Is information all we need to protect?

Monist

Volumn 91, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 151-169

  Meeler, David ^a  

^a WINTHROP UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 61049235581     PISSN: 00269662     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5840/monist200891117     Document Type: Article

References (25)

1. Louis Henkin, "Privacy and Autonomy," Columbia Law Review, 74 (1974): 1410-33
2. Joel Feinberg, "Autonomy, Sovereignty and Privacy," The Notre Dame Law Review, 58 (1983): 445-92
3. See William Parent, A New Definition of Privacy for the Law, Law and Philosophy, 2 (1983): 305-38
4. William Parent, Privacy, Morality, and the Law, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12 , 4 (1983): 269-88
5. William Parent, Recent Work on the Concept of Privacy, American Philosophical Quarterly, 20,4 (1983): 341-55
6. Judith Thomson, "The Right to Privacy," Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4 (1975): 295-314
7. See Judith DeCew, "The Scope of Privacy in Law and Ethics," Law and Philosophy, 5 (1986): 145-73
8. and Judith DeCew, In Pursuit of Privacy: Law, Ethics, and the Rise of Technology. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); also see Ferdinand Schoeman, Privacy and Social Freedom, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992)
9. Ruth Gavison, "Privacy and the Limits of Law," The Yale Law Journal, 89 (1980) 421-71
10. This definition shows up in each of Parent's papers from 1983. The definition is from William Parent "A New Definition of Privacy for the Law," p. 306; "Privacy, Morality and the Law," p. 269; and "Recent Work on the Concept of Privacy," p. 346. (All cited in n. 4, above)
11. William Parent, "Privacy, Morality, and the Law," p. 270
12. Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal.App. 285 (1931)
13. Whalen v. Roe 429 U.S. 589 (1976)
14. Judith DeCew, In Pursuit of Privacy, p. 73
15. Though such language may be reminiscent of Nagel's desire to protect public discourse from private pollutants, DeCew concentrates on the way in which keeping this information out of the public discourse protects the individual. See Thomas Nagel, "Concealment and Exposure," Philosophy and Public Affairs, 27, 1 (1998) 3-30
16. Ruth Gavison, "Privacy & Limits of Law," p. 428
17. Judith DeCew, Pursuit of Privacy, p. 76
18. Expressive privacy is identified with Schoeman's positive aspect of privacy for developing various socially intimate relationships, and so it is also closely tied to Nagel's selective intimacy. See Ferdinand Schoeman ed., Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), and Thomas Nagel "Concealment & Exposure," (cited in n. 15, above)
19. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
20. See Judith Thomson, "Right to Privacy."
21. See Louis Henkin, "Privacy and Autonomy," (cited in n. 2, above) and Joel Feinberg, "Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy."
22. Grinvold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
23. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty. Edited by Elizabeth Rapaport, (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1978), p. 9
24. I have argued elsewhere that religious groups should be allowed to enforce sanctions involving any and all similar behavior on followers, so long as the actions are not contravened by statutory law, whether publicly known or are kept as private observances within the faith. (See David Meeler, "Reasonable Sanctions for Reasonable Doctrines," Journal of Social Philosophy, 31, 2 [2000]: 153-59, p. 157.) At present, our concern is focused more on activities that go beyond legal limits
25. Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: the Political Seduction of the Law. (New York: Free Press, 1990), p. 99