The stage view and temporary intrinsics

Analysis

Volumn 60, Issue 265, 2000, Pages 84-88

  Sider, Theodore ^a  

^a SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 61149129955     PISSN: 00032638     EISSN: 14678284     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-8284.00207     Document Type: Review

References (22)

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