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1
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80054469204
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David Hume: Radical Empiricist and Pragmatist
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Freedom and Experience, ed. Ithaca: Cornell University Press
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John Herman Randall, 'David Hume: Radical Empiricist and Pragmatist', in Freedom and Experience, ed. Sidney Hook and Milton R. Konvitz (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1947), p. 293.
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(1947)
Sidney Hook and Milton R. Konvitz
, pp. 293
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Randall, J.H.1
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3
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80054554854
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Hume's Agnosticism
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London: Macmillan
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Noxon refers to it as an 'unscrupulous and irresponsible fabrication'. (He also provides some other examples of the charge that Hume was wanting in philosophical seriousness in 'Hume's Agnosticism', in V. C. Chappell (ed.), Hume: A Collection of Critical Essays (London: Macmillan, 1966), p. 362.) A more sympathetic criticism is provided by Richard Popkin. Despite firm disagreements with Randall's opinions, Popkin shares sympathy with the latter's targets, and so observes: 'As an antidote to hero-worship and the self-congratulation of the [twentieth century] empiricists, Randall's approach is appealing, intriguing, and often shocking.'
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(1966)
Hume: A Collection of Critical Essays
, pp. 362
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Chappell, V.C.1
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4
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80054524648
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Randall and British Empiricism
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ed. Richard A. Watson and James E. Force Indianapolis: Hackett
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(Richard H. Popkin, 'Randall and British Empiricism', in The High Road to Pyrrhonism, ed. Richard A. Watson and James E. Force (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), p. 47.) It would have been a more effective antidote, however, if it had come closer to the truth.
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(1993)
The High Road to Pyrrhonism
, pp. 47
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Popkin, R.H.1
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5
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80054507426
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History of the Editions
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London: Longmans, Green
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T. H. Grose, for example, was struck by 'the suddenness with which his labours in philosophy came to an end' that is, with the publication of the Treatiseand then goes on to claim that Hume 'certainly lacked the disposition, and probably the ability' to engage in any positive reconstruction after the destructive achievements of the Treatise. ('History of the Editions', in T. H. Green and T. H. Grose (eds.), The Philosophical Works of David Hume (London: Longmans, Green, 1889), III, pp. 75-6.) Remarks like these leave Books II and III of the Treatise in limbo; but for the purposes of this study, the key feature is the interpretation of Book I as entirely destructive.
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(1889)
The Philosophical Works of David Hume
, vol.3
, pp. 75-76
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Green, T.H.1
Grose, T.H.2
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6
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17544384343
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London: Macmillan
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Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume (London: Macmillan, 1941), is the ground-breaking work which revitalised the study of Hume's thought.
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(1941)
The Philosophy of David Hume
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Smith, N.K.1
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10
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33750314604
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Oxford: Clarendon Press
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Two other books have done much to revivify philosophical thinking about Hume in the wider (non-specialist) philosophical community: Edward Craig, The Mind of God and the Works of Man (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987),
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(1987)
The Mind of God and the Works of Man
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Craig, E.1
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12
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0008370192
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Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
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The invigorating effect of studies such as these (including, of course, the invigoration of their critics) is well illustrated in David Fate Norton (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hume (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
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(1993)
The Cambridge Companion to Hume
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Norton, D.F.1
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13
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79954675458
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My Own Life
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ed. Eugene F. Miller Indianapolis: Liberty Fund
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David Hume, 'My Own Life', in Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary, Revised Edition, ed. Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1987), p. xxxiv. Given that the accuracy of 'My Own Life' is a relevant issue here, it is worth pointing out that this famous remark is an exaggeration: certainly the book did not hit the best-seller lists, but it did receive a steadily-increasing degree of recognition. However, the very fact of Hume's decision to write the first Enquiry is sufficient to show that the steady succession of reviews (mostly unsympathetic) were extremely unsatisfying to a young man hoping to take the educated world by storm.
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(1987)
Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary, Revised Edition
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Hume, D.1
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16
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80054507354
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My Own Life
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There are quite a number of remarks of this kind to be found there. For example, he says, speaking of the period 1749-51: 'Meanwhile, my bookseller, A. Miller, informed me, that my former publications (all but the unfortunate Treatise) were beginning to be the subject of conversation; that the sale of them was gradually increasing, and that new editions were demanded. Answers by Reverends, and Right Reverends, came out two or three in a year; and I found, by Dr. Warburton's railing, that the books were beginning to be esteemed in good company.' ('My Own Life', in Essays, p. xxxvi.)
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Essays
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17
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80054533160
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The Letters of David Hume
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Oxford: Oxford University Press
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Hume mentions it in a letter of October 1775, to his printer William Strahan: 'There is a short Advertisement, which I wish I had prefix'd to the second Volume of the Essays and Treatises in the last Edition. I send you a Copy of it. Please to enquire at the Warehouse, if any considerable Number of that Edition remain on hands; and if there do, I beg the favour of you, that you woud throw off an equal Number of this Advertisement, and give out no more Copies without prefixing it to the second volume.' He adds: 'It is a compleat Answer to Dr Reid and to that bigotted silly Fellow, Beattie.' See J. Y. T. Greig, The Letters of David Hume (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1932), Letter 509, II, p. 301.
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(1932)
Letter 509
, vol.2
, pp. 301
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Greig, J.Y.T.1
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18
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80054554729
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ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, rev. P. H. Nidditch Oxford: Oxford University Press
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David Hume, Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals, 3rd edition, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, rev. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 2. (Subsequent references to the Enquiries will be to this edition.)
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(1975)
Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals, 3rd edition
, pp. 2
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Hume, D.1
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19
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80054507354
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My Own Life
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Hume, 'My Own Life', in Essays, p. xxxvi.
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Essays
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Hume1
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80054554820
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Letters
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in Greig, Letters, Letter 13,1, p. 34.
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Letter
, vol.13
, Issue.1
, pp. 34
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Greig1
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22
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80054524501
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Oxford: Oxford University Press
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Reprinted in D. D. Raphael (ed.), British Moralists 1650-1800, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), II, p. 109.
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(1969)
British Moralists 1650-1800
, vol.2
, pp. 109
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Raphael, D.D.1
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23
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0004333389
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Lettres philosophiques Leonard Tancock Harmondsworth: Penguin Books
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(Voltaire, Letters on England [Lettres philosophiques], trans. Leonard Tancock (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1980), pp. 111-4).
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(1980)
Letters on England
, pp. 111-114
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Voltaire1
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24
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80054524416
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Philosophy, Religion and Science in the Seventeenth Century
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ed. J. W. Yolton
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In light of this evidence, we can see that a recent remark by John Valdimir Price, although on the right track, is too weak: he observes that "The "man of letters" in the eighteenth century had to be philosopher, historian, and literary craftsman if he wanted to have any impact on his readers' (J. V. Price, review of Philosophy, Religion and Science in the Seventeenth Century (ed. J. W. Yolton), in British Journal for the History of Philosophy I (1993), p. 153). It would be better to say that an author would have to aspire to knowledge of philosophy, history, and literary craftsmanship if he wanted to present himself successfully to his audience as genuinely a man of letters.
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(1993)
British Journal for the History of Philosophy
, vol.1
, pp. 153
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Price, J.V.1
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25
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Oxford
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(C. A. J. Coady, Testimony (Oxford, 1992), p. x.) In affirming this position, Coady is not abandoning philosophy, but seeking to do it well. The same is true of Hume.
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(1992)
Testimony
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Coady, C.A.J.1
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27
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79953481483
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A Treatise of Human Nature
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An Abstract of a Book lately Published
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See An Abstract of a Book lately Published, Entitled A Treatise of Human Nature, in A Treatise of Human Nature, 2nd edition, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, rev. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 644. (My thanks to David Fate Norton for drawing my attention to these further evidences.)
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A Treatise of Human Nature, 2nd edition
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Selby-Bigge, L.A.1
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34
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80054524390
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Enquiries, p. 16.
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Enquiries
, pp. 16
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35
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0039373862
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Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
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Hume is canonised as an essentially destructive thinker, first, because Reid so understood him, and saw this outcome to be the inevitable tendency of the theory of ideas. Hume himself sought to oppose Reid's interpretation of his philosophy: indeed, Hume tells us that the 'Advertisement' referred to above was affixed to the later editions of his work as 'a compleat Answer to Dr Reid and to that bigotted silly Fellow, Beattie' (Greig, Letters, Letter 509, II, p. 301). Secondly, and, in the end, more influentially, Hume's reputation as a destructive thinker reflects the impact of Kantian philosophy. The critical philosophy understood itself precisely as the overcoming of a species of destructive scepticism, of which Hume was the exemplar. Such was the Kantian influence in the nineteenth century that this picture of Hume triumphed even amongst those who rejected Kant's solution. Thus Hume's philosophy became canonical principally because of what it was understood to be against, and in this way it came to be understood as a philosophy almost wholly concerned to be oppositional i.e. to all constructive traditions in philosophy. See, for example, Frederick C. Beiser, The Fate of Reason (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), Introduction.
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(1987)
The Fate of Reason
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Beiser, F.C.1
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38
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33750314604
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Ch.2
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The point is well made by Edward Craig, who recognises the link between dethroning reason and undermining the doctrine of Man as Imago Dei. See The Mind of God and the Works of Man, Ch.2.
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The Mind of God and the Works of Man
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39
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79956648787
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ed. P. H. Nidditch Oxford: Clarendon Press
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The connection is explicit in Hume's predecessors. See, for example, Locke's definition of reason as 'That Faculty, whereby Man is supposed to be distinguished from Beasts, and wherein it is evident he much surpasses them' (John Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), IV. xvii. 1).
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(1975)
An Essay concerning Human Understanding
, vol.4
, Issue.17
, pp. 1
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Locke, J.1
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40
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80054457347
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ed. M. A. Screech Harmondsworth: Penguin Books
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Cf. Montaigne's Pyrrhonian debunking in 'An Apology for Raymond Sebond': 'The natural, original distemper of Man is presumption. Man is the most blighted and frail of all creatures and, moreover, the most given to pride. This creature knows and sees that he is lodged down here, among the mire and shit of the world, bound and nailed to the deadest, most stagnant part of the universe, in the lowest storey of the building, the farthest from the vault of heaven . . yet, in thought, he sets himself above the circle of the Moon, bringing the very heavens under his feet. The vanity of this same thought makes him equal himself to God; attribute to himself God's mode of being; pick himself out and set himself apart from the mass of other creatures; and (although they are his fellows and his brothers) carve out for them such helpings of force or faculties as he thinks fit.' (Michel de Montaigne, The Complete Essays, ed. M. A. Screech (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1991), p. 505.) This passage helps to show why scepticism and naturalism, sometimes thought of as distinct strands in Hume's thought, are in fact different sides of the same coin.
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(1991)
The Complete Essays
, pp. 505
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De Montaigne, M.1
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41
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80054554582
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A Skeptic's Progress: Hume's Preference for the First Enquiry
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David Fate Norton, Nicholas Capaldi, & Wade L. Robison (eds.) San Diego: Austin Hill Press
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John Immerwahr, 'A Skeptic's Progress: Hume's Preference for the First Enquiry', in David Fate Norton, Nicholas Capaldi, & Wade L. Robison (eds.), McGill Hume Studies (San Diego: Austin Hill Press, 1979), pp. 227-38.
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(1979)
McGill Hume Studies
, pp. 227-238
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Immerwahr, J.1
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42
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Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
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See Sextus's complaint that the Academic philosophy is not really scepticism: Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, trans. Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), I. xxxiii, pp. 57-62.
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(1994)
Outlines of Scepticism
, vol.1
, Issue.33
, pp. 57-62
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Empiricus, S.1
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43
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0007298231
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H. Rackham Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
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See, in particular, Marcus Tullius Cicero, Cicero: De Natura Deorum/Academica, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951).
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(1951)
De Natura Deorum/Academica
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Tullius, M.1
Cicero, C.2
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44
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The chauvinistic element is not to be underplayed. Newton's achievement was all the more enthusiastically received in Britain because it was seen as a world-historic smack in the eye for the French; and not least for that mere pretender, Descartes. See, for example, Derek Gjertsen, 'Newton's Success',
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Newton's Success
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Gjertsen, D.1
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45
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Newton as National Hero
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John Fauvel, Raymond Flood, Michael Shortland and Robin Wilson (eds.) Oxford: Oxford University Press 223-40
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and Maureen McNeill, 'Newton as National Hero', both in John Fauvel, Raymond Flood, Michael Shortland and Robin Wilson (eds.), Let Newton Be! (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 23-42, 223-40.
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(1988)
Let Newton Be!
, pp. 23-42
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McNeill, M.1
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46
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80054554387
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Locke
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London: Routledge Chs. 3-5
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See M. R. Ayers, Locke (London: Routledge, 1991), Volume I: Epistemology, Chs. 3-5;
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(1991)
Volume I: Epistemology
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Ayers, M.R.1
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47
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84909275451
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London: Phoenix
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and Locke: Ideas and Things (London: Phoenix, 1997), pp. 6-7.
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(1997)
Locke: Ideas and Things
, pp. 6-7
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49
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0003942396
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New York: Dover Publications
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Sir Isaac Newton, Opticks, or a Treatise of the Reflections, Refractions, Inflections & Colours of Light (New York: Dover Publications, 1979), p. 402.
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(1979)
Opticks, or a Treatise of the Reflections, Refractions, Inflections & Colours of Light
, pp. 402
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Newton, S.I.1
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50
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80054532818
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See, in particular, Enquiry, 30,
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Enquiry
, pp. 30
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51
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80054532767
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which appears to be based on Opticks, 401-2;
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Opticks
, pp. 401-402
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52
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84880517611
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Indianapolis: Liberty Classics
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Newton and post-Newtonian natural philosophy does not wholly fit this account, of course, since gravitation is a kind of action at a distance, and so not strictly a mechanical principle (not a form of change by impulse). I have tried to accommodate this by speaking of broadly mechanical views, even though I am aware that this will offend the specialist historian of science. My reason for speaking in this way is to emphasise the continuity of the enterprise of (as we would say) experimental science in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and to place Hume squarely within that enterprise rather than to allow the view of him as a metaphysical 'paradoxer' concerned only with picking holes in philosophers' arguments. This is the context within which Hume places himself in the introductory sections of both the Treatise and Enquiry, as already noted. He is himself well aware that gravitation makes Newton's theory a shift away from strict mechanism: as he says in his eulogy of Newton, 'he shewed . the imperfections of the mechanical philosophy' (in The History of England (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1983), VI, p. 542).
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(1983)
The History of England
, vol.6
, pp. 542
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53
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New York: Hather
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Newton, for his part, also played down the shift away from strict mechanism: he preserved the central mechanical doctrine of the passivity of matter by denying that gravitation was a property of matter itself. In a much-quoted letter to Bentley he denies that he has ever affirmed the doctrine of 'innate gravity': 'That gravity should be innate, inherent, and essential to matter, so that one body may act upon another at a distance through a vacuum, without the mediation of anything else, by and through which their action and force may be conveyed from one to another, is to me so great an absurdity that I believe that no man who has in philosophical matters a competent faculty of thinking can ever fall into it. Gravity must be caused by an agent acting constantly according to certain laws, but whether this agent be material or immaterial I have left to the consideration of my readers.' (H. S. Thayer (ed.), Newton's Philosophy of Nature: Selections From His Writings (New York: Hather, 1974), p. 54.
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(1974)
Newton's Philosophy of Nature: Selections From His Writings
, pp. 54
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Thayer, H.S.1
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54
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84922173576
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The Foundations of Knowledge and the Logic of Substance: The Structure of Locke's General Philosophy
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G. A. J. Rogers (ed.) Oxford: Clarendon Press
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Michael Ayers has shown how Locke's treatment of our ideas of substances (Essay, II. xxiii. 1) fits this general picture. See M. R. Ayers, 'The Foundations of Knowledge and the Logic of Substance: The Structure of Locke's General Philosophy', in G. A. J. Rogers (ed.), Locke's Philosophy: Content and Context (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 62-5.
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(1994)
Locke's Philosophy: Content and Context
, pp. 62-65
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Ayers, M.R.1
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55
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80054532738
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Cf. Treatise, pp. 60-1 (quoted above, n. 38).
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Treatise
, Issue.38
, pp. 60-1
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56
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80054524167
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David Hume to Henry Home
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2 December Oxford: Clarendon Press Letter 1
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David Hume to Henry Home, 2 December 1737; in Raymond Klibansky and Ernest Mossner (eds.), New Letters of David Hume (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954), Letter 1;
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(1737)
New Letters of David Hume
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Klibansky, R.1
Mossner, E.2
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57
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Letters
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also Greig, Letters, Letter 6, I, p. 25.
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Letter 6
, vol.1
, pp. 25
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Greig1
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58
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79954781560
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An Early Fragment on Evil
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M. A. Stewart and John P. Wright (eds.) Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press
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See M. A. Stewart, 'An Early Fragment on Evil', in M. A. Stewart and John P. Wright (eds.), Hume and Hume's Connexions (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994), pp. 160-70. (My thanks to John Wright for impressing this point on me.)
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(1994)
Hume and Hume's Connexions
, pp. 160-170
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Stewart, M.A.1
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