Ambiguity in the analects: Philosophical and practical dimensions

Journal of Chinese Philosophy

Volumn 27, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 545-569

  Setton, Mark ^a  

^a STONY BROOK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 61049428508     PISSN: 03018121     EISSN: 15406253     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0301-8121.00030     Document Type: Article

References (61)

1. See Philip J. Ivanhoe, "Whose Confucius? Which Analects?" in Confucius and the Analects: New Essays, edited by Bryan W, Van Norden (London: Oxford University Press, forthcoming)
2. John Kieschnick, "Analects 12.1 and the Commentarial Tradition," Journal of the American Oriental Society 112, no. 4 (1992)
3. For example, a recently published edition of the Analects propounds a theory of "accretion," which argues that ambiguities in the text reflect the changing social conditions and philosophical environments of its various authors over the lengthy period of its compilation, which lasted well into the Warring States era. While I concede that the authors of the Analects may well have been influenced by different schools of Confucian thought, I would nevertheless argue that due to the lack of solid internal historical evidence, it is very difficult to pinpoint precisely which portions of the text were written in which periods, and hence which particular schools of thought influenced them. See E. Bruce Brooks and A. Taeko Brooks, trans., The Original Analects: Sayings of Confucius and his Successors (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998)
4. Analects 11:22. Unless otherwise indicated, translations are my own
5. See, for example, Analects 15:29
6. See, for example, Analects 2:4
7. Analects 4:15
8. As See Yee Chan has argued, part of the confusion stems from the fact that the passage is widely viewed as an interpolation of the followers of Zengzi. See Yee Chan, "Disputes on the One Thread of Chung-Shu" Journal of Chinese Philosophy 26, no. 2 (June 1999): 165
9. Yet Chan correctly points out that the philosophical ambiguity of the "one thread" presents a very thorny dilemma in its own right. In this article Chan examines interpretations of this important passage drawn from five noteworthy commentators: Fung Yu-Lan ("zhong-shu as positive and negative analogical thinking")
10. David Nivison ("zhong-shu as analogical thinking by subordinates and analogical thinking by superiors")
11. Herbert Fingarette ("zhong-shu as commitment to following the rules of li (rules of propriety and analogical thinking")
12. Heiner Roetz ("zhong-shu as benevolence and generalized analogical thinking between social equals")
13. D. C. Lau ("zhong-shu as wholehearted devotion to others, and analogical thinking")
14. For an earlier (and similar) account, see Philip J. Ivanhoe, "Reweaving the 'One Thread' of the Analects," Philosophy East and West 40, no. 1 (January 1990): 17-33
15. After reviewing many of the same interpretations later discussed by Chan, Ivanhoe presents a novel interpretation of the "one thread" that emphasizes the relationship between zhong and li and how these two concepts are mediated by shu. Ivanhoe concludes that the one thread "combines an explicitly defined set of moral guidelines with a subtle appeal to developed human intuitions" ("Reweaving the 'One Thread,'" p. 24)
16. Hattori Unokichi, ed., Rongo shūsetsu (Collected commentaries on the Analects), in Kanbun taikei (Great compendium of classical Chinese literature) (Tokyo: Fuzanbo, 1910), 2:10-11
17. Chǒng Yagyong, Nonǒ kogǔmju (Commentaries on the Analects, old and new), in Chǔngbo yǒyudang chorno (The complete works of Chōng Yagyong, supplemented and revised), 6 vols. (Seoul: Kyǒngin munhwasa, 1970), 2:189
18. Hattori, Rongo shūsetsu, 2:10
19. Indeed, early commentators such as Kong Anguo and He Yan, as well as Sung commentators such as Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi, are reluctant to connect 15:3 and 15:24 by means of shu. This could be a reflection of their lack of confidence in the authenticity of Zengzi's interpretation. By contrast, Chǒng Yagyong identifies shu, exclusively, as the common element, the "one thread," linking 15:3 and 15:24. See Chǒng Yagyong, Nonǒ kogǔmju, 2:189
20. Analects 7:1
21. Analects 7:8 (translation adapted from D. C. Lau, Confucius: The Analects [London: Penguin Books, 1979], p. 86)
22. Analects 5:9
23. see also 11:20
24. See, for example, Analects 1:16
25. See Analects 3:8
26. David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, Thinking Through Confucius (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), pp. 66-67
27. Analects 14:35
28. Hattori, Kongo shūsetsu, 2:28-29
29. Analects 8:8
30. Hattori, Rongo shūsetsu, 3:7
31. Chǒng Yagyong, Nonō kogūmju, 2:226
32. Hattori, Rongo sh ūsetsu, 3:7
33. Ogyū Sorai, Rongo ch'o in Nihon meika chūshaku shisho zensho, vol. 5, 2nd ed. (Tokyo: Tōyō tosho kankōkai, 1936), pp. 162-163
34. Hattori, Kongo shūsetsu, 3:8
35. Ogyū Sorai, Kongo ch'ō, p. 163
36. Itō Jinsai, Rongo kōgi (Ancient meaning of the Analects) Nihon meika chūshaku shisho zensho, vol. 1, 2nd ed. (Tokyo: Tōyō tosho kankokai, 1936), p. 121
37. For a thought-provoking recent discussion of the problem of epistemology as it relates to both the moral and metaphysical thinking of Confucius, see Cheng Chung-ying, "Confucian Onto-hermeneutics: Morality and Ontology," Journal of Chinese Philosophy 27, no, 1 (March 2000): 33-68
38. The expression "fruitful ambiguity" is taken from Tu Wei-ming, Humanity and Self-Cultivation; Essays in Confucian Thought (Berkeley, CA: Asian Humanities Press, 1979), p. 139
39. Analects 9:8
40. Zhongyong, 15
41. A recent commentary by a Western scholar notes an intriguing compatibility between Confucius and Wittgenstein on this point: "Confucius would certainly have approved of Wittgenstein: Wovon man nient sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen [Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one should remain silent], A refusal to speak about the unspeakable implies no denial of its existence - on the contrary. Some passages in the Analects suggest a powerful mystical drive that inspired the Master and which only silence could adequately convey (see, for example, 17:19)" (Simon Leys, trans., The Analects of Confucius [New York: Norton, 1997], p. 142)
42. Analects 12:3
43. Chǒng Yagyong viewed quan in slightly different yet no less important terms, as a defining quality of humanity. See Mark Setton, Chǒng Yagyong: Korea's Challenge to Orthodox Neo-Confucianism (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), pp. 83-85
44. Chad Hansen suggests that rectification of names is a primary mechanism for resolving conflicts among rules and principles; see Chad Hansen, Language and Logic in Ancient China (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1983), p. 76. I would suggest that quan also serves this purpose
45. Ivanhoe discusses the concept of "language skepticism" at length in an article analyzing Zhuangzi's view of language, "Zhuangzi on Skepticism, Skill, and the Ineffable Dao," Journal of the American Academy of Religion 61, no. 4 (Winter 1993): 101-116
46. Zhuangzi, 26
47. Classic of Changes, "Great Appendix," 1.12
48. See principally Analects 13:3 (quoted below)
49. see also Analects 6:25, 12:11, 12:17
50. Analects 17:2
51. see also 15:33
52. Hansen explains this phrase as follows: "The function of language that seemed to preoccupy Chinese thinkers was the regulative, as opposed to the descriptive, function. Words have an impact on people's attitudes and inclinations to act" (Language and Logic, p. 59)
53. See also Hansen, "Chinese Language, Chinese Philosophy, and 'Truth,' " Journal of Asian Studies 44, no. 3 (May 1985), passim
54. In qualifying his argument in this way, Hansen understandably distances his own position from that of Donald Munro, who had earlier adopted the more extreme view that Chinese thinkers were concerned solely with the rhetorical effects of language, or what he termed its behavioral implications: "In China, truth and falsity in the Greek sense have rarely been important considerations in a philosopher's acceptance of a given belief or proposition; these are Western concerns. The consideration important to the Chinese is the behavioral implications of the belief or proposition in question" (Donald J. Munro, The Concept of Man in Ancient China [Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1969], p. 55
55. Hansen, "Chinese Language," p. 515. Hansen associates this outlook with a form of utilitarianism, implying that the lack of interest in truth for its own sake could potentially result in the treatment of humans as means rather than as ends in themselves
56. Philip J. Ivanhoe, "One View of the Language-Thought Debate: A Review of 'Language and Logic in Ancient China,'" Chinese Literature: Essays, Articles, Reviews 9 (1987): 119
57. For an early critique of Hansen's work on the relationship between Chinese thought and language, see also A. C. Graham, review of Language and Logic in Ancient China, by Chad Hansen, Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 45, no. 2 (December 1985): 692-703
58. See, for example, Classic of Odes, 260 ("As there are wu [things, affairs], so are there ze [norms]")
59. (quoted in Mencius 6A:6)
60. Wang Yang-Ming, Chuan-xi lu, 1:22b
61. Mencius 7B:37