On quine's rejection of intensional entities

Midwest Studies in Philosophy

Volumn 28, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 209-225

  Jubien, Michael ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 61049198096     PISSN: 03636550     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-4975.2004.00092.x     Document Type: Article

References (10)

1. See "Steps toward a Constructive Nominalism," with Nelson Goodman, Journal of Symbolic Logic 12 (1947):105-122.
2. The paper appeared in the Philosophical Review in 1951 and was reprinted in Quine's well-known collection, From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953). Page references here are to the latter version.
3. Originally published in the Review of Metaphysics in 1948 and republished, with minor changes, in From a Logical Point of View. (References are to the latter version.)
4. It is reprinted in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969). Page references are to this printing.
5. P. 19. (Quine cites Carnap's Meaning and Necessity [Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1947], p. 23.)
6. For details, see "Propositions and the Objects of Thought," Philosophical Studies 104 (2001):47-62.
7. See "Speaking of Objects," p. 21 (quoted above)
8. and also "On What There Is," p. 9.
9. See Quality and Concept (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980). Unlike Quine, Bealer has no general aversion to intensionality.
10. I am grateful to Gina Calderone, Geoffrey Georgi, Jeffrey King, and George Wilson for helpful comments on an earlier draft.