Cinematic art

Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

Volumn 60, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 299-312

  Gaut, Berys ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 61049255236     PISSN: 00218529     EISSN: 15406245     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1540-6245.00077     Document Type: Review

References (28)

1. Noël Carroll, Philosophical Problems of Classical Film Theory (Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 4
2. Roger Scruton, "Photography and Representation" and "Fantasy, Imagination and the Screen," both reprinted in his The Aesthetic Understanding (London: Methuen, 1983)
3. and his "The Photographic Surrogate," reprinted in his The Philosopher on Dover Beach (Manchester: Carcanet, 1990)
4. Page references in the text of this section are all to the first of these essays. For critical discussion of Scruton's views on photography, see Robert Wicks, "Photography as a Representational Art," The British Journal of Aesthetics 29 (1989): 1-9
5. and William L. King, "Scruton and Reasons for Looking at Photographs," The British Journal of Aesthetics 32 (1992): 258-265
6. Though Scruton's work is not explicitly discussed by them, for points pertinent to his claims, see also Nigel Warburton, "Photographic Communication," The British Journal of Aesthetics 28 (1988): 173-181
7. and Barbara Savedoff, 'Transforming Images: Photographs of Representations," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 50 (1992): 93-106
8. Scruton actually discusses a famous case of Eisenstein's use of montage in Battleship Potemkin, a short sequence that is comprised of three shots of stone lions, the first asleep, the second with open eyes, the third rampant. He remarks that this is a powerful comment on the impotence of imperial splendor, but that this is achievable only because of the intentional juxtaposition of the images, which goes beyond a strictly causal relation (this is not a photograph of a stone lion roaring) (p. 125). The point is correct, but the concession that this is an instance of genuine cinematic commentary undermines his claim that "whatever representational properties belong to it [a film] belong by virtue of the representation that is effected in the dramatic action, that is, by virtue of the words and activities of the actors in the film" (p. 122)
9. Scruton also holds that cinema tends to induce a kind of fantasy, which is a nonaesthetic phenomenon (pp. 125-126; and "Fantasy, Imagination and the Screen")
10. For a critique of the claim that film as a medium somehow tends to encourage or be an expression of perversion, see my "On Cinema and Perversion," Film and Philosophy 1 (1994): 3-17
11. See Pudovkin, Film Technique and Film Acting, extracts from which are reprinted in Film Theory and Criticism, 5th ed., ed. Leo Braudy and Marshall Cohen (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999)
12. Strictly speaking, from the existence of a photograph, P, of O, it follows that O existed at or before the time P was taken, since it is possible to take photographs of stars that have ceased to exist by the time that their light reaches us. And the second claim should be construed so that though the photograph captures the appearance of O on film at that particular time, the appearance of O on film need not be the same as how it would appear to the naked eye
13. Note that a parallel point applies to intentionality in general, not just to intentions as a specific kind of intentional state. It is true that ideal (i.e., nonmanipulated) photographs do not necessarily stand in intentional relations to their subjects, because of the point of logical ontology that Scruton notes - and, hence, natural photographs are possible. But this is compatible with photographs, in addition to the purely causal relation in which they stand to their subjects, also contingently standing in intentional relations to them - that is, it is compatible with photographs conveying thoughts. And real-life nonmanipulated photographs do stand in such intentional relations
14. King also discusses some real-life examples of interest in photographs in respect of the manner in which they represent their subjects in "Scruton and Reasons for Looking at Photographs."
15. Further, attention to how a subject is presented by an artwork need not always be attention to a communicated thought that the photographer intended to convey. A photograph may present its subject in ways that the photographer did not intend - a high angle may make the subject look insignificant, for instance, even though the photographer was trying to exalt it. So certain features of modes of presentation need not always be intended, and therefore Scruton's equation between thoughts communicated and the artist's intentions breaks down
16. See my "'Art' as a Cluster Concept" in Theories of Art Today, ed. Noël Carroll (University of Wisconsin Press, 2000) for a defense of a criterial account of the concept of art
17. Arnheim, p. 8
18. Arnheim, p. 154
19. Scruton, "Fantasy, Imagination and the Screen," p. 129. Scruton in fact tends to run together the two distinct aspects of the objection that are disentangled above
20. In fact, Arnheim himself also writes at several points of capacities, rather than limitations, for example, on p. 111, so he was aware of the point made above. But my point is that his argument for the aesthetic inferiority of sound and color film requires him to think in terms of limitations, not in terms of capacities. Once we see this we can more correctly identify those deviations of cinema required for it to be an art
21. See George Wilson, Narration in Light: Studies in Cinematic Point of View (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 170
22. Lhe objection is due to Patrick Maynard
23. For one of the more promising attempts to specify this, see Crispin Sartwell, "Natural Generativity and Imitation," The British Journal of Aesthetics 31 (1991): 58-67
24. Lhis point should not be construed to hold that an agent only expresses x if the agent chooses to express x. One can express one's anger, for instance, unintentionally - one can let slip how annoyed one really is. Lhe point is simply that the agent must have control over the means of expression (e.g., facial expression, tone of voice), not that all expression is intentionally chosen
25. In a related point, Carroll notes that mechanical recordings can have expressive properties, such as matter-of-factness; see his Philosophical Problems of Classical Film Theory, p. 78
26. Note that this claim does not entail the truth of intentionalism about artistic meaning. First, thoughts are intentional states, but it does not follow from this that the agent necessarily intends to express the thought that his utterance in fact expresses - one can communicate both more and less than one intended. So though very often agents intend to express the thoughts that they do express, this is not necessarily so. Second, artistic meaning is a broad notion that encompasses many artistic properties beyond those that are happily assimilated to communicative content. (See my "Interpreting the Arts: Lhe Patchwork Theory," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 51 (1993): 597-609.) My point is that the agent must have control over the means of communication in order to express thoughts by means of them, not that all aspects of communicative content are intended
27. Also note that if communication occurs, it does not follow that only one person is doing the communicating: there are joint communications. So there is no requirement that all films have a single author. (In fact, I believe that mainstream films are always collectively authored: see my "Film Authorship and Collaboration," Film Theory and Philosophy ed. Richard Allen and Murray Smith (Oxford University Press, 1997)
28. Various versions of this paper were read to the Scandinavian Society of Aesthetics Conference; the British Society of Aesthetics Northern Region Conference; the Theoros Conference; the Aesthetics and Technology Seminar, Aberdeen; and the Film, Mind and Viewer Conference, Copenhagen. I am grateful to audiences at all of these meetings for their helpful questions, and also to Noël Carroll for his comments on the paper