Truthmakers, knowledge and paradox

Analysis

Volumn 67, Issue 295, 2007, Pages 242-250

  López De Sa, Dan ^a,b,c   Zardini, Elia ^b  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY OF BARCELONA   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 61249128234     PISSN: 00032638     EISSN: 14678284     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8284.2007.00681.x     Document Type: Review

References (11)

1. Armour-Garb, B. and J. Woodbridge. 2006. Dialetheism, semantic pathology and the open pair. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84: 395-416
2. Cook, R. 2006. Knights, knaves and unknowable truths. Analysis 66: 10-16
3. Duke-Yonge, J. 2006. Unknowable truths: a reply to Cook. Analysis 66 295-99
4. Grim, P. 2000. The being that knew too much. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 47: 141-54
5. Kripke, S. 1975. Outline of a theory of truth. The Journal of Philosophy 72: 690-716
6. Lewis, D. 1992. Critical notice of D. M. Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70: 211-24
7. López de Sa, D. and E. Zardini. 2006. Does this sentence have no truthmaker? Analysis 66: 154-57
8. Milne, P. 2005. Not every truth has a truthmaker. Analysis 65: 221-23
9. Rodriguez-Pereyra, G. 2006. Truthmaker Maximalism defended. Analysis 66 260-64
10. nd edn.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
11. Sorensen, R. 2001. Vagueness and Contradiction. Oxford: Clarendon Press