Judging our own good

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 74, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 488-494

  Wilkinson, T M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND   (New Zealand)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 61149406056     PISSN: 00048402     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00048409612347461     Document Type: Article

References (10)

1. David Archard, 'For Our Own Good', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1994) pp. 283-293.
2. See the compendium of criticisms of sole access in R. Goodin, 'Liberalism and the Best-Judge Principle', Political Studies 38 (1990) pp. 182-185.
3. See e.g., D. Gauthier, Morals By Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) ch. 2, esp. pp. 32-34;
4. J. Harsanyi, 'Morality and the Theory of Rational Behaviour' in A. Sen and B. Williams (eds.), Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) p. 55.
5. See e.g., James Griffin, Well-Being (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) pp. 11-12.
6. See J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) pp. 388-389.
7. Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) ch. 1;
8. R. Dworkin, 'Foundations of Liberal Equality' in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 11 (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1990) pp. 75-86.
9. For a critique of Dworkin's argument, see my 'Dworkin on Paternalism and Well-Being', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (forthcoming, 1996).
10. See e.g., J.S. Mill, 'Of the Grounds and Limits of the Laisser-Faire or Non-interference Principle' in his Principles of Political Economy (London: Pelican Books, 1970).