Ghosts walking underground: Dewey's vanishing metaphysics

Transactions of the Charles S Peirce Society

Volumn 40, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 53-81

  Seigfried, Charlene Haddock ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 61149239777     PISSN: 00091774     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (33)

1. John Dewey, Experience and Nature, Later Work, Vol. 1:1925 (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1981), p. 62. Abbreviated in the text as (LW 1:62)
2. Raymond D. Boisvert recognizes Dewey's reluctance, but does not relate it to the metaphysical project as such. Reading Dewey, Larry A. Hickman (ed.), (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998), p. 161
3. See Seigfried, "Beyond Epistemology: From A Pragmatist Feminist Experiential Standpoint," Nancy Tuana and Sandi Morgen (eds.), Engendering Rationalities, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001, pp. 99-121
4. For Dewey's explanation of 'critical philosophy' and 'critical radical empiricism,' see "Syllabus: Types of Philosophic Thinking," in Middle Work, Vol. 13:1921-1922 (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1983), pp. 351-53
5. He may be drawing on William James's similar explanation of the critical method in philosophy in Varieties of Religious Experience (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 350
6. John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy in Later Work, Vol. 12:1920 (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1982), p. 94
7. See Seigfried, "Beyond Epistemology," pp. 99-121
8. Comments on William T. Myers in this essay refer to "Pragmatist Metaphysics: A Defense," Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, XL (2004), pp. 39-52
9. There is nothing comparable, that is, to a recommended approach that is used throughout his works. The often cited statement of metaphysics as a ground-map of the province of criticism, is just that, an isolated statement in a single book (LW 1:309). It is a significant one for this discussion, however, since it is used to explain the relation of metaphysics, defined as a statement of the generic traits of existence, to the task of philosophy as criticism. (See the discussion of this further along in the paper.) Dewey does have a quite interesting explanation of the role maps play in experience, where 'map' stands for a science, study, or logical rendering of experience. See "The Child and the Curriculum" in Middle Work, Vol. 2:1902-1903 (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press), pp. 283-85
10. See note 3 above. Dewey says: "The problem of knowledge as conceived in the industry of epistemology is the problem of knowledge in general - of the possibility, extent, and validity of knowledge in general. What does this 'in general' mean? In ordinary life there are problems a-plenty of knowledge in particular. . . But there is no problem of knowledge in general. I do not mean, of course, that general statements cannot be made about knowledge." The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy in Middle Work, Vol. 10:1916-1917 (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press), p. 23
11. See also "The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy," in Middle Work, Vol. 4:1907-1909 (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977), pp. 3-14
12. See Seigfried, "Experience, Anyone? Why Pragmatists Should Get Over the Realism/Anti-realism Debate," Intellectual History Newsletter, 20(1998), pp. 24-32
13. "The World We Practically Live In," in Margaret E. Donnelly (ed.), Reinterpreting the Legacy of William James, Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Assoc. Press, 1992, pp. 77-89
14. and Part One, Chapter 6, of William James's Radical Reconstruction of Philosophy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990)
15. For a sustained argument defending this claim, see Seigfried, William James's Radical Reconstruction, Part Five
16. More intensive examination is needed to determine whether Dewey surreptitiously builds substantive values into his concept of intelligence as scientific procedure, as he seems to do in the following early statement. "The definition of science, then, is to know from the standpoint of humanity; its goal is such a sense of life as will enable man to direct his conduct in relation to his fellows by intelligence and not by chance." "Renan's Loss of Faith in Science," in Early Work, Vol. 4:1893-1894 (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1971), p. 12
17. The Quest for Certainty. Later Work, Vol. 4:1929 (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984)
18. "Syllabus: Types of Philosophic Thinking," (MW 13:377)
19. "Context and Thought," in Later Work, Vol. 6:1931-1932 (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1985), pp. 3-21
20. William James, Pragmatism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 32
21. William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, (New York: Penguin American Library, 1984), pp. 433, 455-56. Abbreviated in text as VRE
22. Seigfried, William James's Radical Reconstruction of Philosophy, pp. 238-39
23. The theme of human nature runs throughout Dewey's writings, and his functional approach and criticism of appeals to immutable qualities of human nature have interesting similarities to his deconstruction of metaphysics. In Human Nature and Conduct, for example, he claims that "[t]he development therefore of a more adequate science of human nature is a matter of first-rate importance" Middle Work, Vol. 14:1922 (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1983), p. 221. What he has in mind is "psychology as a concrete study of human nature in the individual, and sociology as the concrete study of human nature in its organized forms" (MW14:61)
24. Boisvert has also come to the conclusion that Dewey's metaphysics should not be identified with his claims about generic traits, an endeavor which has proven to be "less than successful." But in turning to 'events' and 'the social' as "paradigmatic instances of the real," he risks falling into the very kind of metaphysical talk that Dewey criticizes. "Dewey's Metaphysics: Ground-Map of the Prototypically Real," Reading Dewey, p. 156
25. Boisvert, Dewey's Metaphysics, Publisher: New York: Fordham University Press, 1988
26. "The Inclusive Philosophic Idea," in Later Work, Vol. 3:1927-1928, (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), p. 42
27. "The Significance of the Problem of Knowledge," Early Work, Vol. 5:1895-1898, (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1972), p. 22
28. Reprinted with slight changes in The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, (New York: Henry Holt, 1910), pp. 271-304
29. John Teehan, "Evolution and Ethics: The Huxley/Dewey Exchange," Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 6:3(2002), p. 235
30. Sleeper also characterizes Dewey's approach as post-Kantian and natural or 'naturalistic' "Dewey in Dialogue with Continental Philosophy," in Reading Dewey, Larry Hickman (ed.), (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998), pp. 240-41
31. John Beck, Writing the Radical Center, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), p. 44
32. David Sidorsky, Introduction to Later Work, Vol. 3:1927-1928, pp. xvii-xxi
33. In LW l:xvi, note 3. Dewey's remark originally appeared in Journal of Philosophy, 24 (1927), p. 59