Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind and the morality of memory

Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

Volumn 64, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 119-133

  Grau, Christopher ^a  

^a FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 61049198930     PISSN: 00218529     EISSN: 15406245     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0021-8529.2006.00234.x     Document Type: Review

References (19)

1. I will not be exploring the particular aesthetic and film-theoretic issues raised by Eternal Sunshine, but that certainly is not because I do not think they are worth exploring - there is much that could be said about this notable film. For example, others have pointed out that Eternal Sunshine seems to fit rather nicely within the genre of film that Stanley Cavell has made famous with the label "Comedies of Remarriage." See Cavell's Pursuits of Happiness: The Hollywood Comedy of Remarriage (Harvard University Press, 1981). Such films involve a separated couple ultimately getting back together through rediscovering why they fell in love in the first place. Eternal Sunshine follows that pattern, but with the novel twist of memory removal facilitating the "reunion."
2. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p. 43
3. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, p. 44
4. Christopher Grau, "Bad Dreams, Evil Demons, and the Experience Machine: Philosophy and The Matrix," in Philosophers Explore the Matrix, ed. Christopher Grau (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). My summary of Nozick's thought experiment here draws on my formulation in that essay
5. Charlie Kaufman, Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (The Shooting Script) (New York: Newmarket Press, 2004), p. 111
6. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (London: Macmillan Publishers, 1958), § 217
7. Colin McGinn, Eternal Questions, Timeless Approaches (New York: Barnes & Noble Audio, 2004). McGinn further explores this theme in "Being and Knowingness" (unpublished manuscript, 2005)
8. There is another less direct way in which this procedure brings on the threat of metaphysical isolation: if such a procedure were actually possible, the ordinarily farfetched skeptical worries that we may be radically wrong about our past become much less farfetched and much more worrisome. No one could be sure that they had not in fact had large portions of their lives erased at some earlier point. (This might be grounds for doubting that a utilitarian defense of such technology could ever be feasible, for it is hard to see how this sort of worry could be eliminated if the existence of the procedure became widely known.) The worry here is related to the skeptical worries regarding artificial memories that are raised by such films as Blade Runner (Ridley Scott, 1982) and Total Recall (Paul Verhoeven, 1990)
9. Thomas Nagel, "Death," in The Metaphysics of Death, ed. John Fischer (Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 64
10. Steven Luper, "Death," in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at 〈http://www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/death〉
11. Immanuel Kant, "Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals," in Ethical Philosophy, trans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1983), pp. 36-37, § 429
12. James Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2003), p. 136
13. Kant, Lectures on Ethics, p. 127
14. In a recent New York Times article, Anna Bahney points out that thanks to the dominance of email and digital photography, these days the mementos of a love gone sour can be "expunged with brutal efficiency" ("Zapping Old Flames Into Digital Ash," April 4, 2004)
15. Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of the Good (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), pp. 90-91
16. In an insightful article, Andrew Light has argued that the film The Conversation (Francis Ford Coppola, 1974) can be seen as supporting what Light calls a "substantive" thesis regarding technology. See "Enemies of the State," in Reel Arguments: Film, Philosophy, and Social Criticism (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2003). This thesis (originating in the works of Martin Heidegger, Michel Foucault, and others) involves the view that technology is not "value free" or morally neutral, but has an inherently ethical dimension. In particular, Light suggests that the surveillance technology employed in The Conversation is presented as corrupting its users. Light explains this corruption in terms of the alienation that is inevitably imposed by the technology: by its very nature the surveillance technology tends to objectify the person being surveyed. I think something similar could be said in favor of a "substantive" interpretation of Eternal Sunshine. The film presents the actual employment of the memory-removal technology as inevitably involving the depersonalization and manipulation of the patient. This in turn seems to lead to other moral infractions great and small: Patrick steals both underwear and Joel's girlfriend, Stan utterly fails to show respect for Joel as a patient, Mierzwiak uses the technology to evade responsibility for his affair with Mary, and so forth. Just as The Conversation suggests that surveillance technology corrupts the character of those utilizing it, Eternal Sunshine seems to suggest that memory removal technology is also far from morally neutral and brings with it a problematic attitude of objectification that infects those charged with controlling the technology
17. Robin Marantz Henig, "The Quest to Forget: Drugs to Prevent Painful Memories," The New York Times April 4, 2004
18. This report, Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Happiness, is available at 〈http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/beyondtherapy〉. Future references will be to page numbers only
19. Henig, "The Quest to Forget."