The possibility of Sagehood: Reverence and ethical perfection in Zhu Xi's thought

Journal of Chinese Philosophy

Volumn 25, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 281-303

  Angle, Stephen C ^a  

^a WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 61049205160     PISSN: 03018121     EISSN: 15406253     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6253.1998.tb00514.x     Document Type: Article

References (54)

1. My thanks go out to Donald Munro, Brook Ziporyn, and Allen Wittenborn for their comments on earlier versions of this essay
2. Daoxue, literally "Learning of the Way", was a loosely-knit Confucian movement that began in the Song period (960-1279). Many of its members were interested in philosophical speculation. Tillman chronicles the rise of the group's most famous intellectual leader, Zhu Xi (1130-1200) in his Confucian Discourse and Chu His's Ascendency (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1992)
3. Thomas A. Metzger, Escape from Predicament: Neo-Confucianism and China's Evolving Political Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 73
4. Jing has been translated many different ways. Wing-tsit Chan's "concentration" is followed by Wittenborn, Munro prefers "reverential concentration", while Gardner uses "inner mental attentiveness". For further reading see Reflections on Things at Hand, translated by Wing-tsit Chan, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967)
5. Donald Munro, Images of Human Nature: A Sung Portrait (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988)
6. Zhu Xi, Further Reflections on Things at Hand, translated by Allen Wittenbom (Lanham: University Press of America, 1991)
7. Zhu Xi, Learning to be a Sage, translated by Daniel K. Gardner, (Berkeley: Univerisy of California Press, 1990). The root meaning of the term is "reverence", and it seems to me that so long as we remember that reverence is used here in a somewhat technical sense - the sense partially explicated in the present essay - then we are best off sticking to the simple solution of translating jing by the term "reverence". "Concentration" is equally simple, but strikes me as too pedestrian and missing the quasi-spiritual side of jing. This is shown when we speak of revering pattern (li) and allowing it to rule our lives, not just to concentrate on it
8. Kant, Bentham, Plato, and Hume, respectively, might serve as examples of each of these positions
9. See Munro, Images of Human Nature, p. 127. I render weifa and yifa as "unactualized" and "actualized", rather than the more conventional "unmanifest" and "manifest", in order to make clear that a feeling does not have to be manifested externally to be yifa. Once the feeling has come into being - once it has been actualized - then it is yifa
10. The Doctrine of the Mean is traditionally ascribed to Confucius's grandson, Zi Si. At least part of the text, though, including the sections with which I am here concerned, clearly belongs to a later era. See Yu-lan Fung, A History of Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), pp. 369-371
11. See Mencius 2A:6
12. Zhu Xi, Zhongyong zhangju (Annotations to the Doctrine of the Mean) in Si shu jizhu (Collected Annotations to the Four Books) (Shanghai: Shanghai Book Store, 1987), p. 2
13. I choose "pattern" to stand for li, rather than the more standard "principle", because "principle" is too narrowly cognitive. Li encompasses all aspects of harmonious interactions between things in the cosmos. Daoxue philosophers were never of the opinion that the patterns followed in such interactions could be captured in one or more "principles"
14. From Analects 7:30
15. See Zhu Xi, Zhuzi quanshu, vol. 45, p. 4a
16. translation adapted from Wingtsit Chan, A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 631
17. Metzger believes that the weifa stage comes after contact with things; he translates weifa as "imminent issuance". Zhu makes it clear that weifa precedes contact, though, for instance in a letter to Lin Zezhi where he refers to the need to cultivate one's weifa state as well as one's yifa state, he terms the former "prior to contact with things". See Zhu Xi, Zhuzi wenji (Collected Writings of Master Zhu) in Siku beiyao (The Essentials of the Four Treasuries) (Shanghai: China Press, n.d.), vol. 43, pp. 28b-29a
18. and discussion in Lai Chen, Zhu xi zhexue yanjiu (Research in Zhu Xi's Philosophy) (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1987), p. 119
19. I will discuss the ideas of this letter in more detail below. See Metzger, Escape from Predicament, pp. 85-87
20. Zhu Xi, Zhuzi quanshu, vol. 44, p. 3a
21. translation from Wing-tsit Chan, A Sourcebook, p. 628
22. Dardess gives several examples of writers who were quite pessimistic about the possibilities for ethical aciton. These men may well have been exceptions, though; I agree with Munro that the tone of Zhu's works is cautiously optimistic. See John W. Dardess, Confucianism and Autocracy: Professional Elites in the Founding of the Ming Dynasty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), ch. 3, and Munro, Images of Human Nature, pp. 286-287
23. Zhu Xi, Zhuzi yulei (Classified Conversations of Master Zhu) in Wenyuange Siku quanshu (Taibei: Commercial Press, 1983), vol. 9, p. 10b.
24. translation from Zhu Xi, Learning to be a Sage, p. 122
25. Cf. Lai Chen, Zhu xi zhexue yanjiu, p. 247
26. We will see another reason for Zhu to reject forced ethical action in Section IV: it can be a barrier to sagehood
27. Zhu Xi, Zhuzi quanshu, vol. 2, p. 22a
28. Despite this appearance, we will see that there is a sense in which the tranquil state itself can be an object of cultivation. See section IV below
29. Zhu Xi, Zhuzi wenji, vol. 64, pp. 28b-29b
30. See Lao Siguang, Xinbian zhongguo zhexue shi (A New History of Chinese Philosophy) (Taibei: Three People's Press, 1980), vol. 3A, pp. 294-295
31. Cf. Zhu Xi, Zhuzi wenji, vol. 43, p. 28b
32. Zhang Boxing, annotated, Jinsi lu jijie (Reflection on Things at Hand, with Collected Commentaries), originally compiled by Zhu Xi and Lu Zuqian (Taibei: World Press, 1980), pp. 34-35
33. translation from Wing-tsit Chan, Reflections on Things at Hand, p. 39
34. Zhu Xi, Zhuzi yulei, vol. 96, p. 3b
35. also Lao Siguang, Xinbian zhongguo zhexue shi, vol.3A, p. 299
36. "Personal" is preferable to "private" as a translation of si, since the issue is not whether the intentions are expressed openly, but rather whether they go beyond the self. The term "personal" fits well with the inner-outer distinction that Zhu finds important, while "private" emphasizes the version of the inner-outer distinction that he disregards
37. Zhu Xi, Zhuzi yulei, vol. 44, p. 49b
38. Qian Mu, Zhuzi xin xue'an (New Case Studies on Master Zhu) (Chengdu: Bashu Press, 1986), vol. 1, p. 588
39. Qian Mu, Zhuzi xin xue'an, vol. 1, p. 588
40. The first quote is from the Book of Changes; the second is from the Mencius 2A:2. See below for discussion of the latter
41. For further enlightening discussion of the need for the mind to be unified, see Zhu Xi, Further Reflections on Things at Hand, pp. 35-39 and 186. Wittenborn's suggestion of what Zhu may mean by saying that the mind is "absolute" (wu dui) complements my thesis quite nicely
42. Tang Junyi, Zhongguo zhexue yuanlun: yuan xing pian (Interpretation of Chinese Philosophy: Interpretation of "Nature") (Taibei: Student's Press, 1984)
43. Yang Bojun, annotated, Mengzi yizhu (Mencius, with Translation and Notes) (Hong Kong: China Press, Hong Kong Branch, 1984), p. 62, fn. 30
44. In fairness to Zhu, his interpretation does fit well alongside the very next passage in the Mencius, in which Mencius cautions his readers not to "help plants to grow" like the unfortunate man of Song who killed his plants by being over-eager
45. Zhang Zai, Zhang Zai ji (Collection of Zhang Zai's Writings) (Beijing'. China Press, 1978), p. 24
46. for a discussion of Zhang's understanding of sagehood, see Ira E. Kasoff, The Thought of Chang Tsai (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), ch. 4
47. Zhu Xi, Zhuzi yulei, vol. 9, pp. 6a-b
48. The interpretation of zhu yi considered in this paragraph is not the only possibility. It might mean that one should concentrate only on the event or thing with which one is interacting at the moment, forgetting all past feelings and desires and not looking forward to future feelings and desires. This focus on the moment should result in a non-selfish attitude towards the cosmos, since one would ignore one's future happiness and past resentments. Understood in this way, of course, Zhu's injunction to zhuyi is just more evidence for the interpretation of reverence that I have favored throughout the essay
49. Munro, Images of Human Nautre, p. 127
50. Ray Huang, 1587: A Year of No Significance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981)
51. Bernard Williams' critique of West utilitarianism, which inspired the present objection, is relevant to its target precisely because utilitarians do not believe that their course of moral education will radically transform people. They put their theory forward as simply a clarification of what should be expected of all people, all the time. See Bernard Williams and J. J. C. Smart, Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973)
52. and, for a reply, Peter Railton "Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality." Philosophy and Public Affairs vol. 13,(1984): 134-171
53. Cynthia J. Brokaw, The Ledgers of Merit and Demerit: Social Change and Moral Order in Late Imperial China (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991)
54. Yuan Huang was aware of the danger of purposeful activity: his Ledger included an injunction to collect merit and avoid demerit purposelessly. As his critics pointed out, though, it is hard to imagine someone conscientiously recording positive points for merits and negative points for demerits without becoming "attached" to the process and consciously aiming at building up a high number of points - especially since Yuan assured his readers that high totals would translate into worldly, material success. See Brokaw, The Ledgers of Merit and Demerit, pp. 123-126