Unknowableness and informational privacy

Journal of Philosophical Research

Volumn 32, Issue , 2007, Pages 251-267

  Matheson, David ^a  

^a CARLETON UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 61049245640     PISSN: 10538364     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5840/jpr20073237     Document Type: Article

References (20)

1. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York: Atheneum, 1967), 7
2. Fried, "Privacy," Yale Law Journal 77 (1968), 482
3. "Privacy and the Limits of Law," Yale Law Journal 89 (1980), 421-471
4. Uneasy Access: Privacy for Women in a Free Society (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1988)
5. Parent, "A New Definition of Privacy for the Law," Law and Philosophy 2 (1983), 306-307
6. Thomson, 'The Right to Privacy," Philosophy & Public Affairs 4 (1975), 304-305, n. 1
7. Parent, "Privacy, Morality, and the Law," 273
8. Cf. Gavison, "Limits of Law," 427
9. Parent, "Privacy, Morality, and the Law," 274
10. Parent, "Recent Work on the Concept of Privacy," American Philosophical Quarterly 20 (1983), 346
11. Cf. Allen, Uneasy Access, 22
12. Parent, "A New Definition," 308
13. Fried, An Anatomy of Values: Problems of Personal and Social Choice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), 140
14. And hence in violation of something like the second "quantity constraint" that, according to H. P. Grice, applies to rational conversational conduct: "Do not make your contribution more informative than is required." (Grice, "Logic and Conversation," in Grice, Studies in the Way of Words (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), 26.)
15. Gavison's "Limits of Law,"
16. see Thomas Nagel, "Concealment and Exposure," Philosophy & Public Affairs 27 (1998), 3-30
17. Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982), 15ff
18. Bok, Secrets, 11
19. In their "Hypocrisy and Privacy" (Journal of Philosophical Research 27 (2002): 610-618), Eldon Soifer and Béla Szabados argue that hypocrisy and privacy are, on moral grounds, harder to distinguish than one might suppose. Even so, hypocrisy's essential tie to intentionally fostered ignorance distinguishes it from privacy, whether informational or of some other sort: hypocrisy, like secrecy - or rather as one form of secrecy - "always hides" as well. This point is obscured by Soifer and Szabados's tendency to slide back and forth between the notion of privacy (which doesn't "always hide") and the protection of privacy (which does)
20. Allen, Uneasy Access, 21-22