Locomotive soul: The parts of soul in Aristotle's scientific works

Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy

Volumn 22, Issue , 2002, Pages 142-199

  Whiting, Jennifer E ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 61249128377     PISSN: 02657651     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
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References (22)

1. I translate the Oxford Classical Text prepared by Ross, except where noted. See W. D. Ross, Aristotelis De Anima (Oxford, 1956).
2. a 5
3. For some discussion of this issue see D. Charles, Aristotle's Philosophy of Action (London, 1984) (esp. ch. 1);
4. and T. II. Irwin's critical notice of it: 'Aristotelian Actions', Phronesis, 31 (1986) 68-89 (esP. 71-3).
5. It is like what I call the 'Lockean dualism' of person and animal, except that it does not require anything as complex as a person. See my 'Personal Identity: The Non-Branching Form of What Matters', in R. Gale (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics (forthcoming).
6. This sort of view has been developed most explicitly by-Sydney Shoemaker, especially in his 'Self, Body, and Coincidence', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. 63 (1999) 286 - 307.
7. It is worth thinking here about the criticisms in Plato's Theaetetus of treating the various senses (or sense-organs) as if (like soldiers lodged in a wooden horse) they were themselves the proper subjects of various sorts of perception. For an excellent discussion of these criticisms see M. F. Burnyeat, 'Plato on the Grammar of Perceiving', Classical Quarterly, NS 26 (1976), 29-51.
8. Nussbaum (whose text I translate) interprets this, plausibly, as referring to an angle BAC, with A being the point common to segments BA and AC. See Martha Nussbaum, Aristotle's De Motu Animalium (Princeton, 1978).
9. See sects. 173-5 of T. Irwin, Aristotle's First Principles (Oxford, 1988). It is clear from the last paragraph of sect. 175 that Invin (who stresses the unity of the desiring part) regards the desiring part of soul as distinct from the perceiving part (and from the nutritive, thinking, and deliberative parts).
10. On the common sense, and the way in which the combination of special senses is for perceiving the common sensibles, see I. Vasiliou, 'Perception, Knowledge, and the Sceptic in Aristotle', Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 14 (1996), 83-131.
11. I translate the Oxford Classical Text prepared by W. D. Ross, Aristotelis Politico (Oxford, 1957).
12. Here and in what follows, I translate the Oxford Classical Text prepared by I. Bywater, Aristoteiis Ethica Nicomachea (Oxford, 1894).
13. The frequency with which Aristotle speaks in the biological works (and elsewhere) of various animals as and of some as than others, is an important but frequently neglected point (especially in the standard account of the distinction between us rational animals and all other ones). One person who has given this point the sort of attention it deserves is J. L. Labarrière. See his 'De la phronesis animate', in D. Devereux and P. Pellegrin (eds.), Biologie, logique, el métaphysique chez Arislole (Paris, 1990), 405-28;
14. and 'Imagination humaine et imagination animale chez Aristote', Phronesis, 29 (1984), 17-49.
15. M. Frede, 'Aristotle's Rationalism', in M. Frede and G. Striker (eds.), Rationality in Greek Thought (Oxford, 1996) 157-73.
16. For the suggestion that we take not as offering an alternative, but as a gloss on see W. Charlton, 'Aristotle on the Place of Mind in Nature', in A. Gotthelf and J. G. Lennox (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Aristotle's Biology (Cambridge, 1987), 408 - 23, esp. 415 - 16.
17. I translate the Oxford Classical Text prepared by H. J. Drossaart Luloffs, Aristotelis De Generatione Animalium (Oxford, 1965).
18. I defend a view like this in my 'Human Nature and Intellectualism in Aristotle', Arcliiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 68 (1986), 70 - 95, where I argue (1) that Aristotle views bodily activity as a necessary condition for theoretical thought, though not (as in the case of practical thought) part of its essence; and (2) that Aristotle does not identify theoretical intellect (at least in mortal subjects) with the active intellect of De anima 3. 5 (the formidable difficulties of which I cannot now discuss). If one accepts this distinction between the theoretical intellect of a mortal subject and the active intellect of De anima 3. 5, then one might suppose that (2B)'s reference to a different kind of soul, which alone is capable of being separate, is to active intellect and not to the theoretical intellect of a mortal subject.
19. For a survey of the various accounts given of active intellect, see F. Brentano, Die Psychologie des Aristoteles (Mainz, 1866),
20. translated into English by R. George as The Psychology of Aristotle (Berkeley, 1977).
21. My understanding of the ethical works is much indebted to the work of John McDowell, especially to sect. 11 of his 'Some Issues in Aristotle's Moral Psychology', in S. Everson (ed.), Ethics (Cambridge, 1998), 107-28;
22. repr. in McDowell's Mind, Value, and Reality (Harvard, 1998), 23 - 49.