Clipping the bomber's wings: The Geneva disarmament conference and the Royal Air Force, 1932-1934

War in History

Volumn 6, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 306-330

  Meilinger, Phillip S ^a  

^a US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE   (United States)

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EID: 61149171928     PISSN: 09683445     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/096834459900600303     Document Type: Article

References (65)

1. For a good overview of these operations, see D.E. Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force, 1919-1939 (New York, 1990)
2. F.L. Israel, (ed.), Major Peace Treaties of Modern History, 1648-1967 (4 vols, New York, 1967) II, p. 1277
3. The anger with which Germany viewed her unequal treatment and the pressure of public opinion to rectify this insult is well summarized in a note to the British foreign secretary from the Germany foreign secretary dated 27 July 1931. E.L. Woodward and R. Butler, eds, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, 2nd ser., III: 1931-32 (London, 1948), pp. 483-6
4. Air Commodore L.E.O. Charlton, War From the Air: Past, Present, Future (London, 1935), pp. 172-3
5. Samuel Hoare, 'A Note on the Knock-Out Blow', CP 44 (32), 25 Jan. 1932, AIR 8/142, Public Records Office (PRO), Kew, Britain. [Hereafter, all documents cited with the prefix AIR or CAB are from the PRO]
6. A.C. Bell, A History of the Blockade of Germany, 1914-1918 (London, 1937), p. 672. It should also be noted that the blockade was not lifted until after Germany signed the Versailles Treaty in June 1919, seven months after the armistice. One RAF study noted that the blockade 'in sober truth, killed more men, women and children of the civilian population than are likely to be killed by bombs in any future war'. 'Restriction of Air Warfare' [1934], AIR 8/203. This was an accurate prediction. According to the authoritative US Strategic Bombing Survey commissioned by President Roosevelt, 305 000 German civilians died from air attack in the Second World War - less than half the number who starved to death as a result of the naval blockade 1914-19
7. US Strategic Bombing Survey, Over-all Report (European War), 30 Sept. 1945, p. 1
8. J. Terraine, The Smoke and the Fire: Myths and Anti-Myths of War, 1861-1945 (London, 1980), p. 132
9. ACM Sir John Salmond, 'The Basis for the Limitation of Air Armaments - Metropolitan and Overseas Quota', DC (P) 36 and 37, 8 June 1931, AIR 8/128. Most of the same arguments are repeated in an interesting memo by Arthur Portal to the CAS, 23 Jan. 1933, AIR 8/136. Portal would later be the CAS during most of the Second World War, and would thus have had to live with any limitations agreed to at Geneva
10. Memo by Secretary of State for Air, 'Convention to Improve the Means of War', 2 Jan. 1932, AIR 8/124
11. French concerns were fuelled by the fact that Japan had flagrantly invaded a fellow League member, China, in 1931; yet the League had not even attempted to impose sanctions on Japan, much less take unified military action against her. Why, therefore, should France expect the League to come to her defence in the event of German aggression? For the full text of the French address, see Records of the Conference of the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments. Conference Documents (3 vols, Geneva, 1936), pp. 113-16
12. 'The Disarmament Conference', Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Journal, LXXVII (May 1932), pp. 385-91. For the texts of the proposals of the various countries, see Conference Documents as follows: Germany (pp. 119-22), Italy (123-4), Soviet Union (124-37), US (139), Japan (143), and UK (144)
13. Maj.-Gen. A.C. Temperley, The Whispering Gallery of Europe (London, Collins, 1938), p. 189
14. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1932, vol. I: General (Washington, DC, 1948), pp. 50-1
15. Temperley, Whispering Gallery, p. 190
16. The Disarmament Conference', RUSI Journal LXXVII (Aug. 1932), pp. 623-9
17. memo by GAS, 'The Practicability of Drawing a Distinction between Offensive and Defensive Weapons', 2 Sept. 1931, AIR 8/124
18. A detailed account of these discussions can be found in Records of the Conference of the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments: Minutes of the Air Commission, February 27thr-]une 24th, 1932 (Geneva, 1936)
19. F.P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations (London, 1952), p. 506
20. FRUS, 1932, I, pp. 108-12
21. Memo by CAS, The Limitation of Seaborne Air Forces', RAI 4, 20 Oct. 1931, AIR 8/131
22. 2S Memo by the First Sea Lord, 'Policy in Regard to the Limitation of Naval Armaments', 11 Jan. 1932, AIR 8/135
23. 'Note by CAS to the French Proposals', Aug. 1931, AIR 8/132; memo by Secretary of State for Air, CP 183, 3 June 1932, AIR 8/134; memo by CAS [July 1932], AIR 8/149
24. 'Cabinet Meeting Extract', 12July 1932, AIR 8/134
25. Op. cit., pp. 212-14. One observer also noted that Hoover tended to favour Germany over France at Geneva for the pragmatic reason that there was no French vote in the US; there was, however, a sizeable German vote. J.W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Pipe Dream of Peace: The Story of the Collapse of Disarmament (New York, 1935), p. 208
26. Woodward and Butler, Documents, III, pp. 612-13
27. H. Montgomery Hyde, British Air Policy Between the Wars, 1918-1939 (London, 1976), pp. 281-2
28. In his memoirs, Simon unconvincingly attempts to shift the blame for this position onto the opposition Labour and Liberal parties, arguing they would not allow rearmament, even if the prime minister had proposed it. Viscount Simon, Retrospect (London, 1952), pp. 179-81
29. Eden, on the other hand, argues in a somewhat peculiar fashion that Britain was already so weak in the air that further limitations would probably be to her relative advantage. A. Eden, Facing the Dictators (Boston, 1962), p. 33
30. Letter, Salmond to Londonderry, 8 July 1932, AIR 8/140. It is illustrative of this concern that unrestricted submarine warfare - which had brought the US into the war in 1917 - was banned by the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, to which the US was a signatory. Nonetheless, on 8 Dec. 1941 the US ordered just such a submarine campaign to be conducted against Japan. In the blast of war, paper agreements are often the first to fall. J.E. Talbott, 'Weapons Development, War Planning and Policy: The U.S. Navy and the Submarine, 1917-1941', Naval War College Review, XXXVII (May-June 1984), pp. 53-70
31. Hyde, British Air Policy, p. 283
32. An attempt had been made to define the meaning of 'military objectives' at The Hague in 1923. A formula was devised, but was so narrow as to be impractical, excluding such targets as rail lines and steel mills. As a consequence, not a single country ratified the convention. Nonetheless, it seemed at least theoretically to be the most promising approach. For The Hague Commission of Jurists see M.W. Royse, Aerial Bombardment and the International Regulation of Warfare (New York, 1928), ch. 6. Such definitional issues continue to bedevil negotiations
33. For an excellent and detailed discussion of modern attempts to address the issue of military objectives, see W.H. Parks, 'Air War and the Law of War', Air Force Law Review XXXII (1990), pp. 1-226
34. 'First Impression on Sir John Simon's Latest Paper', Oct. 1932, AIR 8/142 (emphasis original)
35. See also memo by Group Capt. J.T. Babington, 'The Interpretation of HMG's Air Policy by the UK Delegation at Geneva', 11 Feb. 1933, AIR 8/150
36. J. Laffin, Swifter Than Eagles: A Biography of Marshal of the RAF Sir John Salmond (Edinburgh, 1964), p. 219. Laffin further states, unconvincingly, that Salmond should have received the peerage anyway because his actions had saved the RAF
37. 'Cabinet Meeting Minutes', DC (M) (32), 15 Sept. 1932, AIR 8/148
38. See also 'The Proposed Abolition of Military and Naval Machines and of Bombing from the Air, and the Control of Civil Aviation', DC (M) (32) 37, 24 Feb. 1933, AIR 8/147
39. E.L. Woodward and R. Butler, eds, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, 2nd Ser., IV: 1932-33 (London, 1950), p. 243. When discussing civil aviation in the Air Commission, Germany took the interesting position that such matters did not really apply to her because she had no military air force that could be augmented in time of war by civil airliners
40. Minutes of the Air Commission, p. 28
41. Records of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments. Series B: Minutes of the General Commission (Geneva, 1936), p. 273
42. E.W. Bennett, German Rearmament and the West, 1932-1933 (Princeton, NJ, 1979), pp. 53-4, 430-1
43. Baldwin quote in E. Emme, ed., The Impact of Air Power (Princeton: NJ, 1959), pp. 51-2
44. Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, ser. C, vol. I: 30 Jan.-14 Oct. 1933 (Washington, 1957), pp. 37-8. The armaments truce was a resolution agreed to by League members that they would initiate no steps to 'prejudice the preparation of the Disarmament Convention'. In other words, members would not begin rearmament while conducting the disarmament talks. The resolution was due to expire on 1 Mar. 1933
45. Conference Documents, p. 419
46. Documents on German Foreign Policy, pp. 42-4
47. Woodward and Butler, Documents, IV, p. 513
48. The Disarmament Conference', RUSI Journal LXXVIII (Feb. 1933), p. 162
49. 'Cabinet Meeting Notes', 7 Mar. 1933, AIR 8/158
50. The senior British military adviser to the Conference, Ma).-Gen. A.C. Temperley, later stated that MacDonald was old and not well. At one point in his speech the prime minister staggered and began speaking incoherently. MacDonald later admitted he had 'lost consciousness' for 30 seconds or so and had no idea what he had said. Temperley, Whispering Gallry, p. 240
51. 'Cabinet Conclusions', 10 May 1933, AIR 8/159; letter, Londonderry to Simon, 11 May 1933, AIR 8/145. ACM Edward Ellington wrote to a colleague: 'it is a pity that at times like this there are not some Hindu tribes on the frontier to give trouble'. Presumably that would bring the cabinet to its senses. Letter, Ellington to Steel, 29 Sept. 1933, AIR 8/145
52. Actually, a year earlier the Admiralty had already voiced support for a total ban on bombing. 'Measures of Reduction of Armaments Which the Admiralty Are Proposing as Support at the Disarmament Conference', 1 Apr. 1932, AIR 8/146. This was after Salm ond's misguided call to cut the number of aircraft carriers, noted above
53. FRUS, 1933, I: General (Washington, DC, 1950), pp. 143-5
54. Walters, League of Nations, pp. 546-9
55. E.L. Woodward and R. Butler, eds, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, 2nd ser., V, 1933 (London, 1956), p. 287
56. H.R. Wilson, Disarmament and the Cold War in the Thirties (New York, 1963), p. 40. In fairness to the British Foreign Office, however, it should be noted that the official papers of this period reflect far more interest and concern over the domestic situation in Germany than with the technical details of disarmament. Woodward and Butler, Documents, IV and V
57. Wilson, Disarmament, p. 52
58. E.L. Homze, Arming the Luftwaffe: The Reich Air Ministry and the German Aircraft Industry, 1919-1939 (Lincoln, NB, 1976), pp. 4-6
59. For the significance of the glider experience in interwar Germany, see P. Fritzsche, A Nation of Fliers: German Aviation and the Popular Imagination (Cambridge, 1992)
60. Bennett, German Rearmament, pp. 79-84
61. Homze, Luftwaffe, pp. 8-15
62. J.S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform (Lawrence, KS, 1992), pp. 159-64
63. Eden, Facing the Dictators, p. 28
64. Maj. B.T. Reynolds, 'Germany and Equality in Armaments', RUSI Journal LXXVII (Nov. 1932), p. 847
65. J.W. Wheeler-Bennett, Disarmament and Security since Locarno, 1925-1931 (London, 1932), p. 354