterbuch zum Rig-Veda (Leipzig).
7. This theory goes back at least to Taittirīya Upanisad . Cf. WERNER, KAREL (1986) Yoga and the old Upanisads, in: PETER CONNOLLY (Ed.) Perspectives on Indian Religion: Papers in Honour of Karel Werner, (Delhi: Satguru) pp. 1-8.
8. Cf. JOHNSTON, E. H. (1974) Early Sāmkhya. An Essay on its Historical Development according to the Texts (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass) (1956) (1st edn, 1937).
9. Cf. ZIMMER, HEINRICH (1956) Philosophies of India, (New York: Meridian) pp. 280-332.
10. As Larson would have us believe, see: Larson, G. J. (1969) Classical Sāmkhya (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass)
11. and also the introduction: LARSON, G. J. & BHATTACHARYA, R. S. (1987) Sāmkhya. A Dualist Tradition in Indian Philosophy (Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies IV) (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass)
12. Cf. the review of the latter: WERNER, KAREL (1988) Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, pp. 429-30.
13. Cf. WELBON, GUY RICHARD (1968) The Buddhist Nirvāna and its Western Interpreters (University of Chicago Press, London), for some negative interpretations of nirvāna which imply cessation of existence and therefore of individual beings. Positive views of nirvāna which imply the complete disappearance of the personalities of the enlightened ones come close to the radical Advaitic interpretation of the Upanisadic brahman/ātman/ fīvātman which accounts for the accusation of Śankara's 'brahman-only' doctrine as being 'crypto Buddhist'.
14. The artificially created expression 'selflike person' hardly fits the notion of purusa/purisa and certainly not puggala as Harvey would have it in his book: HARVEY, PETER (1995) The Selfless Mind: Personality, Consciousness and Nirvāna in Early Buddhism (London: Curzon) p. 34.
15. Cf. CONZE, EDWARD (1962) Buddhist Thought in India (Allen & Unwin, London) pp. 122-132.
16. As does, for example: COLLINS, STEVEN (1982) Selfless Persons. Imagery and Thought in Theravāda Buddhism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
17. Others advocate some form of the Upanisadic ātman doctrine as implicit in Buddhist teachings, as does PÉREZ-REMÓN, JOAQUIN (1980) Self and Non-Self in Early Buddhism (The Hague: Mouton).