Philosophical significance of Gongsun Long: A new interpretation of theory of zhi as meaning and reference

Journal of Chinese Philosophy

Volumn 24, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 139-177

  Cheng, Chung Ying ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII   (United States)

^b TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

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[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 61049232689     PISSN: 03018121     EISSN: 15406253     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6253.1997.tb00202.x     Document Type: Review

References (15)

1. In this essay my references to Gongsun Long are from the text of ((Gongsun Longzi Jijie)), compiled and annotated by Chen Zhu, The Commercial Press, Shanghai, 1937. I also consulted Professor Mou Zongsan's critical comments on various commentators, both pre-modern and modern, in his book ((Mingjia yu Xunzi)) Xuesheng Book Co. , Taipei, 1994.
2. In his specific explanation of the rise of names in the Zhengming chapter he has already introduced a political and social standard for the conventional set-up of names and hence would not tolerate any deviation from this standard But it can be also independently argued that free discussions of names can be the foundation for the establishment of an objective development and understanding of the standard of language use, which would explain all differences and deviations as possible variations within a framework of inquiry for truth and reality. Hence the two senses of rectifying names logical and moral, could be reconciled without subjugating one to the other. But this issue will be discussed in a separate paper.
3. Although ((Zhouli)) as a Confucian Classic is composed of three books, the ((Yili)), the ((Zhouguan)) and the ((Liji)), it is in the Zhouguan that one sees the nearly full formal presentation of the organization of governmental powers and administrative functions for a people in terms of satisfying and regulating their needs in orderly ways according to a scheme of harmonized relationships between heaven and earth and among five powers. One can see here an application of the cosmology and ontocosmology of yin-yang and wuxing to organization of government. One may call this a transformation of the natural order into a human or moral and political order (which is different from reading human meaning into a natural order such as in the Zhang Zai theory of ren cohumanity), the purpose of which is to establish an order of provision and control in the political and social sphere which would generate both validity and credibility. But in doing so one's attention is turned away from pursuing understanding of nature and becomes concentrated on the maintenance of the moral and political order and its authority. Regarding the dating of the formation of the book called ((Zhouguan)) it was recently argued that it was actually formed in the beginning of Han-perhaps at the time of Jia Yi (-200-168), for its ideas of controlling and suppressing commerce are similar to the Qin and early Han policies. Kuo Moju suggested that it was composed by disciples of Xunzi. The young scholar Peng Lin, instead suggested that it was somewhat later composed by followers of Xunzi in the beginning of Han. See Peng Lin, ((Zhouli zhuti sixiang yu chengshu niandai yanjiu)), Chinese Social Sciences Publishing House, Beijing, 1991.
4. One may raise the question whether moral collapse of social values would lead to intellectual free inquiry and whether free intellectual inquiry would lead to moral corruption of social values. It is true that the collapse of central authority which represents ultimate standard of values could lead to an intellectual emancipation process such as also exemplified in the collapse of the medieval church in the Western history, which led to the powerful free intellectual movement from Renaissance to Enlightenment, producing modern science, technology, industry and economical system as a result. But it need not be the case that the intellectual inquiry would necessarily contribute or conduce to a moral decay and a social disorder. Yet these propositions are propositions of contingencies which require disclosure and discussion of many factors and conditions and there is no necessary correlation of the rise and fall of intellectual movement with the fall and rise of morality. The relation between theoretical/ scientific reason and practical reason of morality is a serious topic which should engage our discussion from time to time.
5. Please see my article on Hui Shi for distinction between Hui Shi as a Scientific Daoist and Zhuangzi as a Metaphysical Daoist.
6. We should not forget that the Neo-Moists should be also considered an important branch of Mingjia in so far as they have engaged in the project of clarifying the nature of expression of meaning and reasoning in language. It is in this broad sense of Mingjia that we can come to see Mingjia deals with not only issues of rectifying names but also issues of logic and reasoning. We could also argue that it is in the Neo-Moist works mentioned earlier that a basic predicate logic with identity is defined and outlined.
7. I have formulated the term "onto-hermeneutics" as a theory of interpretation of reality as interpretation. In this theory interpretation always has ontological import because it is through interpretation that an ontology is to be displayed or explained. On the other hand, any ontological reference or predication must be understood through a system of interpretation.
8. In the Neo-Moist Canons these two principles on bici are recognized, leaving the question whether the Neo-Moist or GSL first formulated these principles and consequently whether one has influenced the other. But for the Neo-Moist, these principles apply in strict use of names (wei as yi) which are to be distinguished from saying or predicates (wei as ju). See Canons #31, #32, #80. In Zhuangzi's Qiwu Lun the relationship between 'this' and 'that' is conceived differently: Everything is either a 'that' or a 'this' but one determines on 'this' or 'that' from a relative distinction between 'this' and 'that'. Hence 'this' comes from 'that' and 'that' comes from 'this'. This gives reason for Zhuangzi to say that 'this' is 'that' and 'that' is 'this'. Hence there need not be a distinction between 'that' and 'this'. And one needs to transcend this distinction (because of its relativity and the mutual dependence of what is distinguished) and to reach the 'axis of the dao' (daoshu). In the experience of the daoshu one need not engage oneself or others in arguments, hence not to name and not to say and this is the way to respond to the infinite circles of argumentation.
9. It is clear that the Neo-Moist logic as found in the six essays including the Xiaoju chapter is founded in response to difficulties posed by the earlier philosophers of the School of Names such as GSL. GSL's arguments have provided an incentive to the Neo-Moist systematic exploration of the empirical and common usages of language which lead to their discovery of various categories of language use or semantical inferences as well as to their formulation of logical categories of language based upon abstraction of functions of language and reflections on the formation of language and discourses. This no doubt sets them on the right path toward formulation of a basic logic no less significant and no less systematic than Aristotelian logic by Aristotle. Apart from consi- dering the problem of inference arising from intentional context and predication, the Neo-Moist has also dealt with the problem of inference from union and intersection of two classes in considering such cases as whether "buffalo-horse (niuma) is buffalo or is not buffalo". It is clear that language use is not decided on the question on where buffalo-horse is or is not horse" which is unlike the case of predication that white horse is horse or the case of intentional action that killing a bandit-man is killing man in one sense and not killing a man in another.
10. In fact, I have argued for a tendency toward Platonic abstract ontology in GSL in an earlier paper of mine: "Kung-Sun Lung: White Horse and Other Issues'" in Philosophy East and West, Also consult my article in collaboration with my former student Richard H. Swain, "Logic and Ontology in the Chih Wu Lun of Kung-sun Lung Tzu", in Philosophy East and West, Volume 20, number 2, April 1970, 137-153.
11. We may also point out that a world of abstract entities won't match experiences of our world nor would the world of unrelated concrete objects match experiences of our world Hence a nominalist account of reality in our world is as much reductive and impoverishing as an abstract realist account of reality in our world. The genuine characteristic of this world as revealed in our language we come to develop and use consists in existence of things related via first-order predication and identity as a base.
12. It is important to point out that these three may not exactly correspond to Charles Peirce's triadic distinction between firstness, secondness and thirdness, but there is an interesting coincidence in seeing firstness in perceptual reference, secondness in objective reference and thirdness in intentional reference.
13. See the 6th question and answer in the Jianbai essay.
14. Mou Zongsan has made this suggestion in reference to the Buddhistic theory of dependent causation. See his book ((Mingjia yu Xunzi)) (School of Names and Xunzi) Taipei, 1994, page 178. Also consult his overall annotation of GSL and criticism of earlier commentaries.
15. See W V. Quine, ((Pursuit of Truth)), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1992, 50, 101.