Virtues of Junzi

Journal of Chinese Philosophy

Volumn 34, Issue SUPPL., 2007, Pages 125-142

  Cua, Antonio S ^a  

^a CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 61049284268     PISSN: 03018121     EISSN: 15406253     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6253.2007.00456.x     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (84)

1. See Antonio S. Cua, "Reflections on the Structure of Confucian Ethics," Philosophy East and West 21, no. 2 (1971): 125-40, incorporated in Dimensions of Moral Creativity (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1978), chap. 4
2. For an extensive discussion of the conceptual framework of Confucian ethics, see Antonio S. Cua, Moral Vision and Tradition: Essays in Chinese Ethics (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1998), essay 13
3. Cua, Dimensions of Moral Creativity, chaps. 2-4
4. James Legge, trans., The Four Books (Taiwan: Culture Book Company, 1981)
5. Fung Yu-Lan, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, trans. and ed. Derk Bodde (New York: Macmillan, The Free Press, 1948), 38-48
6. Homer H. Dubs, trans. with notes, The Works of Hsuntze (London: Arthur Probsthian, 1928)
7. Wing-tsit Chan, trans., A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963)
8. Arthur Waley, trans., The Analects of Confucius (New York: The Modern Library, 1938)
9. D. C. Lau, trans., Confucius: The Analects (Middlesex: Penguin, 1979)
10. Burton Watson, trans., Hsün Tzu: Basic Writings (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963)
11. Lionel Giles, Sayings of Confucius (London: John Murray, 1907)
12. Herbert Fingarette, Confucius: The Secular as Sacred (New York: Harper and Row, 1972)
13. Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985)
14. and Wm. Theodore de Bary, The Trouble with Confucianism (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1991)
15. The distinction between basic and dependent virtues is not the distinction between basic and subordinate virtues mistakenly attributed to me by Schoper, citing my earlier article: Antonio S. Cua, "Hsun Tzu and the Unity of Virtues," Journal of Chinese Philosophy 14, no. 4 (1987): 381-400
16. See Jonathan W. Schoper, "Virtues in Xunzi's Thought," in Virtue, Nature, and Moral Agency in the Xunzi, ed. T. C. Kline and Philip J. Ivanhoe (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000), 69-88
17. For elaboration of the relation between basic, interdependent virtues and dependent virtues, see Cua, Moral Vision and Tradition, essay 13
18. In Dimensions of Moral Creativity (51-57, 67-69), I considered ren as an internal criterion of morality and li as the external criterion. Since the application of li as rules of propriety is determined by yi, yi can also be regarded as an internal criterion, as it is an exercise of judgment concerning the applicability of li. Moreover, "just as jen (ren) cannot be practiced without li, or the cultural setting, jen cannot be realized without I (yi), or the judgment of the relevance of jen and li in concrete situations of moral performance." In Moral Vision and Tradition, based on a modification of Chen Daqi's work on Lunyu, I discussed the criteria for determining the central or fundamental concepts in the Lunyu
19. See Chen Daqi, Kongzi Xueshuo (Taipei: Zhengzhong, 1977)
20. See Antonio S. Cua, "The Concept of Li in Confucian Moral Theory," in Understanding the Chinese Mind: The Philosophical Roots, ed. Robert E. Allinson (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989), 209-35
21. For a more extensive account, see Cua, Moral Vision and Tradition, essay 13
22. Chen Daqi elaborates ren and yi as constituents of de: "The core of ren is ai (affectionate concern), thus ai is the main concern of ren. The fundamental nature of yi is appropriateness (yi), thus appropriateness is the main concern of yi. Consider xin (trustworthiness or being true to one's words). Because of affectionate concern for people, one will not allow people to be deceived. One's words must be suited to the action, and action must be suited to the words. This is the core of ren. In order to abide by fairness (zhongken), and for the sake of obtaining good results, one should adhere to xin only if such adherence is appropriate and should not adhere to xin if such adherence is inappropriate. This is the fundamental nature of yi." Chen goes on to distinguish ren and yi from particular virtues by way of the distinction between complete virtues (quande) from partial or incomplete virtues (piande). The former are said to be "perfect virtues free from any defects whatsoever. If a virtue has the ren element but does not possess the yi element, it can only be called a partial virtue" (Chen, Kongzi Xueshuo, 230). Chen's distinction is quite different from my distinction between basic interdependent and dependent virtues, for at issue is not completeness or possession of both ren and yi, but the ethical significance of particular virtues. In other words, in the absence of the connection to ren and yi, particular virtues may have non-ethical values and may well be commendable from the prudential point of view, provided, of course, they are not exercised contrary to ren and yi. As I will discuss shortly, Chen's distinction is valuable for elaborating my own
23. For further discussion, see Antonio S. Cua, Ethical Argumentation: A Study in Hsun Tzu's Moral Epistemology (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1985), 42-43, passim
24. and Antonio S. Cua, "The Problem of Conceptual Unity in Hsun Tzu and Li Kou's Solution," Philosophy East and West 39, no. 2 (1989): 115-34
25. incorporated in Human Nature, Ritual, and History: Studies in Xunzi and Chinese Philosophy (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2005). Note that Chen Daqi employs the same distinction in distinguishing "whole" and "partial virtues."
26. See Tianlun Pian, 381
27. Translations of Xunzi are provided by the author unless otherwise stated. Sections of the Xunzi and page numbers, as cited in this paper, refer to Li Disheng, Xunzi jishi (Taipei: Xuesheng, 1979), which was based on the standard Wang Xianqian's Xunzi jijie, 2 vols. (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1988)
28. See Jiebi Pian, 478
29. See also Tianlun Pian, 381
30. For the distinction between ideal norm and ideal theme, see Cua, Dimensions of Moral Creativity, chap. 8
31. See Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry Concerning Moral Good and Evil, 158
32. This is part II of An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue; in Two Treatises (London: J. and J. Knapton, et al., 1729), 158
33. In this translation, I read mei as meide, ethically admirable qualities or virtues. All translations of the Analects are by the author, unless otherwise stated
34. The interpretation proposed below is a reconstruction that makes no claim to being faithful to the original text. It draws some materials from two articles: Antonio S. Cua, "Confucian Vision and the Human Community," Journal of Chinese Philosophy 11, no. 3 (1984): 226-38
35. and Antonio S. Cua, "Reasonable Persons and the Good: Reflections on an Aspect of Weiss' Ethical Thought," in Philosophy of Paul Weiss, Library of Living Philosophers, ed. Lewis E. Hahn (La Salle: Open Court, 1995), 495-514
36. Here I discuss zhong and shu as distinct, supportive, and constitutive virtues of ren. This interpretation does not deal with zhong-shu as a pair, thus leaving open the interpretative issue. For a brief critical survey of different interpretations of zhong and shu as a related pair, see David S. Nivison, "Zhong and Shu (Loyalty, Reciprocity)," in Encyclopedia of Chinese Philosophy, ed. A. S. Cua (New York and London: Routledge, 2003), 882-85
37. See also David S. Nivison, "Golden Rule Arguments in Chinese Moral Philosophy," in The Ways of Confucianism: Investigations in Chinese Philosophy, ed. David S. Nivison and Bryan W. Van Norden (La Salle: Open Court, 1996), 59-76
38. See Lau, Confucius: The Analects, Introduction, xv. Note that Confucius occasionally paired zhong and xin (trustworthiness)
39. Xin is also an important dependent virtue. For an informative, historical survey, see Kwong-loi Shun, "Zhong and Xin," in Encyclopedia of Chinese Philosophy, ed. A. S. Cua (New York and London: Routledge, 2003), 885-88
40. Adopting this definition implies no commitment to Royce's conception of "loyalty to loyalty" as a supreme good. See Josiah Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty (New York: Macmillan, 1920), 16-17
41. Zhu Xi, Sishu Jizhu (Hong Kong: Taipingyang, 1980), 23
42. Presumably, these passages are partly the basis for Nivison's view that zhong is to be construed as "loyalty" as expressing the standard governing the conduct of an inferior to a superior or to an equal
43. For this reason, Chen Daqi endorses Zhu Xi's interpretation of zhong as jinji. This interpretation is plausible when we draw attention to its ethical basis in ren. See Chen, Kongzi Xueshuo, 236-37. See endnote 16 above
44. Zidao Pian, 651
45. See also 5.12: "Zigong said, 'While I do not wish others to impose on me, I also wish not to impose on others.' "
46. For a similar translation in Modern Chinese, see Mao Zishui, Lunyu Jinzhu Jinyi (Taipei: Shangwu, 1977), 248
47. This is Lau's gloss. Lau continues: "It is interesting to note that when Tzu-kung (Zigong) remarked that if he did not wish others to impose on him neither did he wish to impose on others. Confucius' comment was that this was beyond his ability." See Lau, Confucius: The Analects, 135, n. 7
48. For a discussion of the Confucian notion of reasonableness as contrasted with rationality, see Antonio S. Cua, The Unity of Knowledge and Action: A Study in Wang Yang-ming's Moral Psychology (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1982), chap. 4
49. and more generally, Antonio S. Cua, "Ideals and Values: A Study in Rescher's Moral Vision," in Praxis and Reason: Studies in the Philosophy of Nicholas Rescher, ed. Robert Almeder (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1982), 176-208
50. See Lunyu 12.12 and 15:23
51. See Robert Allinson, "The Confucian Golden Rule: A Negative Formulation," Journal of Chinese Philosophy 12, no. 3 (1985): 305-15
52. Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of View (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958), 316
53. Other renderings of yong are possible in different contexts, for example, "bravery, boldness, being daring, audacity, fearlessness." One passage (14.28) clearly says that a yong person has no fear (yongzhe buju). (See also 9.29.) I leave the translation issue open, since my discussion deals only with the relation of yong to ren, li, and yi
54. For the Confucian conception of shame, see Antonio S. Cua, "Ethical Significance of Shame: Insights of Aristotle and Xunzi," Philosophy East and West 53, no 2 (2003): 147-202
55. incorporated in Human Nature, Ritual, and History
56. Lilun Pian, 417
57. For a discussion of the three functions of li, see Cua, "The Concept of Li in Confucian Moral Theory." More extensive discussion of li and its connection with ren and yi is given in my Moral Vision and Tradition, essay 13
58. See Antonio S. Cua, "The Ethical and Religious Dimensions of Li," Review of Metaphysics 55, no. 3 (2002): 501-49
59. incorporated in Human Nature, Ritual, and History. A shorter version of the same title appeared in Weiming Tu and Mary Evelyn Tucker, eds., Confucian Spirituality, vol. 1 (New York: Crossroads, 2003), 252-88
60. For the notion of Confucian ethical tradition, see Cua, Moral Vision and Tradition, essay 12
61. Zhu Xi, Sishu Jizhu, 91. Author's translation
62. Zhou Yi. Chan renders jing as "seriousness" (Source Book, 264). Jing, rendered as "reverence" in the sense of "deep respect" for something or someone is a serious, attentive state of mind. This point is consistent with Graham's remark that the word jing, as used by the Cheng brothers (Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi), "cannot be translated by 'reverence" "; and Bruce's "seriousness" is utterly inadequate, although accusation can be made against Bruce, it is difficult to find a better alternative. The two aspects of ching are interdependent; to collect oneself, be attentive to the person or thing implies that one respects him or takes it seriously; and to be respectful implies that one is collected and attentive. But there is no English word which covers both, and the only course seems to use "reverence" for one and a different word for the other
63. See A. C. Graham, Two Chinese Philosophers: Ch'eng Ming-Tao and Ch'eng Yi-ch'uan (London: Lund Humphries, 1958), 69
64. Quanxue Pian, 19
65. Lilun Pian, 424: "Guiben zhiwei wen."
66. Lunyu, 9.4: "There were four things the Master refused to have anything to do with: he refused to entertain conjectures or to insist on certainty; he refused to be inflexible or to be egotistical" (author's translation)
67. The same remark in 9.29. On another occasion, Confucius said, "In the knowledge of letters and the arts, I may perhaps compare myself with other men. But as for the character of a junzi who carries out in his personal conduct what he professes - that is something to which I have not yet attained" (7.32)
68. Wang Mengou, Liji Jinzhu Jinyi, 2 vols. (Taipei: Shangwu, 1977), 1:301
69. For a critical discussion of the virtues associated with the five human relationships, see Antonio S. Cua, "Li and Moral Justification: A Study in the Li Chi," Philosophy East and West 33, no. 1 (1983): 1-16
70. For the notion of yi as appropriateness (yi), see Zhongyong, sec. 20 in Chan, Source Book, 104
71. For this notion of yi and its general significance as ruling on the relevance of moral rules to particular circumstances, see Antonio S. Cua, "Concept of Paradigmatic Individuals in the Ethics of Confucius," Inquiry 14, no. 1 (1971): 44-45
72. elaborated in Dimensions of Moral Creativity, chaps. 5 and 6. Similar interpretation may be found in Chung-ying Cheng, "Yi as a Universal Principle of Specific Application in Confucian Morality," Philosophy East and West 22, no. 3 (1972): 269-80
73. and Chen Daqi, Kongzi Xueshuo, chap. 3
74. See Zhengming Pian, 524
75. Rongru Pian, 55: "Shangren zhi yan, shenyu maoji."
76. Legge's translation of 2.15. For other passages on thinking and learning, see 15.31, 15.32
77. This is a revised Legge's translation of 15.9
78. See Antonio S. Cua, "The Possibility of Ethical Knowledge: Reflections on a Theme in the Hsun Tzu," in Epistemo logical Issues in Ancient Chinese Philosophy, ed. Hans Lenk and Gregor Paul (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 159-83
79. incorporated in Human Nature, Ritual, and History, essay 6
80. In my keynote address to the Eleventh Conference of the International Society for Chinese Philosophy held in Taipei in 1999, I mentioned other problems: "What is the role of the developing tradition as the background of Confucian ethics? To what extent can the ideal of dao or ren be concretely specified in a conceptual framework comprising ren, li, and yi? How are these fundamental notions to be further shaped to accommodate the evolving normative problems in the ethical life today and tomorrow, problems that are quickly acquiring greater transcultural and global significance? In the context of inter-traditional and/or intercultural ethical conflict, what degree of success can one expect from the employment of my proposed ground rules or transcultural principles of adjudication, such principles as non-prescriptivity or cultural integrity, mutuality, procedural justice, rectification, and reconsideration? (See Cua, Moral Vision and Tradition, essay 14.) Perhaps additional or other principles will do a better job in conflict resolution."
81. See Antonio S. Cua, "Problems of Chinese Moral Philosophy," Journal of Chinese Philosophy 27, no. 3 (2000): 269-85
82. See Cua, Human Nature, Ritual, and History, essays 4 and 5
83. Elizabeth Telfer, "The Unity of Moral Virtues in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (1989-90): 35-48
84. See Neera-Kapur Badhwar, "The Limited Unity of Virtue," Nous 30, no. 3 (1996): 306-29