A Kantian prescription for artificial conscious experience

Leonardo

Volumn 35, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 407-411

  Stuart, Susan A J ^a   Dobbyn, Chris ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW   (United Kingdom)

^b OPEN UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 61049187711     PISSN: 0024094X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/002409402760181213     Document Type: Article

References (16)

1. I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Norman Kemp Smith, trans. (London: Macmillan, 1929)
2. I. Alcksander, Impossible Minds (London: Imperial College Press, 1996)
3. See, for example, M. Bedau, "Philosophical Content and Method of Artificial Life," The Digital Phoenix: How Computers Are Changing Philosophy, T.W. Bynam and J.H. Moor, eds. (Oxford, U.K.: Basil Blackwell, 1998) pp. 135-152
4. and M. Boden, The Philosophy of Artificial Life (Oxford., U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1996)
5. A.M. Turing, "On Computable Numbers with an Application to the Entscheidungs Problem," Proceedings of the London Mathemalical Society 2, No. 42 (1937)
6. H. Hendricks-Jansen, "In Praise of Interactive Emergence or Why Explanations Don't Have to Wait for Implementations," Artificial Life IV, R.A.. Brooks and P. Maes, eds. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994)
7. A. Clark, "Happy Couplings: Emergence and Explanatory Interlock," The Philosophy of Artificial Life, M. Boden, ed. (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1996) pp. 262-281
8. L. Steels, "The Artificial Life Roots of Artificial Intelligence," C.G. Langton, ed., Artificial Life I (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994) pp. 75-110
9. J. Haugeland, Artificial Intelligence: The Very idea (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/A Bradford Book, 1985)
10. See, for example, D.E. Rumelhart and J.L. McClelland, "On Learning the Past Tenses of English Verbs," in Parallel Distributed Processing, Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition, Vol. 2: Psychological and Biological Models (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986)
11. R. Brooks, "Intelligence Without Representation," Artificial Intelligence 47, No. 1-3, 139-1.59 (1991)
12. P.E Strawson, The Bounds of Sense (London: Methuen, 1966) p. 24
13. P.F. Strawson contrasts descriptive metaphysics with revisionary metaphysics; the former addresses itself to "the actual structure of our thought about the world" rather than projecting an alternative and, in some sense, preferential version of the world itself. See P.F. Strawson, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (London: Methuen, 1959)
14. A. Brook, Kant and the Mind (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1994)
15. P. Kitcher, Kant's Transcendental Psychology (Oxford, U.K: Oxford Univ. Press, 1990) p. 206
16. J.A. Fodor and Z.W. Pylyshyn, "Counectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis," Cognition 28 (1988) pp. 3-71