Resiliency, robustness and rationality of probability judgements

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science

Volumn 11, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 21-34

  Logue, James ^a  

^a SOMERVILLE COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 61149217230     PISSN: 02698595     EISSN: 14699281     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/02698599708573548     Document Type: Article

References (26)

1. ADLER, J. (1991) An optimist's pessimism: conversation and conjunction, in: E. EELLS & T. MARUSZEWSKI (Eds) Probability and Rationality: Studies on L.J. Cohen's Philosophy of Science (Amsterdam, Rodopi)
2. BLACKBURN, S. (1981) Rational animal?, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 4/3, pp. 331-332
3. COHEN, L.J. (1979) On the psychology of prediction: whose is the fallacy?, Cognition, 7, pp. 385-407
4. COHEN, L.J. (1981) Can human irrationality be experimentally demonstrated?, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 4/3, pp. 317-330
5. COHEN, L.J. (1991) Some remarks by L.J.C., in: E. EELLS & T. MARUSZEWSKI, (Eds) Probability and Rationality: Studies on L.J. Cohen's Philosophy of Science (Amsterdam, Rodopi)
6. DAWID, A.P. (1982) The well-calibrated Bayesian, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 77, pp. 605-613
7. DE FINETTI, B. (1974) Theory of Probability, vol. 1. (New York, Wiley)
8. EELLS, E., & MARUSZEWSKI, T. (1991) (Eds) Probability and Rationality: Studies on L.J. Cohen's Philosophy of Science (Amsterdam, Rodopi)
9. GIGERENZER, G. (1991) On cognitive illusions and rationality, in: E. EELLS & T. MARUSZEWSKI (Eds) Probability and Rationality: Studies on L.J. Cohen's Philosophy of Science (Amsterdam, Rodopi) pp. 226-249
10. GIGERENZER, G., HELL, W. & BLANK, H. (1988) Presentation and content: the use of base rates as a continuous variable, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 14, pp. 513-525
11. JEFFREY, R.C. (1983) De Finetti's probabilism, Synthese, 60, pp. 73-90
12. KAHNEMAN, D. & TVERSKY, A. (1972) Subjective probability: a judgment of representativeness, Cognitive Psychology, 3, pp. 430-454
13. KAHNEMAN, D. & TVERSKY, A. (1973) On the psychology of prediction, Psychological Review, 80, pp. 237-251
14. KAHNEMAN, D. & TVERSKY, A. (1974) Judgment under uncertainty: heuristics and biases, Science, 185, pp. 1124-1131
15. KAHNEMAN, D. & TVERSKY, A. (1979) On the interpretation of intuitive probability: a reply to Jonathan Cohen, Cognition, 7, pp. 409-411
16. KAHNEMAN, D. & TVERSKY, A. (1982) Judgment under Uncertainly: Heuristics and Biases (New York, Cambridge University Press)
17. KOEHLER, J. (1996) The base rate fallacy reconsidered, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 19, pp. 1-17
18. LOGUE, J. (1995) Projective Probability (Oxford, Clarendon Press)
19. LOPES, L. & ODEN, G. (1991) The rationality of intelligence, in: E. EELLS & T. MARUSZEWSKI, (Eds) Probability and Rationality: Studies on L.J. Cohen's Philosophy of Science (Amsterdam, Rodopi)
20. NISBETT, R.E., KRANTZ, D.H., JEPSON, C. & KUNDA, Z. (1983) The use of statistical heuristics in everyday inductive reasoning, Psychological Review, 90, pp. 339-363
21. NISBETT, R.E. & BORGIDA, E. (1975) Attribution and the psychology of prediction, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32, pp. 932-943
22. OAKSFORD & CHATER (1995) A rational analysis of the selection task as optimal data selection, Psychological Review, 103, pp. 1-28
23. PHILLIPS, L. & EDWARDS, W. (1966) Conservatism in a simple probability inference task, Journal of Experimental Psychology, 72, pp. 364-354
24. SAVAGE, L.J. (1954) The Foundations of Statistics (New York, Wiley)
25. UNGAR, S. & SHEV'ER, A. (1989) 'Say it ain't so, Ben': attributions for a fallen hero, Social Psychology Quarterly, 52, pp. 207-212
26. WASON, P.C. (1966) Reasoning, in: B. Foss (Ed.) New Horizons in Psychology (London, Penguin)