The moral self and the perfect self in Aristotle and Mencius

Journal of Chinese Philosophy

Volumn 28, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 235-256

  Yu, Jiyuan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 61049399105     PISSN: 03018121     EISSN: 15406253     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0301-8121.00045     Document Type: Article

References (75)

1. Susan Wolf, "Moral saints," Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): 436
2. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (hereafter cited as NE), 1094a23-25, 1095a18-20
3. Mencius 7B:16
4. NE, 1097B33-1098a4
5. NE, 1097a33-1098a3
6. Aristotle does not believe that animals have reason (De Anima, 428a8-23, 432a5-11). Since eudaimonia means exercising rationality well, and animals do not share rationality, he denies that animals are capable of eudaimonia (NE, 1178b24-28)
7. The Chinese term is duan, also translated as "roots," "sprouts," "beginnings," "stirrings," "germs," and so forth. For the sake of consistency, I use "seed" throughout
8. Mencius 2A:6
9. Unless otherwise indicated, the translation of the Book of Mencius is based on D. C. Lau, Mencius (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1984)
10. NE, 1144b4-6
11. Mencius 6A:15
12. Generation of Anima, 736b3-4
13. De Anima II.1., 412a10-11, a22-26
14. NE, 1098b33-34; cf. 1175b34-35
15. It is in this latter sense of actuality that the soul is called the "first actuality" (De Anima II.1, a27-28, b5)
16. Mencius 3B:9
17. E.g., Mencius 7B:24
18. A. C. Graham, "The Background of the Mencian Theory of Human Nature," in his Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990) pp. 27-28
19. There has been much debate regarding Mencius's conception of xing when he talks about the goodness of xing. Mencius is clearly not talking about the whole of human nature. Fung Yulan believes that xing in Mencius is only limited to moral inclinations (A History of Chinese Philosophy, vol. 1 [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1952], pp. 124-5)
20. Graham suggests that the term refers to "the maturation of a continuing growth" ("Background of Mencian Theory," p. 8)
21. Roger Ames argues that the xing of a human being in Mencius is viewed more as a cultural achievement or construction than what is unlearned, so he proposes that "For the human being at least, xing seems to come closer to 'character,' 'personality' or 'constitution' than what we generally understand by 'nature'" ("The Mencian Conception of Ren xing: Does it Mean 'Human Nature"?," in Chinese Texts and Philosophical Contexts edited by Henry Rosemont, Jr. [La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1991], p. 150)
22. It seems that different views emphasize different aspects of the complicated notion of xing in our classification. Fung holds onto sense (2), Graham underscores sense (3), and Ames emphasizes the result of sense (3). These senses can be unified if we consider the four seeds in the process from potentiality to actuality. It is the same good xing that is potentially owned by every human being, and that can only be developed by some. Once it is developed, a gentleman is made. Since the gentlemen represents the development of these four seeds, the four seeds are also said to be "xing of the gentleman" (Mencius 7A;21)
23. For the definitions of these two senses in Aristotle's ethics, see the glossary in T. H. Irwin, trans., Nicomachean Ethics (Indiana: Hackett, 1985)
24. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1050a21. Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations are based on the Revised Oxford Translation of the Complete Works of Aristotle, edited by J. Barnes
25. A further point might be worth making. Many critics of Mencius question how his roots could be innate. Mencius indeed painstakingly argues that these roots are given. His main strategy is to show that they are unlearned, spontaneous, unreflective, and uncalculating. He illustrates the existence of the innate seed of benevolence by pointing out our spontaneous and disinterested concern at the sight of a child about to fall into a well (Mencius 2A:6); he also underscores the infants' pre-socially conditioned love of and respect for his parents and siblings (Mencius 7A:15)
26. For a detailed discussion of Mencius's arguments on the innateness of the four roots, see P. J. Ivanhoe, Ethics in the Confucian Tradition (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1990), pp. 29-36
27. Nevertheless, Mencius's arguments are not taken to be convincing. For instance, in "Background of Mencian Theory," Graham comments: "... we are now almost morbidly aware of the difficulty of proving that apparently disinterested actions do not have egoistic motives and that apparently instinctive reactions are not socially conditioned" (p. 29)
28. Graham's view is widely shared. As Chad Hansen aptly observes: "Typically, western treatments of Mencius' psychological theory, drawing on traditional Western cynicism about human nature, regard Mencius' view as lacking any empirical support" (A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992], p. 167). This issue is too complicated to be solved by philosophical arguments alone. I would like to mention, however, that Aristotle believes that rationality is innate and does not argue why. Yet he is rarely questioned in this regard
29. NE, 1095b19-20
30. There are two related debates; First, does Mencius mean that xing is originally good, or that it is directed toward goodness? Second, does Mencius mean that human beings are moral agents, and that shan is a formal term, referring to whatever conforms to the direction of xing, without having substantial content? For a helpful discussion of this debate, see Kwong-Loi Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997), pp. 210ff
31. Mencius 6A:6
32. A. C. Graham, "Background of Mencian Theory," p. 60
33. Mencius 3A:1, 6A:6, 6A:2
34. Cf. NE, 1144a21-36, 1140a29, 1141b13
35. They are fused in such a way that they constitute a direct sensitivity. A moral self can immediately judge what is right and has the practical perception of "just seeing" what the right thing to do is (NE, 1142a27-30, 1143b14, 1144a29, 114b1-17; cf. 1109b23)
36. Analects 12:1
37. E.g., Mencius 3A:1
38. For instance, Graham says: "By the time of Mencius however jen [ren] is directly translatable by 'benevolence'" (Disputers of the Tao [La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1989], p. 113)
39. Donald J. Munro, The Concept of Man in Early China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1969), p. 75
40. This is supported by Chad Hansen, who holds that yi should be "an idealised social practice" (Daoist Theory, p. 165)
41. and also by Shun, in whose analysis, yi, whether as an attribute of a person or as a quality of action, is related to certain ethical standards (Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, pp. 62-63)
42. Mencius 3A:4, 7B:24
43. There is no explicit remark, so far as I am aware, in the Book of Mencius that yi should be grouped with zhi, or that yi involves adjusting universal principles according to the particular circumstances. Mencius indeed recognizes the need for a person to depart from the established li under certain circumstances. However, such a decision not to hold li too rigidly is called "discretion" (chuan). For instance, li prescribes that man and woman should not touch each other. But Mencius proposes that one should use discretion to help save a sister-in-law who is drowning (Mencius 4A:17, cf. 7A:26)
44. Further, if yi is the evaluation function, what is its difference from zhi (wisdom)? Munro's answer is that whereas a person of yi is involved in the activities he is evaluating, a person of zhi does not have to get involved (Concept of Man in Early China, p. 76)
45. This distinction is rejected by Shun (Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, p. 71)
46. Mencius 4A:10, 6A:11
47. Analects 12:22
48. Mencius, 4A:4, 4B:28, 7A:45, 7A:46, 7B:1
49. In Julia Annas's analysis, Aristotle's virtue, in addition to the dispositional and intellectual aspects, also has an affective aspect. This means that virtues "involve our feelings, especially our feelings of pleasure and pain, and developing a virtue involves habituating our feelings in certain ways" (The Morality of Happiness [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993], p. 49). Since the feelings of pleasure and pain operate in the cultivation of disposition, I do not take them to form a separate aspect of Aristotle's virtue. More important, the feelings of pleasure and pain in Aristotle involve no altruistic or benevolent love for others
50. Jiyuan Yu, "Virtue: Confucius and Aristotle," Philosophy East and West 48, no. 2 (1998): 335ff
51. NE, 1103a25
52. NE, 1103al4-17; a25; a34-b4; b14-25; 1104a33-b2; 1105al4-16
53. NE, 1114a12-14
54. NE, 1140b11-20, 1144a8-9, 1144a30-31, 1145a5-6; 1151a15-19
55. Mencius 7B:3
56. NE, 1103b23-25
57. Sometimes Aristotle suggests that we have a natural ground for habituation. We have a natural part in the human soul that obeys reason, and we have natural virtues. Without these natural factors, one cannot acquire virtues through habituation. As a stone cannot be habituated to go up no matter how hard you try (NE, 1103a21-23)
58. Aristotle even claims that what habituation achieves is to perfect our nature (NE, 1103a25). But it is not clear how this line of thought can be reconciled with the importance of habituation that he underscores, and it is also not an idea on which he spends much time
59. Mencius, 1A:3, 3A:3
60. NE, 1178a9-10
61. This point is also made by Thomas Nagel when he says: "Aristotle believes, in short, that human life is not important enough for humans to spend their lives on. A person should seek to transcend not only his individual practical concerns but also those of society or humanity as a whole" ("Aristotle on Eudalmonia," in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, edited by A. O. Rorty [Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980], p. 12)
62. NE, 1178b22-23
63. Metaphysics, 1072b15, 23-24
64. For instance, Fung Yulan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, pp. 129ff
65. For instance, Anthony Kenny says, "Aristotle's belief that the pursuit of happiness must be the pursuit of a single dominant aim, and his account of the nature of philosophy, seem to be both so seriously mistaken as to make unprofitable a discussion of his arguments that happiness consists in theoria" (The Aristotelian Ethics [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978], p. 58)
66. Mencius, 7A:1
67. NE, 1177a21-22, 1177a24, 1177a26-34
68. Mencius, 6A:7
69. Mencius, 4B:28
70. NE, 1177b27-28
71. This is also what Plato means in the Phaedo by saying that to do philosophy is to practice death
72. NE, 1177b32-1178a2
73. NE, 1142a26
74. Mencius's sages, because of their developed sense of right and wrong, are usually very critical of moral requirements themselves. When they feel it suitable, they would violate the requirement. For instance, the sage King Shun married without telling his father, because he was afraid his father would reject his love (Mencius 4A26)
75. An earlier version of this article was presented at a symposium "Chinese Accounts of Finitude and the Self: Beyond Comparative Philosophy," at the University of Oxford, November 6, 1999. I wish to thank Nick Bunnin for editing that version and for including it in Chinese Philosophy Working Papers (no. 8). I am also grateful for all the helpful comments from the participants at that conference, and for comments from Pablo DeGreiff, Peter Hare, Xinyan Jiang, and Roger Worthington