메뉴 건너뛰기




Volumn 65, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 263-271

Collective authorship in film

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords


EID: 61049358892     PISSN: 00218529     EISSN: 15406245     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-594X.2007.00257.x     Document Type: Review
Times cited : (39)

References (15)
  • 1
    • 79954356747 scopus 로고
    • On Justifying Interpretive Norms
    • I would like here to anticipate an objection. Some may suspect that I am espousing a romantic notion of authorship that asserts the author as the sole authority over a text. This is not the case. Although authors have intentions when they produce their works, these intentions do not imply a singular meaning. E. D. Hirsch explains why clearly. He contends that the plurality of linguistic codes is too flexible to determine meaning in texts. In production, they require the presence of a human agent to choose between the several subcodes possible. This does not deny plurality in interpretation, but instead insists on intention in authorship and a relative competency with language. See E. D. Hirsch, Jr. "On Justifying Interpretive Norms," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 43 (1984): 89-91.
    • (1984) The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism , vol.43 , pp. 89-91
    • Hirsch Jr., E.D.1
  • 2
    • 0040766677 scopus 로고
    • Oxford University Press
    • Jack Stillinger argues that individual authorship does not occur even in literature. See his Multiple Authorship and the Myth of Solitary Genius (Oxford University Press, 1991).
    • (1991) Multiple Authorship and the Myth of Solitary Genius
  • 3
    • 84898235745 scopus 로고
    • Richard Shusterman sketches out many of these debates in "Interpretation, Intention, and Truth," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 46 (1988): 399-411. He then argues that (1) authors intentionally create works of literature and (2) numerous views can be held about these works without postulating that each interpretation constitutes a different text.
    • (1988) The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism , vol.46 , pp. 399-411
  • 4
    • 79954372030 scopus 로고
    • London: Routledge
    • The definition of utterance that I have in mind differs somewhat from what film scholars are accustomed to. John Caughie, in the introduction to the third section of Theories of Authorship (London: Routledge, 1981), states that the term 'utterance,' inflected by discourse theory, has come to mean something like the meaning of a statement not as given, but "in process at the moment of projection." An utterance is an "enunciating practice" that differs from a statement in the way that a product differs from a "producing activity" (pp. 201-202).
    • (1981) Introduction to the third section of Theories of Authorship , pp. 201-202
    • Caughie, J.1
  • 5
    • 0001098778 scopus 로고
    • Instead, in this article, I have in mind Paul Grice's notion of utterance from his "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions," The Philosophical Review 78 (1969): 147-177. For Grice, an utterance is an intentional (purposeful), meaningful expression.
    • (1969) The Philosophical Review , vol.78 , pp. 147-177
  • 6
    • 0347598302 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Cinematic Authorship
    • ed. Richard Allen and Murray Smith Oxford University Press
    • Paisley Livingston, "Cinematic Authorship," Film Theory and Philosophy, ed. Richard Allen and Murray Smith (Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 132-148; quote from p. 134, emphasis added.
    • (1997) Film Theory and Philosophy , pp. 132-148
    • Livingston, P.1
  • 8
    • 0011340258 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Livingston's definition seems to exhibit similarities to Paul Grice's analysis of an utterer's meaning. Grice's basic model of communication stipulates that "'U meant something by uttering x' is true iff, for some audience A, U uttered x intending: (1) A to produce a particular response r; (2) A to think (recognize) that U intends (1); (3) A to fulfill (1) on the basis of his fulfillment of (2)" (Grice, "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions," p. 151). This version of Grice's definition is his most basic with further, more complicated redefinitions being added to account for troublesome examples. Livingston's definition asserts Grice's premise, and his ensuing discussion echoes Grice's conditions closely. One of Grice's redefinitions aims to account for the lack of an audience at the production of the utterance. This is clearly an issue that needs to be examined closely at a later time but is beyond the scope and ambitions of this paper.
    • Utterer's Meaning and Intentions , pp. 151
    • Grice1
  • 9
    • 0001350294 scopus 로고
    • Utterer's Meaning and Intentions as well as his Meaning
    • For Grice's arguments, see his "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions" as well as his "Meaning," The Philosophical Review 66 (1957): 377-388.
    • (1957) The Philosophical Review , vol.66 , pp. 377-388
  • 12
    • 0005217458 scopus 로고
    • Shared Intention
    • 'Superagent' is Michael Bratman's term. See his "Shared Intention," Ethics 104 (1993): 97-113.
    • (1993) Ethics , vol.104 , pp. 97-113
  • 13
    • 0000312158 scopus 로고
    • Collective Intentions and Actions
    • eds. Philip R. Cohen, Jerry Morgan, and Martha E. Pollack London: MIT Press
    • John Searle, "Collective Intentions and Actions," Intentions in Communication, eds. Philip R. Cohen, Jerry Morgan, and Martha E. Pollack (London: MIT Press, 1991), pp. 401-415.
    • (1991) Intentions in Communication , pp. 401-415
    • Searle, J.1
  • 14
    • 2142735586 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • I will not rehearse Searle's arguments here. For his counterexamples and explanation of circularity, see his "Collective Intentions and Actions."
    • Collective Intentions and Actions


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.