Research on brain and spirit;Forschungen über Hirn und Geist

Deutsche Zeitschrift fur Philosophie

Volumn 52, Issue 6, 2004, Pages 891-920

  Detel, Wolfgang ^a,b  

^a Institut für Philosophie ^*

^b GOETHE UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 61049180012     PISSN: 00121045     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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