Confucius's virtue ethics. Li, Yi, Wen and Chih in the analects

Journal of Chinese Philosophy

Volumn 25, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 101-130

  Chong, Chong Kim ^a  

^a NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE   (Singapore)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 61049378386     PISSN: 03018121     EISSN: 15406253     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6253.1998.tb00500.x     Document Type: Review

References (32)

1. I shall constantly be referring to "Confucius's ethics," to emphasize that this is a textual discussion of the Analects, and not what may generally be referred to as "Confucian ethics," which may have other connotations.
2. In the "Introduction" to his translation of the Analects (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979). Unless otherwise stated, quotations are from D. C. Lau's translation. Text numberings and page numbers of quotations from Lau's "Introduction" are given in parentheses, directly after the quotations.
3. For a concise account of virtue ethics or virtue theory, see Greg Pence, "Virtue Theory," in Peter Singer (ed), A Companion to Ethics (Cambridge Massachusetts: Basil Blackwell, 1991).
4. I am grateful to Alan Chan for raising these objections.
5. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, translated by H. J. Paton (New York: Harper and Row, 1964).
6. John Kekes has pointed out to me that a non-Kantian deontological theory can recognize several criteria of Tightness. Thus, W. D. Ross (The Right and the Good, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930
7. and Foundations of Ethics, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1939), for instance, refers to a list of prima facie duties, recognizing that these criteria may conflict, and that the final decision must involve judgment. This should not affect my argument against Lau, insofar as he ends to talk of yi as a criterion of judgment, without actually specifying what it is. Also, I shall argue that his account of morality as duty-based does not square with the analysis of yi and li.
8. Cheng Chung-ying, "On yi as a universal principle of specific application in Confucian morality," Philosophy East and West 22 (1972), p. 269.
9. Herbert Fingarette, Confucius-the Secular as Sacred (New York: Harper and Row, 1972).
10. David Hall and Roger Ames, Thinking Through Confucius (State University of New York Press, 1987).
11. For textual references, see the discussion in Hall and Ames of yi, e. g. pages 90 and 96, and their notes 38, 49-5 1, on pages 347 and 348 of Thinking Through Confucius.
12. Yang Po-chun, Lun-Yu Yi-Chu (Taiwan, Taichung: Lan-teng wen-hua shihyeh kung-si, 1987), p. 173.
13. Confucius's only remark in the Analects on human nature: "Men are close to one another by nature. They diverge as a result of repeated practice. " (17. 2).
14. Also, Tzu Kung's remark: "One can get to hear about the Master's accomplishments, but one cannot get to hear his views on human nature and the Way of Heaven. " (5. 13).
15. In personal correspondence.
16. Thus, according to Shun, Mencius 4A:26 involves departing from a rule of li so as to preserve the spirit behind the rule while 4A:17 involves departing from a rule of li on the basis of considerations not related to the rule.
17. Shun does not do this, and it would be interesting to see his discussion of the relation between li and yi in his Mencius and Early Chinese Thought (Stanford University Press, forthcoming). But see his paper, "Jen and Li in the Analects," in Philosophy East and West Vol. 43, No. 3, July 1993.
18. Both Shun (in this paper) and Benjamin Schwartz in The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985) also talk of the emotions and attitudes which encompass the spirit of li, in terms of jen, something which I have not done. There seems to be an implicit standard in this sense, where jen ultimately judges the application of yi and also li.
19. See for example, page 80 of Schwartz: "The prescriptions of li do not always clarify what is right (i) in the infinite variety of life situations, and 'righteousness' is just as essential an attribute of jen as is a submissiveness to li. " In view of these complications, and A. C. Graham's seemingly different views on the relation between the three concepts (see following note), my next project shall be an investigation into the concept of jen and its relation to the other two concepts.
20. There is some support for my argument about the inseparability of li und yi, in A. C. Graham's placing of jen (which he translates as "noble" instead of the more common "benevolence") within the "one thread" analogical thinking of shu. Shu as such, is said to unify "courage, reverence, and the other dispositions which are distinctively noble or human. " These virtues are manifested in the various forms of ceremony, and although Graham notes that the one thread idea may have later become "a principle wholly detached from ceremony," (e. g. in the case of Mo Tzu), this is not the case with Confucius. In the latter case, "The achievement of jen results immediately from 'return to ceremony' (fu li) which may be understood as the recovery of ceremony by which it ceases to be mere formality. " See A. C. Graham, Disputers of the Tao (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1989), pp. 21-22.
21. On p. 19, Graham notes that jen "can indeed from Mencius onwards be understood in detachment from ceremony. "
22. The contemporary analytic philosopher, R. M. Hare, does this. See his Freedom and Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), chapter 5.
23. . See for example, the dialogue Gorgias.
24. David Hume, Scottish philosopher, 1711-1776.
25. Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), is a good example of this Kantian point of view. Nagel, however, has since changed his views.
26. See The View From Nowhere, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
27. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book II, Part III, Section III. (See page 462 of the Penguin edition-Pelican Classics, 1969-edited by Ernest C. Mossner).
28. Philippa Foot, "Morality as a system of hypothetical imperatives", in Philippa Foot, Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).
29. Susan Wolf, "Moral Saints," Journal of Philosophy 79, 8 (August 1982). 419439.
30. See for instance, Robert B. Louden, "On Some Vices of Virtue Ethics," American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (July 1984). 227-36. Louden defends Kant's ethics in Morality and Moral Theory (New York Oxford University Press, 1992).
31. Aristotle, The Ethics of Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics translated by J. A. K. Thomson (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976), p. 93.
32. Soren Kierkegaard puts it nicely: "There is no deed, not a single one, not even the best, of which we dare to say unconditionally: he who does this thereby unconditionally demonstrates love. It depends upon how the deed is done. " See page 30 Works of Love, translated by Howard and Edna Hong (New York; Harper and Row, 1962).