Tradition and morality in the analects: A reply to Hansen

Journal of Chinese Philosophy

Volumn 31, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 517-533

  Hourdequin, Marion ^a  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 61049359897     PISSN: 03018121     EISSN: 15406253     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6253.2004.00169.x     Document Type: Article

References (53)

1. Chad D. Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: A Philosophical Interpretation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 106-107
2. Throughout the paper, for simplicity I use 'Confucius' and 'Confucian' in reference to the ideas and text of the Analects. Though the Analects is generally understood to be an accretive text, reflecting the views of Confucius to varying degrees, I treat the text here as a whole without focusing the authenticity of particular passages
3. Hansen, pp. 82-83
4. Hansen's target is not just Confucius, but Confucianism. However, since many of his critiques point to the writings of Confucius, I focus on the text of the Analects in challenging the contrast between Confucius and Mozi that Hansen develops in chapters 3 and 4 of his book
5. This latter consideration would not be compelling in and of itself: if, on the best interpretation, the ethics of the Analects really was fully implausible from a contemporary point of view, this would be no reason to abandon the interpretation. In this case, however, correcting a flawed interpretation both does better justice to the text and delivers benefits for contemporary ethical theory and comparative philosophy
6. The interpretation that I recommend is not nearly as radical as Hansen's. In claiming that Confucius reduces morality to tradition and/or convention, Hansen diverges from many earlier commentators. My own view is much more closely aligned with traditional commentaries such as that of Zhu Xi
7. To a lesser extent, Confucius looked to the leaders of the Xia and Shang dynasties as models (see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985], p. 64); however, the Analects strongly emphasizes the rule of the Zhou sage-kings as instantiating the tian-dao
8. See pp. 36-40 in Chung-Ying Cheng's "Confucian Onto-Hermeneutics: Morality and Ontology," Journal of Chinese Philosophy 27, no. 1 (2000): 33-68 for a thoughtful discussion of the relationship between harmony and ren
9. Hansen makes this comment in a critical light. Interestingly, P.J. Ivanhoe ("Reweaving the 'One Thread' of the Analects," Philosophy East and West 40, no. 1 (1990): 17-33) offers a similar comment, but from a much more favorable perspective. Ivanhoe suggests that Confucius was more concerned with providing practical moral guidance than in presenting a systematic, unified theory. I tend to agree with Ivanhoe, though I argue below that an ethical theory (of sorts) can be gleaned from the Analects
10. Interestingly, the Mohist utilitarianism that Hansen finds much more plausible relies on an "objective" standard of utility. However, utilitarian approaches may suffer from a problem similar to the one identified here. As many critics of Western utilitarianism have noted, the preferences people have (and hence the actions which satisfy those preferences and contribute to welfare) are in part culturally determined. So what is right from the perspective of a utilitarian morality is to some degree culturally relative
11. My account shares some features with the views presented in Anthony Cua's "Competence, Concern, and the Role of Paradigmatic Individuals (Chun-tzu) in Moral Education," pp. 138-155 in his Moral Vision and Tradition: Essays in Chinese Ethics (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1998)
12. All quotations are from Raymond Dawson's translation, Confucius: the Analects (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), except where indicated otherwise
13. In addition to Dawson, I consulted the following translations: E. Bruce Brooks and A. Taeko Brooks, The Original Analects: Sayings of Confucius and His Successors (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998)
14. D.C. Lau, trans. The Analects (Lun yu)/ Confucius (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1983)
15. Edward Oilman Slingerland, trans. "Kongzi (Confucius) "The Analects"," in Philip J. Ivanhoe and Bryan W. Van Norden, Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy (New York: Seven Bridges Press, 2001)
16. Arthur Waley, trans. The Analects of Confucius (London: G. Allen & Unwin: 1964)
17. For another example, see 14.24
18. Analects 2.7
19. See, for example Analects 3.14, 8.20
20. Confucius follows the Zhou because the Dao prevailed during this era: the Zhou kings embodied goodness, and harmony prevailed under their rule. Schwartz makes these points in The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 67, 78-79
21. Hansen, p. 100
22. See, for example, Analects 4.18, 12.18, 15.1
23. Interestingly, Hansen raises the possibility that ren could be an "acquired intuition" akin to language competency. However, he argues that since this intuition is shaped by the moral tradition of one's culture, it is culturally relative and cannot answer the question of what justifies certain practices or rules
24. Analects 7.1
25. Analects 1.12 (Slingerland)
26. The relationship between ren and li has been discussed in detail elsewhere. See Kwong-Loi Shun, "Ren and Li in the Analects" in B.W. Van Norden, ed., Confucius and the Analects: New Essays (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) for a recent review
27. See Analects 17.9 and 3.12
28. Analects 15.36 (Slingerland)
29. Hall and Ames describe thinking as "a continuing interplay among "learning" [xue] and "reflecting" [si]" (Thinking Through Confucius, p. 43)
30. Analects 4.15 (Slingerland)
31. Both the interpretation and authenticity of this passage have been much discussed. The authenticity issue is discussed by Bryan Van Norden in "Unweaving the 'One Thread' of the Analects 4:15" in Bryan W. Van Norden, ed., Confucius and the Analects: New Essays (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002)
32. On the interpretive question, my view agrees closely with that of Philip Ivanhoe, "Reweaving the 'One Thread' of the Analects," Philosophy East and West 40, no. 1 (January 1990): 17-33
33. Ivanhoe ("Reweaving the 'One Thread' of the Analects," p. 20) characterizes shu as "a principle we use in the application of rituals." This closely reflects my own view
34. I do think that in a sense, the dao provides an ultimate standard. However, discussion of the dao is not foregrounded in the Analects, and one cannot meaningfully answer the question, "Does X accord with the dao ?" unless one has cultivated oneself through learning and reflection. Critics like Hansen are unlikely to be satisfied by such a standard, which is accessible only from an internal perspective
35. Analects 2.15. I have mixed terms from multiple translations to keep the English terms consistent throughout this section. 'Si' has been translated as both 'thinking' and 'reflecting.' 'Xue' has been translated as both 'learning' and 'studying.'
36. The quotes from this passage are from Slingerland's translation
37. Analects 9.3
38. Mencius 2A6, 6A7
39. Philip J. Ivanhoe, "Reweaving the 'One Thread' of the Analects," Philosophy East & West 40, no. 1 (January 1990): 17-33, p. 24
40. See, for example, Hansen, p. 99
41. The li are important because without social structure, one would lack a rich set of resources with which to express gratitude, show respect, or understand one's role and its associated expectations. See Herbert Fingarette, Confucius-The Secular as Sacred (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), especially chapter 1
42. David Backhurst, "Ethical Particularism in Context," in Brad Hooker and Margaret Little, eds., Moral Particularism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), p. 157
43. There are a variety of forms of particularism; Roger Crisp outlines three types (about rules, reasons, and motivations) in his paper, "Particularizing Particularism" (also in Moral Particularism). I am concerned here with particularism concerning rules, and the idea that a code of rules is insufficient to make proper moral judgments
44. Slingerland, p. 16, note 66
45. Analects 4.10 (Slingerland)
46. Analects 15.24 (Slingerland)
47. Analects 1.12. See also 2.2, 8.2, 9.11
48. For example, Analects 6.13, 13.18, 15.37
49. A.C. Graham, Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China (LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1989), p. 12
50. Analects 19.6 (Slingerland)
51. Hansen, pp. 90-91
52. Fingarette, Secular as Sacred, p. 20: "We may even think of li as the map or specific road-system which is Tao."
53. See, for example, Analects 8.9